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GOLD EX REL GOLD V. UNITED HEALTH SERV. HOSP.1
(decided February 15, 2001)
.

SYNoPsIs

In a majority decision, the New York Court of Appeals held that
where a state or city social services agency is relying on unique recoupment provisions specific to Medicaid, Social Services Law § 104(2)
does not apply, therefore allowing state and city social services agencies
to place a lien on the entire amount of a personal injury judgment or
settlement.2 Furthermore, the court held that Social Services Law
§ 104(1) continues to be a recoupment mechanism when forms of
medical assistance other than Medicaid are involved and consequently
when public welfare officials rely solely on § 104(1), the limitation in
3
§ 104(2) continues to apply.
II.

BACKGROUND

Two issue-related proceedings were merged by the court of appeals for this decision. In the first case, Kimberly Santiago, an infant,
was allegedly poisoned by lead paint in her apartment 4 Kimberly's
mother sued the landlord on behalf of herself and Kimberly. 5 The
case settled for $140,000, and after the deduction of attorney's fees
and expenses, the Santiagos netted close to $90,000, which they proposed to deposit in a supplemental needs trust. 6 The New York City

Department of Social Services asserted a lien on the settlement proceeds to recoup the $12,877 in health care benefits that Kimberly had
received under Medicaid, and demanded that the lien be satisfied
before the Santiagos funded the trust.7 The Santiagos moved to vacate
the lien in the supreme court, and argued that Social Services Law
§104(2) prevents the City from recovering from an infant.8 The su1.

95 N.Y.2d 683 (2001).

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See id. at 691.
See id.
Santiago v. Craigbrand Realty Corp., 706 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dep't 2000).
Gold, 95 N.Y.2d at 687.
Id.
Id.
1&
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preme court agreed with the Santiagos and vacated the lien. 9 The City
appealed, and the appellate division reversed, holding that the City
may recoup wholly notwithstanding Social Services Law § 104(2).10
The appellate division concluded that because the Department for Social Services' right to recoupment did not come from New York Social
Services Law § 104(1), the limitations set forth in § 104(2) did not apply.1 1 The appellate division also granted the Santiagos' leave to appeal
12
to the court of appeals.
In the second action, Kathleen Gold suffered a grand mal seizure
during her pregnancy, and her baby, Abraham, was delivered prematurely by an emergency Caesarean section. 13 Abraham now suffers
from spastic quadriplegic cerebral palsy. 14 Kathleen Gold, on behalf
of herself and her child, sued her doctor and the hospital, alleging that
they negligently failed to treat the seizure. 15 The jury's verdict significantly exceeded $5,000,000; however, the parties had entered into a
"high-low" agreement during jury deliberations which provided a
$5,000,000 defense liability cap and a base amount of $450,000 that
plaintiffs would receive in the event of a defense verdict or a lower
award.16
Since his birth, Abraham has received Medicaid benefits for medical assistance and custodial care.' 7 The Broome County Department
of Social Services and the New York Office of Mental Retardation and
Developmental Disabilities asserted liens on the settlement proceeds to
recoup their expenditures in the amounts of $62,410 and $1,707,884,
respectively. 18 In the supreme court, the Golds moved for an order
proportionally reducing the liens according to the ratio the settlement
bore to the jury's verdict. Therefore, according to the Gold's proposal,
the supreme court would have allocated $103,000 of the settlement to
satisfy the liens fully, and the remainder would go toward attorney's
fees and a supplemental needs trust for Abraham.' 9
9.

Id.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 688.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

17.

Id.

18.
19.

Id.
Id.
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However, the supreme court rejected the Gold's motion and allocated the proceeds as follows: $705,359 for attorney's fees, $1,784,680
for the Medicaid liens, $2,173,626 for a reserve to pay for Abrahams
post-verdict medical and custodial care, and $336,335 for a supplemental needs trust for Abraham. 20 The Gold's appealed and the appellate
division affirmed, holding that notwithstanding Social Services Law
§ 104(2), the Medicaid liens must be fully satisfied. The appellate division held that since Medicaid's assignment, subrogation, and recoupment rights derived from New York Social Services Law
§§ 366(4) (h) (1), 367-a(2) (b), neither of which contain a provision
demonstrating an intent to treat infants differently regarding the recoupment of expenditures for their care, the trial court was correct in
deeming the entire settlement amount available to satisfy the Medicaid
liens. 2 ' Also, the appellate division held that the supreme court did
not abuse its discretion by reserving $2,173,626 for Abraham's postverdict medical and custodial needs.2 2 The court of appeals granted
23
the Golds leave to appeal.

III.

DISCUSSION

As mentioned above, the appellants in each case argue that the
appellate division erred by allowing the: Medicaid agencies to satisfy
the full amount of their liens from the settlement proceeds. Appellants
contend that because they are infants, Social Services Law § 104(2)24
25
prohibits the agencies from recouping their expenses.
The court of appeals began its discussion by addressing whether
27
Social Services Law § 104(1)26 and § 104(2) apply to the cases at bar.
20.

Id.

21.

Gold v. United Health Services Hospitals, 701 N.Y.S.2d 123, 126 (3d Dep't

1999).
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 127.
Id. at 123.
New York Social Services Law § 104(2) provides in pertinent part:

"No right of action shall accrue against a person under twenty-one years of
age by reason of the assistance or care granted to him unless at the time it
was granted the person was possessed of money and property in excess of
his reasonable requirements, taking into account his maintenance, educa-

tion, medical care and any other factors applicable to his condition."
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 104(2) (McKinney 2001).
25. Gold, 95 N.Y.2d at 688.
26. Id., N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 104(1) (McKinney 2001) authorizes public welfare
officials to bring proceedings against recipients of various forms of public assistance
who receive property within ten years after receiving such benefits.
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The court held that Social Services Law § 104(2), which restricts an
agency's ability to recover under § 104(1) when the public assistance
recipient is under 21 years of age, does not apply when the Medicaid
agencies are relying on Medicaid's own assignment, subrogation, and
28
recoupment provisions.
The court rejected the appellants' argument that Social Services
Law § 104(2) provides a blanket limitation on Medicaid's assignment,
subrogation, and recoupment provisions when the Medicaid recipient
is an infant. 29 Relying heavily on Baker v. Sterling, appellants contend
that Medicaid can only recover that portion of the judgment or settlement specifically designated for past medical expenses. 30 In Baker, the
New York City Department of Social Services attempted to recoup
from an infant's personal injury settlement the amount it had expended for the infant's medical assistance. 3 1 The Department relied
on the recoupment provisions in Social Services Law § 104(1). The
court in Baker concluded that § 104(2)'s limitation on recoupment
from infants under § 104(1) was applicable, and the Department of
Social Services could not recoup any portion of the settlement representing compensation for the infant's personal injuries since such
compensation could not be considered "money or property in excess
of his reasonable requirements." 32 Therefore, the appellants argued
that Medicaid can only recover that portion of the judgment or settlement specifically appropriated for past medical expenses.
However, the court noted that since it decided Baker, the relevant
regulatory scheme has undergone significant development, and Federal law now requires the states to "take all reasonable measures to
ascertain the legal liability of third parties to pay for care and services
available under the plan" and seek reimbursement from them. 33 Furthermore, the court noted that Congress and the Legislature have added unique Medicaid provisions pertaining to assignment,
subrogation, and recoupment. 34 And "as a condition of eligibility, ap27. Id.
28. See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 366(4) (h) (1) and § 367a(2) (b) (McKinney 2001);
N.Y. Comp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 360-7.4(a) (4), (6) (2002).
29.
Gold, 95 N.Y.2d at 690.
30. Baker v. Sterling, 39 N.Y.2d 397 (1976).
31.
Baker, 39 N.Y.2d at 400.
32.
Id. at 405; N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 104(2) (McKinney 2001).
33.
See Gold, 95 N.Y.2d at 690, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (a) (25) (A)-(B).
34. See Gold, 95 N.Y. 2d at 690 (citing Pub. L. 103-66, tit. XIII, § 13622, 107 US Stat
312 at 632; L 1981, ch. 319, §§ 1-2).
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plicants must assign to the appropriate Medicaid agency their rights to
seek reimbursement from third parties up to the amount of medical
assistance paid by Medicaid."35 As a result of the statutory scheme, the
court noted that the Medicaid agency "obtain all of the rights that the
recipient has against the third party to recover for medical expenses,
including the ability to immediately pursue those claims against the
36
third party."
In rejecting the appellants' argument, the court relied heavily on
the decisions in Cricchio v. Pennii 7 and Calvanese v. Calvanese.38 In
Cricchio, adult Medicaid recipients took a similar position to that of the
appellants'. 39 They argued that Social Services Law § 104(3), another
restriction on recoupment under § 104(1), limited the Department's
ability to place a Medicaid lien against a personal injury settlement. 40
The court of appeals, rejecting that argument, held "[t]he right to recover from responsible third parties at issue is not derived from § 104,
but rather from [Medicaid's own] assignment, subrogation, and recoupments provisions. Accordingly, any limitations found in § 104 are
4
not relevant here." '
The court of appeals reiterated this point in Calvanese, stating that
the Department of Social Services had "broad authority to pursue any
amount of third-party reimbursement to which [the recipient's] are
entitled" and that the Department's authority to enforce a lien is "cor42
respondingly broad".
Therefore, the court concluded that when Medicaid agencies are
relying on Medicaid's own assignment, subrogation, and recoupment
provisions, 43 the agencies have broad authority to satisfy the lien from
the entire amount of the personal injury judgment or settlement.4 4
35. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396k (a) (1) (A); 42 CFR 433.146 (c); N.Y. Soc.
SERv.LAw § 366 (4) (h) (1) (McKinney 2001); N.Y. COMP. CODES PR& REGS. tit. 18, § 3607.4 (a)(4) (2002)).
36. See id. (citing Cricchio v. Penisi, 90 N.Y.2d 296 (1997)); see also Calvanese v.
Calvanese, 93 N.Y.2d 111 (1999).
37. Cricchio v. Penisi, 90 N.Y.2d 296 (1997).
38. Calvanese v. Calvanese, 93 N.Y.2d 111 (1999).
39. See Cricchio, 90 N.Y.2d 296.
40. See Gold, 95 N.Y.2d 683, citing Cricchio, 90 N.Y.2d at 305.
41. Id.
42. Calvanese, 93 N.Y.2d 117 n.38 (1999).
43. See Gold, 95 N.Y.2d 683 n.40 (citing N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 366(4) (h) (1); § 367a(2) (b) (McKinney 2001); 18 N.Y.C.R.R. 360-7.4(a) (4), (6) (2002)).
44. Id. at 691.
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The court went on to say that its holding does not read the limitadon in Social Services Law § 104(2) out of existence. 45 Instead, the
court noted that § 104(1) continues to be a recoupment mechanism
46
when forms of public assistance other than Medicaid are involved.
Therefore, when public welfare officials rely solely on § 104(1), the
47
limitation in § 104(2) continues to apply.
Lastly, the court addressed the issue of whether the Supreme
Court abused its discretion in Gold by setting aside over $2,000,000
from the settlement proceeds as a reserve for Abraham's future medical and custodial needs. 48 The Golds argued that the court should
have placed these funds in a supplemental needs trust therefore preserving Abraham's continued Medicaid eligibility. 49 The court concluded that under CPLR 1206, the trial court has the discretion to
invest or disburse the proceeds of an infant's recovery if it serves the
infant's best interests. However, the trial court, without citing any authority, mathematically apportioned an amount of the settlement proceeds based on the proportional share of the various items in the jury's
verdict. The court of appeals remitted the matter to the supreme
court for exercise of its discretion pursuant to CPLR 1206 as to the
amount of the settlement proceeds to be placed in a supplemental
needs trust.50
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Gold, the New York Court of Appeals held that when Medicaid
agencies are relying on Medicaid's own assignment, subrogation and
recoupment provisions, they have broad authority to satisfy a lien from
the entire amount of the personal injury judgment or settlement.
Therefore, if Medicaid agencies are not relying on Social Services Law
§ 104(1), then the limitation on recoupment from infants in § 104(2)
is not applicable.
Haley A. Meade

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Gold, 95 N.Y.2d at 691.
Id.

SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION V.
BDO SIEDMAN, L.L.P.'
(decided February 20, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the NewYork Court of Appeals held that
a plaintiff cannot recover against an accountant for fraudulent misrepresentation made to a third party where the third party did not communicate those misrepresentations to the plaintiff, but where the
defendant knew that the third party was required to communicate any
negative information to the plaintiff and the plaintiff relied to his detriment on the absence of any such communication. 2 In addition, the
court held that a plaintiff may not recover against an accountant for
negligent misrepresentation where the plaintiff had only minimal direct contact with the accountant, but where the transmittal to the
plaintiff of any negative information the accountant reported was the
"end and aim" of the accountant's performance.
II.

BACKGROUND

This case was brought to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York by Securities Investor Protection Corporation ("SIPC") and James W. Giddens as Trustee ("Trustee") for the
liquidation of the business of securities broker-dealer A.P,. Baron &
Co., Inc. ("Baron") against defendant BDO Siedman, L.L.P.
("Siedman"), seeking damages for numerous state law causes of action,
including negligence, fraud, and breach of contract.
Defendant, Siedman, is an independent certified public accounting firm that audited financial statements for Baron for the years 1992
through 1995.3 In 1996, Baron filed for bankruptcy. In a subsequent
investigation it was revealed that Baron's management team had engaged in conduct that violated securities laws. 4 In a separate proceeding, thirteen of Baron's employees were convicted of crimes for
1.
2.

95 N.Y.2d 702 (2001).
Id.
3. Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. BDO Seidman, 49 F.Supp.2d 644, 647
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).
4. See id.
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activities they conducted while at the brokerage firm.5 Baron himself
6
pleaded guilty to one count of enterprise corruption.
Plaintiffs contended that Siedman was liable for their failure to
adequately audit Baron's financial statements for the years 1992
through 1995. Plaintiffs seek recovery for: "(1) Seidman's alleged multiple misrepresentations as Baron's certified public accountant; (2)
Siedman's failure to conduct a year-end audit of Baron in accordance
with generally accepted auditing standards ("GAAS"); (3) Seidman's
failure to disclose that Baron did not present fairly its year-end financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP"); and (4) Seidman's failure to comply with the rules
and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC")
governing the practices of independent certified public accountants
for SEC registrants." 7 Seidman's failure to disclose its lack of an adequate reporting system and internal controls to detect or prevent fraud
as Baron's certified independent accountant was one of the most damaging of Seidman's alleged acts.8 Furthermore, the plaintiffs' claim alleged that "Seidman's failure to disclose this information permitted
the Bressman Team to hide the true financial state of Baron." 9
The SIPC brought this action on its behalf and as the suborgee to
the net equity claims of Baron's customers, which were paid by SIPC.
This action was brought by the Trustee as "(1) bailee of the fund of
customer property entrusted to Baron by customers; (2) as assignee of
the rights and claims of customers whose net equity claims have been
paid by the Trustee; and (3) as the representative of the estate of
Baron in liquidation."1 0
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b) (1) and 12(b) (6). The United States District Court of the Southern District of New York granted both motions. l l
To have standing, "a plaintiff must allege a personal injury that is
fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
which is likely to be redressed by the requested relief."1 2 The court
held that the Trustee did not have standing. Under SIPC, a trustee is
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 647.
Id at 648.
Id.at 646.
Hirsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 72 F.3d 1085, 1091 (2d Cir. 1995).
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vested with the same power and title with respect to the debtor and the
property of the debtor, (including the same rights to avoid preferences) as a trustee in a case under Title 11.13 Thus, "when a bankruptcy trustee brings a claim, it stands in the shoes of the bankrupt
corporation and has standing to assert a claim that the bankrupt cor14
poration could have instituted had it not petitioned for bankruptcy."
The court concluded that since Baron pled guilty on one of the
counts, the Trustee had no standing to sue. However, the holding also
suggested that the Trustee could replead this claim to allege the existence of an innocent member of Baron's management who could have
prevented the fraud. 15
The court further held that SIPC did not have standing to sue
because it did not have the power to assert this claim on its own behalf
under § 78ccc(b) and because it did not have the subrogation powers
under § 78ffi to bring this claim against third parties. 16
The court further held that "plaintiffs failed to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (6)."17 In FirstFed. Savings and Loan Assoc. v.
Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., the court held that in order to plead a
claim for common law fraudulent misrepresentation properly, a plaintiff must allege the "misrepresentation of a material fact made with
scienter that induces reliance to the detriment of the party to whom
the misrepresentation is directed." 18 The plaintiffs could not make
such an allegation here because Baron's customers did not receive,
read, or review any financial statements certified by Seidman. Thus,
the court dismissed plaintiffs' claim for fraudulent misrepresentation
or common law fraud due to the absence of any allegation of reliance
on supposed misrepresentation. 19
The court also dismissed plaintiffs' claim for negligent misrepre1
sentation. 20 In Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 2 the court

held that a relationship sufficiently approaching privity must be established. To establish this relationship three criteria must be met:
13.

COMMERCE AND TRADE, 15 U.S.C. § 78 fl-I (2001).

14.

BDO Siedman, 49 F.Supp.2d at 650.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 654.
629 F.Supp. 427, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
BDO Siedman, 49 F.Supp.2d at 656.

20.

See id.

21.

65 N.Y.2d 536 (1985).
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(1) the accountant must have been aware that the financial reports were to be used for a particular purpose; (2)
in furtherance of which a known party or parties was intended to rely; and (3) there must have been some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them to the
allegedly relying party, evincing the accountant's under22
standing of that party's reliance.
The court held that since plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient "linking conduct" between Seidman and Baron's customers, they have
failed to state a claim for negligent misrepresentation on behalf of
SIPC in its own right or on behalf of Baron's customers. 23
Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. The Court of Appeals held that SIPC had standing to
sue on its own behalf, but not as subrogees of Baron's customers. 2 4
However, the court certified SIPC's claims for fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation to the New York Court of
Appeals.
The court found that SIPC had standing to sue as subrogee because "at common law, an insurer may be subrogated 'to any right of
action which the insured may have against a third person whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss,' and that nothing in the SIPA
exempted the SIPC from this general rule." 25 The court further held
that SIPC has standing to sue on its own behalf, disagreeing with the
district court's reasoning that if this ability is not in § 78ddd, then Con6
gress did not intend it.2
The court relied on the reasoning of the district court in dismissing the claim of fraudulent misrepresentation. However, the court
found that two prongs of the Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson &
Co. 2 7 test were not satisfied by plaintiffs' allegation. 28 The second criteria mandates that a "known party" must have relied on the reports. To
qualify as "known parties," under New York law, plaintiffs must be
members of "a known group possessed of vested rights, marked by a
definable limit and made up of certain components. '29 The court held
that because the reports were filed with the SEC and NASD, and that
22.
23.
24.
2000).
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

BDO Siedman, 49 F.Supp.2d at 656.
See id. at 655.
See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. BDO Seidman, 222 F.3d 63 (2d Cir.
Id. at 63, 68.
See id. at 69-70.
Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Anderson & Co, 65 N.Y.2d 536, 551 (1985).
BDO Seidman, 222 F.3d at 74.
BDO Seidman, 222 F.3d at 75.
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there was no allegation that Siedman knew Baron's investors, Baron's
customers did not comprise a group of "known parties," regardless of
whether it can be shown that they relied on these reports.
The court also found that the third prong, which requires a "linking conduct" between Seidman and Baron's customers sufficient to impose negligent liability on Seidman, of the Credit Alliance test was not
satisfied.3 0 The court held that "to demonstrate 'linking conduct,' a
plaintiff generally must show some form of direct contact between the
accountant and the plaintiff, such as a face-to-face conversation, the
sharing of documents, or other 'substantive communication' between
the parties."3 1 Thus, since no such "linking conduct" had been3 2demonstrated, this prong of the Credit Alliance test was not satisfied.
In regard to SIPC's claim on its own behalf for fraudulent and
negligent misrepresentations the court certified the following questions to the New York Court of Appeals:
1. May a plaintiff recover against an accountant for fraudulent misrepresentations made to a third party where
the third party did not communicate those misrepresentations to the plaintiff, but where the defendant
knew that the third party was required to communicate
any negative information to the plaintiff and the plaintiff relied to his detriment on the absence of any such
communication?
2. May a plaintiff recover against an accountant for negligent misrepresentation where the plaintiff has only
minimal direct contact with the accountant, but where
the transmittal to the plaintiff of any negative information the accountant reported was the "end and aim" of
the accountant's performance?3 3

III.

DISCUSSION

One issue that came before the Court of Appeals was whether
SIPC has a claim on its own behalf against Seidman for fraudulent mis34
representation and for negligent misrepresentation.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

(2001).

BDO Seidman, 49 F.Supp.2d at 656.
BDO Seidman, 222 F.3d at 75.
BDO Seidman, 49 F.Supp.2d at 656.
BDO Seidman, 222 F.3d at 81.
Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. BDO Seidman, 95 N.Y.2d 702, 709
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In its determination of whether the SIPC had a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation, the court stated that the "plaintiff cannot sustain a cause of action for fraud if defendant's misrepresentation did
not form the basis of reliance."3 5 The court further noted that SIPC
relied to its detriment on the implication of the NASD's silence, and
not on the representation from Seidman. The court concluded that
NASD has a significant role in choosing what information it wants to
36
receive and, in addition, what it deems worthy of communicating.
The court stated that in such a situation SIPC's reliance upon NASD's
silence cannot be equated with its reliance on any affirmative misrepresentation or concealment of material fact by Seidman. Thus, the court
held that the SIPC did not have a claim against Seidman or BDO for
37
fraudulent misrepresentation.
The next question the court addressed was whether the SIPC has a
claim on its own behalf of negligent misrepresentation.3 8 The court
identified three critical criteria for imposing liability. In deciding
"whether liability can be imposed by a non-privity third
party, we ask whether the accountant was aware that the
reports were to be used for a particular purpose, whether
in furtherance of such purpose a known party was intended to rely and, finally, whether there was some 'linking conduct'
which evinced the accountant's
39
understanding of that party's reliance."
The court held that there was no "linking conduct" that created a relationship of privity between SIPC and Seidman since Seidman's audits
were not prepared for the specific benefit of SIPC, were not sent to
SIPC, were not read by SIPC and, as a result, did not place SIPC in a
relationship significantly different from anyone else in the regulatory
community or the investing public at large." 40 Thus, the court held
that SIPC did not have a claim against Seidman for negligent
41
misrepresentation.

35.

Id.at 709.

36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 710.
Id.
Id.at 709.
Id. at 711.

40.
41.

Id.at 712.
Id.
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IV.

475

CONCLUSION

In BDO Seidman the New York Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff may not recover against an accountant for fraudulent misrepresentations made to a third party where the third party did not
communicate those misrepresentations to the plaintiff, but where the
defendant knew that the third party was required to communicate any
negative information to the plaintiff and the plaintiff relied to his detriment on the absence of any such communication. Furthermore, a
plaintiff may not recover against an accountant for negligent misrepresentation where the plaintiff has only minimal direct contact with the
accountant, but where the transmittal to the plaintiff of any negative
information the accountant reported was the "end of aim" of the accountant's performance.
Marina Rabinovich

CHASE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH, INC. V. MIA GROUP, NC.
1
GIUSEPPE GUGL[OTTA, V APOLLO ROLAND BROKERAGE, INC

(decided March 22, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

The Appeal in the first action was granted by permission of the
New York Court of Appeals, from an order of the Appellate Division,
Second Department.2 The order was entered May 15, 2000, which, inter alia, affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester
3
County, dismissing the complaint as time barred.
The Appeal in the second action was granted by permission of the
New York Court of Appeals, from an order of the Appellate Division,
Second Department. 4 The order was entered on July 31, 2000, which
modified, on the law, and affirmed ajudgment of the Supreme Court,
Rockland County, inter alia, granting a motion by defendants to dismiss the complaint against defendant Apollo Roland Brokerage, Inc. as
time barred.5 The modification reinstated a cause of action against an6
other defendant
II.

BACKGROUND

In the first case, plaintiff Chase engaged defendants, insurance
brokers, to procure property insurance for its business. Several
months later, a severe storm damaged plaintiff's warehouse and inventory.7 Defendant's moved to dismiss the entire action as time barred
under CPLR 214 (6), contending that the claim was one for malpractice, that it accrued on the policy date, and that more then three years
had elapsed.8 Plaintiff countered that the action was governed by the
six-year statute of limitations applicable to contract actions (CPLR 213
(2)), and that, even applying the three-year statute of limitations
1.

2.

95 N.Y.2d 762 (2000).
Chase Scientific Research v. NIA Group, 708 N.Y.S.2d 128, 129 (2d Dep't

2000).
3.
4.

Id.
Gugliotta v. Apollo Roland Brokerage, 712 N.Y.S.2d 398 (2d Dep't 2000).

5.

Id.

6.
7.
8.

Id.
Chase Scientific Research, 708 N.Y.S.2d at 129.
Id. at 129.
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(CPLR 214 (6)), the claim was timely because it accrued on the date of
loss. 9 The supreme court agreed with defendants and dismissed the
complaint. The appellate division affirmed.
In the second case, defendant Apollo, through its insurance
agent, procured insurance for plaintiff's commercial building.' 0 A
man slipped and fell in the building. Only after the accident did plaintiff discover that he lacked general liability coverage.'l After counsel
failed to appear, a default judgment was entered. 12 Claiming both
negligence and breach of contract, plaintiff commenced an action for
failure to procure adequate insurance coverage, which defendants
sought to dismiss as timed-barred under CPLR 214 (6). 13 As in Chase,
the supreme court determined that CPLR 214 (6) was the applicable
statute of limitations, rendering plaintiff's claims untimely, and the appellate division affirmed. 14 The court of appeals was left to determine
the applicable statute of limitations.
III.

DIscussIoN

Under CPLR 214 (6), a three-year statute of limitations is applicable in non-medical malpractice actions, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort. 15 The appeals before the
court raised the novel issue of who is "professional" within the section. 16 The question arises in the context of insurance agents and
brokers.
"Defining 'professional' is a task engaging many courts for many
purposes."17 The court's objective, as always in matters of statutory interpretation, is to "carry out the legislature's will." 8 This difficult task
was further convoluted because, in C.P.L.R. 214 (6), "malpractice" is
undefined and "professional" unmentioned.' 9
9. Id.
10. Chase Scientific Research, Inc. v. NIA Group, Inc., 725 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594 (Ct.
App. 2001).
11.
Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214 (6) (Consol. 2001).
16.
Chase Scientific Research, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
17. Id. at 165 (citing from Michael J. Polelle, Who's On First, And What's A Professional?, 33 U.S.F. L. REv. 205 (1999).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Professional is a term in wide usage, commonly understood to
have several meanings. 20 "For example, it denotes a measure of quality, as in professional dry cleaners; a distinction from trade or business21
people, and from amateur status, as in professional golfers." Most
likely, the legislature sought to award the protections of CPLR 214 (6)
on a relatively small group of defendants. Support for this proposition
lies in the fact that if their goal had been otherwise, the legislature
surely would have shortened the six-year breach of contract period to
22
three years for all contracts for services.
It was the legislature's intent that particular groups receive a benefit. In Karasek v. LaJoie, for example, the court refused, absent legislative clarification, to include licensed psychologists within the category
of "medical" services subject to the truncated limitations of CPLR 214a.

23

"The term 'professional' is also commonly understood to refer to
the learned professions, exemplified by law and medicine." 24 Doctors
were the original professionals granted with the two and three-year
malpractice statutes of limitation, and soon thereafter attorneys and
accountants enjoyed the same privilege. 25 In 1996, when CPLR 214
(6) was before the legislature for amendment, the New York State Bar
Association referred specifically to architects, engineers, lawyers or ac26
countants when speaking of professional malpractice.
To conclude, a "professional" is one who has had extensive formal
learning and training, is subject to licensure and regulation indicating
a qualification to practice, is bound by a code of conduct imposing
standards beyond those accepted in the marketplace, and is exposed to
a system of discipline for violation of those standards. 2 7 Furthermore,
a professional alliance is one of faith and trust, which entails a duty to
28
counsel and advise clients.
20.

Id.

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214 (6), book 7B at 214 (McKinney Supp. 2001).
Karasek v. LaJoie, 92 N.Y.2d 171 (1998).
Chase Scientific Research, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 597.
Id.
Legis. Rep. No. 76-B of N.Y. State Bar Ass'n., Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch. 623 at 13-

14.
27. In re Accounting of Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 34 N.Y.2d 1, 5-6 (1974); see
also BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 93 N.Y.2d 382, 389-390 (1999).
28. Murphy v. Kuhn, 90 N.Y.2d 266, 269-70 (1997); Kimmell v. Schaefer, 89 N.Y.2d
257, 262-63 (1996).
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The court was mindful that its definition ideally should establish a
bright line so that, absent legislative clarification, it can be fairly and
uniformly applied. 29 With the rise of large numbers of skilled "semiprofessionals," any broader definition would make it hard to draw
meaningful distinctions in the future, and the groups covered by CPLR
30
214 (6) would quickly proliferate.
A six-year statute of limitations is generally attached to breach of
contract actions.3 1 When the legislature amended CPLR 214 (6)to
affix a three-year limitations period to all non-medical malpractice actions, whether based on tort or contract, it ended one controversy but
unveiled another: who are the "professionals" whose malfeasance to32
ward clients is subjected to the abbreviated limitations interval?
In 1962, the legislature replaced the two-year limitations period
contained in Civil Practice Act § 50 (1) with CPLR 214 (6), bringing
the statute of limitations for malpractice actions in line with the limitations period for general negligence. 33 Leaving CPLR 214 (6) in place,
in 1975, in response to a perceived health care crisis affecting medical
malpractice insurance, the Legislature shortened the statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions to two and one-half years.3 4 This
again created a disparity among professionals as to their period of ex35
posure to a malpractice suit.

The court thereafter confronted non-medical malpractice claims
grounded on a breach of contract theory, and it exercised the six-year
contract statute of limitations.3 6 Common to all of these "contractual"
malpractice cases, the determinative factor of the court's analysis centered on the character of the claim asserted by the plaintiffs-tort or
contract-in deciding the befitting statute of limitations. 37 "While the
cases involved architects, lawyers and insurance brokers, no issue was
29. Polelle, supra note 14, at 205.
30. Id.
31.
Kenneth R. Kirby, The Six Year Legal Malpractice Statute of Limitations: Judicial
Disruption of the Legislative Prerogative,66 N.Y. ST. B.J. 14 (1994).
32. Legis. Rep. No. 76-B of N.Y. State Bar Ass'n., Bill Jacket, L 1996, ch. 623 at 1314.
33. Sixth Report of Sen. Fin. Comm. on Revision of Civ. Prac. Act, 1962, N.Y.
Legis. Doc., No. 8, at 92-93.
34. Bleiler v. Bodnar, 65 N.Y.2d 65, 66-67 (1985).
Chase Scientific Research, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
35.
36. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 43 N.Y.2d 389 (1977); Video Corp. v.
Flatto Assocs., 58 N.Y.2d 1026 (1983); National Life Ins. Co. v. Hall & Co., 67 N.Y.2d
1021 (1986); Santulli v. Englert, Reilly & McHugh, 78 N.Y.2d 700 (1992).
37. Chase Scientific Research, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 596.
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raised-and none decided-as to whether those actors were capable of
malpractice within the contemplation of CPLR 214 (6)."s8
The legislature recently amended 214 (6) as a reply to the Sears
line of cases, in order to make clear that the limitations period in nonmedical malpractice claims is three years, "whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort." 9 The purpose of this change was to
curtail potential liability of insurers and corresponding malpractice
premiums, and to make the term in which all professionals would remain subjected to a malpractice suit more evenhanded. 40 It has been
said that "there is no rationale for subjecting professional malpractice
by an architect, engineer, lawyer, or accountant to a statute of limitations over twice as long as that applied to doctors, dentists and podiatrists."41 In addition, in Brothers v. Florence, the court concluded that
the amended statute applied retroactively to bar certain claims accruing prior to the effective date of the statute. 42
These two actions were brought to recover damages against insurance agents and brokers arising out of an alleged failure to provide
proper insurance coverage. 4 3 The court held that they are governed
not by the malpractice statute of limitations (CPLR 214 (6)) applicable
to "professionals," but by the limitations periods applicable to negligence actions (CPLR 214 (4)) and breach of contract actions (GPLR
213 (2)). 44
The court reversed in Chase, reinstating both causes of action, and
45
modified in Gugliotta, reinstating the breach of contract claim.
The court comes to the decision that insurance agents and brokers are not within the scope of CPLR 214 (6). Agents and brokers
must be licensed; but more importantly, they are not indebted to take
part in any expansive specialized education and teaching. 46 Contrasting, someone who has been habitually employed by an insurance company, agent or broker for at least one year during the three years
preceding the date of his or her license application may meet the re38. Id.
39.

N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214 (6), as amended by L 1996, ch 623.

40.

Letter from N.Y. State Ins. Dept.,July 16, 1996, BillJacket, L 1996, ch 623m at

9-10.
41.

Legis. Rep. No. 76-B of N.Y. State Bar Assn., Bill Jacket, at 13-14.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Brothers v. Florence, 95 N.Y.2d 290, 298 (2000).
Chase Scientific Research, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
Id. at 598.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 598.
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quirements to be a broker. 47 It is not untrue that lawyers, engineers,
architects and accountants can also get around the formal education
criteria of their corresponding fields, however, they must transcend far
higher obstacles. 48 Nor are insurance agents and brokers bound by a
standard of conduct for which discipline might be imposed.4 9 Moreover, as this court recently made clear, an insurance agent has a common-law duty to obtain requested coverage, but generally not a
continuing duty to advise, guide or direct a client based on a special
relationship of trust and confidence. 50 The main point is that insurance agents and brokers are held to high standards of education and
qualification, but these criteria are simply not as rigorous as those embraced as professionals within CPLR 214 (6).51
TV.

CONCLUSION

Thus, in both cases, the court concluded that "the actions against
defendant agents and brokers are governed not by CPLR 214 (6), but
by the limitations periods applicable to negligence actions (CPLR 214
(4)) and breach of contract actions (CPLR 213 (2)). ,,52 In Chase, the
plaintiff argues that its negligence cause of action should be reinstated,
regardless of whether or not CPLR 214 (4) is utilized. 53 The court
agreed. Both parties are in agreement as to the fact that that the plaintiff's action was commenced within three years of the accrual date for
the negligence claim. 54 The pertinent statute of limitation was the exclusive issue before the court in both cases.
Jennifer Cesarano

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

N.Y. INs. LAw § 2104 (c) (1) (B) & (C) (McKinney 2001).
Chase Scientific Research, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
See, e.g., 22 N.Y. C.R.R. 603 (attorney discipline).
Murphy v. Kuhn, 90 N.Y.2d 266, 269-70 (1997).
N.Y. INS. LAW § 2103-04.
Chase Scientific Research, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
Id. at 599.
Id.

KELLY V. SAFIR1
(decided March 22, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the NewYork Court of Appeals held that
judicial review of an administrative penalty is limited to whether the
measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed constitutes an abuse
of discretion as a matter of law.2 The court reversed and held that a
penalty must be upheld unless it is so disproportionate to the offense
as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness, thus constituting an abuse
3
of discretion as a matter of law.

II.

BACKGROUND

Two issue-related proceedings based on CPLR Article 78 were
merged by the Court of Appeals for this decision. 4 In the first case,
Petitioner Timothy Kelly was dismissed from his job as a police sergeant with the New York City Police Department after twenty-nine
years of service. 5 The specifications charged Kelly with violations of
the Patrol Guide and the Penal Law.6 Following a hearing, the Police
Commissioner determined that Kelly engaged in unauthorized off-duty
employment as a New York State Certified Instructor for Security
Guard Training.7 He also determined that Kelly issued and sold false
certificates stating that two armed security guards employed by Fortunoff had completed the required firearms training and, with intent to
defraud, offered the false instruments for filing with the State Division
of Criminal Justice Services. 8 As a result, Kelly was dismissed from service as a police officer.9
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Kelly v. Safir, 96 N.Y.2d 32 (2001).
Id. at 38.
Id. at 40.
Id. at 36.
Id.
Id. at 37; see also N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 175.40, 210.45 (Consol. 2001).
Kelly, 96 N.Y.2d at 37.
Id.
M
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Kelly commenced this proceeding seeking to annul the determination.10 After transfer from the supreme court, the Appellate Division, First Department, modified the determination "on the facts" by
vacating the penalty of dismissal and remanding the matter to respondent for the imposition of a lesser penalty." Although the appellate
division concluded that substantial evidence supported the determination, it found that the penalty of dismissal was disproportionate in view
of Kelly's service record and his numerous awards. 12 The appellate
division also indicated that the two security guards involved were licensed to carry firearms and were otherwise qualified for the certificates.' 3 The appellate division further noted that Kelly would lose his
pension as a result of the dismissal.
In the second case, Justin Meagher, a police officer with the New
York City Police Department, was assigned to a tour of duty with Officer Edward Ryan. 14 Meagher assisted Ryan in the April 1996 arrest of
complainant, Constantine Moratos, for a parking violation. 15 Moratos
later claimed that he was wrongfully arrested and that the two officers
used excessive force. 16 Ryan accepted a plea offer of command disci17
pline with a minimum penalty of forfeiture of five vacation days.
Meagher rejected the same offer and proceeded to administrative
trial. 18
The Administrative LawJudge found Meagher guilty of the charge
of using excessive force. The Police Commissioner adopted the findings and recommendations of the ALJ and imposed a penalty of forfei9
ture of ten vacation days.'
Meagher then commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding.
Upon transfer, the appellate division modified the determination "on
the law, the facts and in the exercise of discretion" by reducing the
penalty imposed to forfeiture of five vacation days. 20 Again, as in Kelly,
the appellate division noted that substantial evidence supported the
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.
Kelly v. Safir, 706 N.Y.S.2d 113 (lst Dep't 2000).
Id.
Id.
Kelly, 96 N.Y.2d at 37.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Meagher v. Safir, 707 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1st Dep't 2000).
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determination but concluded that the penalty was disproportionate to
the offense. 2 ' The appellate division determined that no record basis
existed for the different penalties accorded Meagher and Ryan. In addition, the court ruled that Meagher's election to pursue an administrative trial could not be used as justification for a higher penalty and
that since "petitioner's brief discloses that the Department has also
withdrawn its scholarship support for his law school tuition . .. the
22
penalty is disproportionate to the offense."

IlL.

DISCUSSION

The court of appeals began its analysis by describing the precedential weight that courts must afford administrative penalties and determinations: "Uludicial review of an administrative penalty is limited
to whether the measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed constitutes an abuse of discretion as a matter of law."2 3 The court noted
that the appellate division is subject to the same constraints with respect to administrative determinations as the court of appeals, namely,
"a penalty must be upheld unless it is 'so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense of fairness,' thus constituting an
24
abuse of discretion as a matter of law."
The court stated that such a determination involves consideration
of whether the impact of the penalty on the individual is so severe that
it is disproportionate to the misconduct, or to the harm to the agency
or the public in general.2 5 However, the court noted that the appellate division does not have discretionary authority or interest ofjustice
jurisdiction in reviewing the penalty imposed by the Police
26
Commissioner.
Further, the court emphasized the significant role of the Police
Commissioner in matters concerning police discipline. 2 7 The court
said that "great leeway" must be accorded to the Commissioner's determinations concerning the appropriate punishment in such matters,
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 423.
Id.
Kely, 96 N.Y.2d at 38; see also Featherstone v. Franco, 95 N.Y.2d 550, 554

(2000).
24. See Kelly, 96 N.Y.2d at 38; see also PeU v. Bd. of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 237
(1974); In re Vemey v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 94 N.Y.2d 779 (1999);Gillen v. Smith
Town Library Bd. of Trustees, 94 N.Y.2d 776 (1999).
25. Kelly, 96 N.Y.2d at 38; see also Pell, 34 N.Y.2d at 234.
26. Id.; see also Featherstone,95 N.Y.2d at 554.
27. Kelly, 96 N.Y.2d at 38.
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because the Commissioner, not the courts, must be held accountable
28
to the public "for the integrity of the Department."
Turning to the first action, Kelly, the court stated that the appellate division could not have modified the Commissioner's determination "on the facts." 29 The Court stated that the scope of the appellate
division's fact-review powers of an administrative agency determination
is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the determination. 30 The court reasoned that the facts were established at the disciplinary hearing and reconfirmed in the appellate division's
"substantial evidence" review, and that once established, the factual record on which the penalty was assessed was no longer subject to appellate alteration. 3 ' Specifically, the court stated that the appellate
division correctly noted that substantial evidence supported the Commissioner's determination. 32 The Commissioner determined that, in
exchange for money, Kelly falsely certified that the two men in question had successfully completed a mandatory state certificate course on
the use of deadly force and firearms, and that Kelly filed this false in33
formation with the State Division of Criminal Justice Services.
Further, the court stated that the appellate division ignored this
principle by relying on facts outside the record in concluding that
Kelly should not have been dismissed because, among other things,
the two security guards were "then currently licensed to carry firearms,
as well as qualified for the certificates in all other respects." 34 Such
facts were never raised directly before the administrative agency and
thus were not within the scope of the appellate division's review. 3

5

The

appellate division could not rely upon the post-determination submissions in its assessment of Kelly's penalty because, as the court noted,
"[t]he review of an administrative determination is limited to the facts
"3 6
and record adduced before the agency.
Furthermore, the court held that the appellate division erred in its
failure to apply the Pell standard in reviewing the penalty imposed by
28.

Id; see also In re Berenhaus, 70 N.Y.2d 436, 445 (1987).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Kelly v. Safir, 96 N.Y.2d at 38.
Id.
Id. at 38-39.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 39.

34.
35.
36.

Id.; see also Kelly v. Safir, 706 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1st Dep't 2000).
See Kelly, 96 N.Y.2d at 39.
Id.; see also Featherstone v. Franco, 95 N.Y.2d 550, 554 (2000).
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the Commissioner.3 7 The court criticized the appellate division for
substituting its own judgment in weighing the facts and their implications against Kelly's prior service record, stating that "[g] iving due deference to administrative proceedings and the Commissioner's
obligation to protect the integrity of our law enforcement community,
we cannot endorse the appellate division's balancing test."38
The court endorsed the Pell standard as the applicable standard of
law.3 9 Under Pell, factors such as the loss of a pension and length of
service might be significant in the consideration of whether a penalty
shocks "one's sense of fairness" where there is no "grave moral turpitude and grave injury to the agency involved or to the public." 40 The
court noted that this is not such a situation because Kelly issued false
certificates that authorized the two guards to carry firearms and permitted them to work security in a department store.41 The court stated
Kelly's misrepresentations undermined his credibility as a law enforcement officer and could have jeopardized public safety. Despite his
commendations and service, the court concluded that the penalty of
dismissal imposed by the Commissioner did not shock the judicial
42
conscience.
Similarly, in the second action, Meagher,the court held that forfeiture of ten vacation days is not so disproportionate as to shock "one's
sense of fairness" under the Pell standard. 43 The court first stated that
the appellate division erred by modifying the penalty "on... the facts
and in the exercise of discretion." 44 The court reiterated that the appellate division's powers are limited to fact review using the "substantial evidence" standard. 45 The appellate division held, and the court
agreed, both that there was substantial evidence that Meagher had an
unblemished disciplinary record prior to the incident and that Mea46
gher engaged in excessive force in the arrest of complainant.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Kelly, 96 N.Y.2d at 39.
Id.
See id.
See id.; see also Pell v. Bd. of Ed., 34 N.Y.2d 222, 233, 235 (1974).
Kelly, 96 N.Y.2d at 39.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 40; see also Pell, 34 N.Y.2d at 233.
Kelly, 96 N.Y.2d at 40; see also Meagher v. Safir, 707 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1st Dep't

2000).
45.
46.

Kelly, 96 N.Y.2d at 40.
Id.
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The court stated that although Officer Ryan forfeited five vacation
days as part of a plea arrangement, Meagher should have anticipated
the possibility of a harsher penalty in opting for an administrative trial:
"Given that the quid pro quo of the bargaining process will almost necessarily involve offers to moderate sentences that ordinarily would be
greater... it is also to be anticipated that sentences handed out after
trial may be more severe than those proposed in connection with a
plea.

47

Finally, the Court noted that there is no record evidence to support the appellate division's determination that the Commissioner imposed an additional penalty of forfeiture of Meagher's police
department law school scholarship as part of the sanction. 4 8 Thus, the
appellate division could not extend its powers of review to such facts
that were not presented before the administrative agency. 49 Accordingly, the court held that the appellate division erred in considering
this "fact" as part of the penalty imposed. 50
IV.

CONCLUSION

The New York Court of Appeals upheld the Police Commissioner's determination-which was remanded by the appellate division-ruling that the dismissal of an officer from duty after twenty-nine
years of service was not an abuse of discretion in light of the fact that
the officer, in exchange for money, falsely certified that two men had
completed a mandatory State Certificate Course on the use of deadly
weapons. In the second action, the court held that the forfeiture of
ten vacation days for an officer who elected not to plea-bargain, while
his partner plea-bargained for the forfeiture of only five vacation days,
was not so disproportionate as to shock one's sense of fairness. In both
cases, the court held that each penalty must be upheld because it was
not so disproportionate to the offense as to be shocking to one's sense
of fairness, and thus did not constitute an abuse of discretion as a matter of law.
Kostos Cheliotis

47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.; see also People v. Pena, 50 N.Y.2d 400, 412 (1980).
Kelly, 96 N.Y.2d at 40; see also Meagher, 272 A.D.2d at 114.
Kelly, 96 N.Y.2d at 40.
Id.

DJL REST. CORP. V CUY OF NEW YORK 1
(decided March 29, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the NewYork Court of Appeals held that
the Amended Zoning Resolution (AZR) of the City of New York did
not conflict with, and therefore was not preempted by the New York
State Alcoholic Beverage Control Law (ABC Law) 2 despite the exis3
tence of overlapping requirements of the ABC Law and the AZR.
II.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-appellants, DJL Restaurant Corp., doing business as "Shenanigans," WESJOE Restaurant Corp., doing business as "New York
Dolls," and 320 West 45h Street Restaurant, Inc., doing business as
"Private Eyes," are all establishments which provide adult entertainment in the form of topless dancing and which are all licensed to dispense alcoholic beverages. 4 In 1993, the NewYork City Department of
City Planning commenced a study on such establishments, which examined the impact they had on the quality of urban life.5 The study
concluded that such establishments had a negative impact on city life
includeding "increased crime rates, reduced property values, neighborhood deterioration and inappropriate exposure of children to sexually oriented environments." 6 In response to the study, the City of
7
New York amended its zoning ordinance.
The relevant section of the AZR required that establishments such
as those operated by plaintiffs would be restricted only to the city's
high density commercial zoning districts and manufacturing districts.8
Additionally, the amendments required that such establishments could
not operate within 500 feet of a school or place of worship. 9 The ABC
1. 96 N.Y.2d 91 (2001).
2. See id. at 91.
3.
4.

See id. at 97-98.
See id. at 93.

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

9.

See id. at 96.
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Law, on the other hand, had its own provisions concerning nudity and
alcohol and required only 200 feet in distance between such establishments and a school or place of worship. 10
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the City's amendments to the zoning laws were preempted by the State's ABC Law. 11
The City responded by filing a motion to dismiss. 12 On or about February 10, 1999, the Supreme Court, New York County treated the
City's motion as one for summaryjudgment and declared that the AZR
was not preempted by the ABC Law. 13 Plaintiffs appealed.
On April 13, 2000, in a memorandum decision, the Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the decision of
the lower court. 14 The appellate division found that the State's ABC
Law was "surely preemptive." 15 However, the court espoused that such
establishments were "[not] necessarily exempt from local laws of general application," simply because such establishments sell alcoholic
beverages. 16 The court continued that the City's amendments were
"local laws of general application with a legitimate governmental purpose."'1 7 Thus, any affect on licensed establishments were only "incidental, and not a result of an attempt by the [Ciity to regulate the sale,
distribution or consumption of alcohol."' 8 Additionally, the appellate
division rejected plaintiffs' constitutional argument that topless dancing is a protected form of entertainment. 19 The court recognized that
the court of appeals had upheld the constitutionality of the AZR with
20
respect to freedom of expression challenges.
Plaintiffs then appealed the issue whether the AZR was preempted
by the ABC Law to the New York Court of Appeals, pursuant to
C.P.L.R. 5601 (b). The court of appeals unanimously affirmed the appellate division's decision noting that "[a] liquor licensee wishing to
provide adult entertainment must do so in a location authorized by the
10.

Id.

11.

See id. at 92.

12. Id.
13. See DJL Rest. Corp. v. City of New York, 706 N.Y.S.2d 395, 395-96 (1" Dep't
2000).
14. See id. at 396.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See id.; see also Stringfellows of New York, Ltd. v. City of New York, 91 N.Y.2d
382 (1998).
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AZR - not because it is selling liquor, but because it is providing adult
entertainment."2 ' The court explained that while the AZR and the
ABC Law may "have some overlapping requirements [it] is merely peripheral and involves no more than.., a zoning ordinance's inevitable
22
exertion of some incidental control over a particular business."

Ill. DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiffs contended that the AZR conflicted
with and was therefore preempted by the State's ABC Law. In beginning its discussion the court reviewed the relationship between the legislative powers of the state and local governments.2 3 The court noted
that the local governments had only those powers to enact local laws
that the state's legislature had granted them and that zoning was an
exercise of such local lawmaking power.2 4 The court explained that
the state Constitution provides that "every local government shall have
power to adopt and amend local laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this constitution or any general law ... except to the extent
that the legislature shall restrict the adoption of such a local law." 25
The court continued that the legislative enactment of the Municipal
Home Rule Law 26 specifically authorized municipalities to establish
local laws for the "protection and enhancement of its physical and visual environment" and for "government, protection, order, conduct,
safety, health and well-being of persons and property therein."2 7 Furthermore, municipalities are authorized to "adopt, amend and repeal
28
zoning regulations," by virtue of the Statute of Local Governments.
Thus, the court concluded that given the constitutional and statutory
scheme, municipalities are authorized to enact zoning laws, unless
such laws are in conflict with state law, in which case they would be
29
preempted.
The court then discussed whether, and under which circumstances a local law would be preempted by the ABC Law. The court
identified two situations in which state preemption of a local law would
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See DJL Rest. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d at 97.
See id. at 98.
See id. at 94.
Id.
See id. at 94, (citing NY CONST. art. IX, § 2 (c) (ii)).
N.Y. MUN. HOME RuLE § 1 et seq.(West 1994 & Supp. 2001).
See DJL Rst. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d at 94.
Id.
See id. at 94-95.
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occur: first, where a local law directly conflicts with state law, and second, where the local law has invaded a field in which the state has
expressly or implicitly intended to occupy for full regulatory control.30
The court explained that an implied intent to occupy the field may be
apparent through "a declaration of State policy by the State Legislature
...or from the fact that the Legislature has enacted a comprehensive
and detailed regulatory scheme in a particular area."3 1 In such case,
the municipality would not be authorized to legislate unless clearly and
explicitly authorized.3 2 The court concluded that it was well settled
that the state implicitly intended to preempt the field with the enact33
ment of its ABC Law.
In this respect, the plaintiffs asserted that the AZR is unenforceable because it intruded in a field preempted by the ABC Law.3 4 Specifically, plaintiffs noted that the ABC Law has its own requirements as
to nudity in premises licensed to serve alcohol, and that the AZR requires an adult entertainment establishment to be located at least 500
feet from a school or place of worship where the ABC Law requires
only 200 feet.3 5 Accordingly, the plaintiffs contended that the AZR
36
conflicts with the ABC Law.
Conversely, the city argued that the AZR is a law of general application which applies to all adult entertainment establishments regardless of whether they sell alcohol. 37 Furthermore, the purpose of the
AZR is to mitigate the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments and that any consequence such regulations have on those
establishments which serve alcoholic beverages are merely
38
incidental.
In agreeing with the City, the court explained that the ABC Law
was enacted "to promote temperance in the consumption of alcoholic
beverages."3 9 Consequently, in regulating the sale and distribution of
30.
31.

See id. at 95.
See id. (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. Town of Red Hook, 60 N.Y.2d 99,

105 (1983)).
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

See DJL Rest. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d at 94.
Id.
See id. at 95-96.
See id. at 96.
See id. at 95-96.
See id. at 96.
Id.
Id.
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alcoholic beverages, the ABC Law preempts the field. 40 However, as
the court noted, alcohol is not land.4 1 Accordingly, the ABC Law and
42
the AZR are aimed at two completely separate activities.
The court espoused that a local government's enactment of zoning ordinances is one of its most important functions. 43 Relying on an
earlier decision, Matter of Frew Run Gravel Prods. v. Town of Carroll,44 in

which the court held that the "purpose of a municipal zoning ordinance in dividing a governmental area into districts and establishing
uses to be permitted within the districts is to regulate land use generally,"45 the court concluded that "t] he AZR does just that, and stands
in contrast to laws that regulate alcoholic beverages." 46 The court recognized that such regulation may "inevitably exert an incidental con47
trol" over the use or business such as those operated by plaintiffs.
However, such a local law of general application, directed toward legitimate local concerns, enforcement of which only incidentally trans48
gresses the preemptive field, will not be preempted.
By way of example, the court explained that a local law which
dealt "solely with the actions of patrons of establishments which sell
alcoholic beverages," was preempted by the ABC Law.49 In contrast,
such an establishment would not be excused from a local law "requiring smoke alarms in all business premises, or one forbidding dumping
of refuse on city sidewalks, or one prohibiting disorderliness."5 0 Here,
the court concluded that the AZR regulates the actual location of the
adult entertainment establishments regardless of whether or not the
establishments sell alcohol.5 ' The fact that the plaintiffs do in fact sell
alcoholic beverages brings them within both regulations; however,
each involves an "independent realm of governance."5 2 Thus, in order
to provide adult entertainment, the establishment must do so in a loca40.
41.

Id.
Id.

42. Id.
43. Id.
44.
45.
Town of
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

71 N.Y.2d 126 (1987).
See DJL Restaurant Corp., 96 N.Y.2d at 96, (citing Frew Run Gravel Prods. v.
Carroll, 71 N.Y.2d 126, 131 (1987)).
See DJL Restaurant Corp., 96 N.Y.2d at 96-97.
See id. at 97 (citing Frew Run Gravel, 71 N.Y.2d at 131).
See DJL Rest. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d at 97.
See id.; see also People v. DeJesus, 54 N.Y.2d 465, 471 (1981).
See DJL Rest. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d at 97; see also DeJesus, 54 N.Y.2d at 471.
See DJL Rest. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d at 97.
See id.
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tion as specified by the AZR.53 Similarly, in order to dispatch alcoholic
54
beverages, a licensee must do so in accordance with the ABC Law.
The fact that some provisions may overlap is "merely peripheral" and
involves no greater control over the business than the situation de55
scribed in Matter of Frew Run Gravel.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The New York Court of Appeals held that the amended zoning
regulation of the City of New York did not conflict with the state Alcoholic Beverage Control Law and, therefore, was not preempted
thereby.56 The fact that there existed overlapping regulations was
merely peripheral and involved only an incidental control over the
57
licensees' businesses.
Richard W Gaeckle

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 97-98.
See id. at 91.
See id. at 97-98.

RANGOLAN V COUNTY OFNASSAU A
(decided March 29, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the NewYork Court of Appeals held that
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 1602(2) (iv) ("CPLR
1602 (2) (iv)")2 does not preclude a defendant from seeking apportion-

ment for non-economic damages among joint tortfeasors where liability arises from a breach of a non-delegable duty.3
II.

BACKGROUND

Neville Rangolan, plaintiff, was incarcerated at the Nassau County
Correctional Center ("NCCC") where he was seriously beaten by
Steven King, a fellow inmate.4 Rangolan and King were housed together by the Nassau County Housing and Assignment Unit even
though their information history forms stored in the NCCC's computer system indicated that the two should not be in contact.5 A
NCCC correction officer failed to notice the warning that King was not
to be housed with Rangolan. 6
Rangolan and his wife brought the following claims against Nassau
County and the Nassau County Sheriff's Department ("the County") in
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York: (i) a
§ 1983 claim,7 alleging a violation of Rangolan's Eighth Amendment
rights due to the County's deliberate indifference of his safety; (ii) a
negligence claim under New York law, for breaching duties to protect
Rangolan; and (iii) a claim for Mrs. Rangolan's loss of her husband's
services. 8 The District Court dismissed plaintiff's § 1983 claim, but
granted his motion for judgment as a matter of law on his negligence
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

96 N.Y.2d 42 (2001).
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1602(2) (iv) (McKinney 1997).
Rangolan, 96 N.Y.2d at 49.
Id. at 45.
Id. (Rangolan had cooperated as a confidential informant against King, and it

was feared that King would retaliate against Rangolan).
6. Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
8. See Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 51 F.Supp.2d 236, 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
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claim and ordered a trial on damages. 9 In addition, the District Court
denied the County's motion for judgment in the loss-of-services
claim.1 0
At the close of evidence, the County requested a jury instruction
concerning the apportionment of damages with King in accordance
with New York Practice Law and Rules § 1601 ("CPLR 1601").11 CPLR
1601 provides, in part, the following:
When a verdict.., in an action.., for personal injury is
determined in favor of a claimant in an action involving
two or more tortfeasors jointly liable.., and the liability
of a defendant is found to be fifty percent or less of the
total liability assigned to all persons liable, the liability of
such defendant to the claimant for non-economic loss
shall not exceed that defendant's equitable share determined in accordance with the relative culpability of each
person causing or contributing to the total liability for
non-economic loss .... 12
The County contended that, pursuant to this statute, the jury
should determine the culpability of the assailant. 13 However, the
plaintiff argued that the County is not entitled to the protection of
CPLR 1601 because CPLR 1602(2) (iv) makes CPLR 1601 inapplicable
where a defendant's liability arises by breach of a "non-delegable"
duty. 1 4 CPLR 1602(2) (iv) provides that "the limitations set forth in
this article [16] shall ... not be construed to impair, alter, limit, modify, enlarge, abrogate or restrict ... any liability arising by reason of a
non-delegable duty or by reason of the doctrine of respondeat
superior." 15
The district court denied the County's request that the jury should
determine the culpability of the assailant.' 6 The district court concluded that CPLR 1602(2) (iv) rendered apportionment under article
16 unavailable where the County's liability arose from a breach of a
9.
10.
11.
1997).
12.
13.
14.
15.
1997).
16.

See id. at 238.
See id.
See Ragolan, 51 F.Supp.2d at 233-234; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1601 (McKinney
Rangolan, 51 F.Supp.2d at 234; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1601 (McKinney 1997).
See Rangolan, 51 F.Supp.2d at 233-34.
See id.
Rangolan, 96 N.Y.2d at 46; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1602(2)(iv) (McKinney
See Rangolan, 51 F.Supp.2d at 235-236.
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non-delegable duty. 17 The court stated that the County's liability arose
by reason of a breach of its non-delegable duty to protect prisoners
within its custody. 18
The jury awarded Rangolan $300,000 in past pain and suffering,
$1.25 million in future pain and suffering, and $60,000 to Rangolan's
wife on her loss-of-services claim.1 9 On the County's motion for a new
trial, the District Court ordered a new trial on damages unless the
plaintiff agreed to a reduced award.20 The plaintiff accepted the
award, and both parties appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal of RangoIan's § 1983 claim.2 1 However, noting the absence of controlling
precedent interpreting CPLR 1602(2) (iv), the Second Circuit certified
to the New York Court of Appeals the following question:
"whether a tortfeasor such as the County can, in the
facts and circumstances of this case, seek to apportion its
liability with another tortfeasor such as King pursuant to
N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1601, or whether N.Y.C.P.L.R.
§ 1602(2) (iv) precludes such a defendant from seeking
22
apportionment."
III.

DIscussION

The New York Court of Appeals began its opinion with a discussion on the common law rule of joint and several liability.23 Prior to
the enactment of Article 16 of NewYork's Civil Practice Law and Rules,
"ajoint tortfeasor could be held liable for the entire judgment, regardless of its share of culpability." 24 However, the court stated that the
enactment of article 16 modified this common law rule by limiting a
joint tortfeasor's liability in certain circumstances. 25 Although "article
16 was intended to remedy the inequities created by joint and several
liability on low-fault, "deep pocket" defendants, it is nonetheless sub26
ject to various exceptions that preserve the common law rule."

17.

See id.

18.

See id.

19.

See Rtngolan, 51 F.Supp.2d at 238.

20.

See id. at 244.

21.

See Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 217 F.3d 77, 78 (2d Cir. 2000).

22.

Id. at 80.

23.
24.
25.

See Rangolan, 96 N.Y.2d at 46.
Id. (citing Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp., 79 N.Y.2d 540, 556 (1992)).
See id.

26.

Id. at 46.
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Therefore, the issue is whether CPLR 1602 (2) (iv) is such an exception
to the apportionment rule. 27 If it is, then the common law rule ofjoint
28
and several liability applies.
In determining whether CPLR 1602(2) (iv) was an exception to
the apportionment rule, the court began its analysis by stating that the
section preserves principles of vicarious liability. 29 CPLR 1602(2) (iv)
"ensures that a defendant is liable to the same extent as its delegate or
employee, and that CPLR article 16 is not construed to alter this liability."3 0 As an example, the court cited Faragianov. Town of Concord,3 1 a
case decided the very same day. In Faragiano,the court held that a
municipality that delegates a duty for which the municipality is legally
responsible (such as the resurfacing of its roads) to an independent
2
contractor remains vicariously liable for the contractor's negligence.A
Therefore, the town could not rely on CPLR 1601 to apportion liability
between itself and the contractor.3 3 However, the Rangolan court
noted that "nothing in N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 1602 (2) (iv) precludes a municipality, landowner, or employer from seeking apportionment between
34
itself and other tortfeasors for whose liability [it] is not answerable."
35
Next, the court analyzed the statutory scheme of CPLR 1602.
CPLR 1602 includes several exceptions to the apportionment rule, all
of which provide that article 16 shall "not apply" in certain circumstances. 3 6 However, CPLR 1602(2) (iv) does not contain this language.3 7 Rather, this section provides that the "limitations on liability
shall not be construed to impair, limit or modify any liability arising from
a non-delegable duty or respondeat superior."3 8 Therefore, the court
stated that "given the precise 'shall not apply' language chosen by the
Legislature to describe the exceptions, the absence of such language in
CPLR 1602 (2) (iv) indicates that the Legislature never intended to in27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
added).

See id.
See id.
See id at 47.
Id.
96 N.Y.2d 776 (2001).
See id.at 778.
See id.
Rangolan, 96 N.Y.2d at 47 (citing Faragiano,96 N.Y.2d at 777).
See id.
See id; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1602(3)-(11)(McKinney 1997).
See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1602(2) (iv).
See Rangolan, 96 N.Y.2d at 47; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1602 (2) (iv) (emphasis
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dude an exception for liability based on a breach of a non-delegable
duty."3 9
40
Finally, the court took a detailed look at article 16's purpose. If
CPLR 1602(2) (iv) were to be read as an exception, then it would impose "joint and several liability on municipalities, landowners and employers, who often owe a non-delegable duty or are vicariously liable
for their agents' actions." 4 1 These are "precisely the entities that article 16 was designed to protect."42 Construing CPLR 1602(2) (iv) as an
exception to the apportionment rule "would defeat the legislative goal
of benefiting low-fault, "deep-pocket" defendants by imposing joint
and several liability whenever a defendant's liability is based on a nondelegable duty or respondeat superior."43
After a detailed analysis of CPLR 1602 (2) (iv), the court concluded
that CPLR 1602 (2) (iv) does not preclude apportionment where a defendant's liability arises from a breach of a non-delegable duty.44 In
the process, the court rejected the interpretations of other New York
courts holding that CPLR 1602(2) (iv) creates a non-delegable duty exception to article 16. 4 5 The court stated that these cases did not involve "any meaningful analysis of CPLR 1602(2) (iv); rather, they
assume [d], without explanation, that CPLR 1602(2) (iv) precludes application of CPLR 1601."46

IV.

CONCLUSION

The New York Court of Appeals held that CPLR 1602 (2) (iv) is not
an exception to apportionment under CPLR article 16. 47 Rather, it is
48
a savings provision that preserves the principles of vicarious liability.
Therefore, CPLR 1602 (2) (iv) does not preclude the County of Nassau,
39.
40.
41.

Rangolan, 96 N.Y.2d at 47-48.
See id. at 48.
Id.

42.
43.

Id.
Id.

44. See id. at 49.
45. See id. (see, e.g., Nwvaru v. Leeds Management Co., 654 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1st Dep't
1997); Cortes v. Riverbridge Realty Co., 642 N.Y.S.2d 692 (2d Dep't 1996)).

46.

Id.

47.
48.

See id. at 48.
See id.
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based on the facts and circumstances of this case, from seeking
49
apportionment.
Adam Taylor

49.

See id. at 49.

HAMILTON V. BERETA U.S.A. CORP.'
(decided April 26, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the New York Court of Appeals held that
gun manufacturers do not owe shooting victims a duty to exercise reasonable care in the marketing and distribution of the guns they manufacture. 2 Additionally, the court held that liability against gun
manufacturers can not be apportioned on the basis of a market share
theory3
II.

BACKGROUND

In January 1995, two plaintiffs, relatives of people killed by illegal
firearms, 4 filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of NewYork against numerous handgun manufacturers. 5 They
alleged negligent marketing, design defect, ultrahazardous activity and
fraud. 6 A number of the defendants jointly moved for summary judgment and the court dismissed the products liability and fraud claims,
7
but allowed the plaintiffs to proceed on a negligent marketing theory.
Other parties intervened, including a plaintiff named Stephen
Fox, who was shot by a friend and permanently disabled.8 The gun was
never found and the shooter had no recollection of how he obtained
it. However, other evidence indicated that he purchased it out of the
trunk of a car from a seller who said it came from the "south."9
Eventually, seven plaintiffs went to trial against twenty-five gun
manufacturers.' 0 They asserted that the defendants distributed their
products negligently so as to create and support an illegal, underground market in handguns, one that supplied the weapons to the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Hamilton v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222 (2001).
Id. at 240.
Id. at 242.
See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1306, 1313 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 810 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
See Hamilton, 96 N.Y.2d at 229.

7. Id.
8. Id.
9.

10.

Id.

Id.
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shooters in this lawsuit." 1 Because only one of the guns was recovered,
the plaintiffs were permitted, over defense objections, to proceed on a
market share theory of liability. 12 They argued that the defendants
were severally liable for failing to use safe marketing and distribution
procedures, and that this failure sent a high volume of guns into the
13
underground market.
After a four-week trial, the jury returned a special verdict finding
that fifteen of the twenty-five gun manufacturers had failed to use reasonable care in the distribution of their guns. 14 Nine of the fifteen
were found to have proximately caused the deaths of the decedents of
5
two of the plaintiffs, but no damages were awarded against them.'
Damages were only awarded to the surviving shooting victim, Stephen
Fox, and his mother, Gail Fox, against three of the defendants-American Arms, Inc., Beretta U.S.A. Corp. and Taurus International Manu6
facturing, Inc.'
The jury calculated $3.95 million in damages for Fox's injuries
and $50,000 for his mother and apportioned liability to each of three
defendants based on their share of the national handgun market.' 7 As
a result, American Arms was found liable for 0.23 percent of the damages (or $9,200);18 Beretta was found liable for 6.03 percent of the
damages (or $241,200);19 and Taurus was found liable for 6.80 percent
of the damages (or $272,000).20
Following the verdict, the gun manufacturers unsuccessfully
moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 ' The district court offered several theories for imposing a duty on the defendants "to take reasonable steps
available at the point of their sale to primary gun distributors to reduce
the possibility that these instruments will fall into the hands of those
22
likely to misuse them."
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. at 229-30.
Id.
Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 41.
Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
Hamilton, 222 F.3d at 41.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Hamilton, 96 N.Y.2d at 230.
Id. (quoting Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 825 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)).
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The district court concluded that the gun manufacturers had the
unique ability to detect and guard against foreseeable risks associated
with their products, and that ability created a special "protective relationship" between the defendants and potential victims of gun violence.23 The court further noted that the relationship of handgun
manufacturers with their downstream distributors and retailers gave
them the authority and the ability to control the latter's conduct for
the protection of prospective crime victims.2 4 Relying on Hymowitz v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 25 the district court concluded that apportionment of
liability among the defendants on a market share basis was appropriate
and that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to connect Fox's shooting to the negligence of a particular manufacturer. 26
Following this decision, the defendants filed an appeal with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit claiming that
the district court erred in denying their Rule 50(b) motion. 27 The defendants argued that they did not owe a duty to the plaintiffs and that
absent such a duty they could not be held liable for failing to use reasonable care in the marketing of their handguns.2 8 They also asserted
that even if they did owe the plaintiffs a duty, apportioning liability on
a market share basis was impermissible under New York law.2 9
The Second Circuit concluded that the case presented questions
of duty and causation that required certification to New York's highest
court.3 0 Accordingly, the court certified the following two questions to
3
the New York Court of Appeals: '
(1) "Whether the defendants owed plaintiffs a duty to exercise reasonable care in the marketing and distribution of the handguns they
32
manufacture?"
(2) "Whether liability in this case may be apportioned on the market
33
share basis, and if so, how?"

23.

Id. (quoting Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 821).

24.

Id.

25.
26.
27.

See 73 N.Y.2d 487 (1989).
See Hamilton, 96 N.Y.2d at 230.
See Hamilton v. Beretta U.SA. Corp., 222 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2000).

28.
29.

Id.
Id.

30.

Id. at 39.

31.

Id.

32.
33.

Id.
Id.
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The New York Court of Appeals accepted the certification 3 4 and
35
answered both questions in the negative.
III.

DIscussION

The court began its analysis of the duty question by identifying
five factors that New York courts have traditionally used to balance the
duty equation. 3 6 First, the courts consider the reasonable expectations
of the parties and society in general.3 7 Second, the courts consider the
possible proliferation of claims. 38 Third, the courts consider the likelihood of creating unlimited or insurer-like liability. 39 Fourth, the
courts consider the issues of disproportionate risk and reparation allocation. 40 And fifth, the courts consider public policies affecting the
expansion or limitation of new channels of liability. 4 1 The court noted
that the duty determination required courts to be mindful of the precedential, consequential and future effects of their rulings and to limit
42
the legal consequences of wrongs to those that can be controlled.
The court also observed that foreseeability alone does not define
duty43 and that the expansion of duty is only appropriate when its so44
cial benefits will outweigh its costS.
In reviewing the district court's analysis, the court observed that
the district court imposed a duty on the defendants because they were
in a position "to take reasonable steps at the point of sale to primary
distributors to reduce the possibility that these instruments would fall
into the hands of those likely to misuse them."45 But the court cautioned against extending liability this far.4 6 Relying on D'Amico v. Christie, the court said that "[a] defendant generally has no duty to control
34. See Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 N.Y.2d 878 (2000).
35. See Hamilton, 96 N.Y.2d at 230.
36. Id. at 231 (citing Palka v. Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579, 586
(1994); Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399, 402-03 (1985)).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781, 785 (1976); Eiseman v. State of
New York, 70 N.Y.2d 175, 187 (1987)).
44. Id. at 232 (citing Waters v. New York City Hous. Auth., 69 N.Y.2d 225, 230
(1987)).
45.
Id. (quoting Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 825 (E.D.N.Y 1999)).
46. Id.
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the conduct of third persons so as to prevent them from harming
others, even where as a practical matter [the] defendant can exercise
such control." 47
The court did acknowledge that a duty could arise in cases when a
special relationship exists between a defendant and a third person. 48
It observed that courts have long recognized a duty of care in suits
involving a master and servant, a landlord and tenant, a parent and
child, and a common carrier and passenger. 4 9 However, the court said
that this special duty was limited to these specific classes of relation50
ships and held that it did not extend to the community at large.
In analyzing the relationship between the plaintiffs and defendants in this case, the court relied heavily on Waters v. New York City
Housing Authority.51 In Waters, the court held that the owner of a housing project did not owe a duty to a woman passerby to keep his building's door locks in good repair after she was dragged into the building
by an assailant and sexually assaulted. 52 The court said that imposing
such a duty would do little to reduce crime and that the social benefits
to be gained did not warrant extending a landlord's duty to maintain a
secure premises to the millions of people who use the sidewalks of New
53
York City each day.
Applying a similar rationale here, the court noted that imposing a
duty on the gun manufacturers would expose them to a very large pool
of possible plaintiffs-potentially, any of the thousands of victims of
gun violence each year. 54 The court concluded that the connection
between the gun manufacturers, criminal wrongdoers and the plaintiffs was too remote. 55 It held that such broad liability should not be
imposed without a more tangible showing that the defendants were a
direct link in the chain of events that resulted in the plaintiffs' injuries.5 6 Thus, the court ruled that even giving the plaintiffs' evidence
47. Id. (quoting D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76, 88 (1987); citing Purdy v. Public Adm'r of County of Westchester, 72 N.Y.2d 1, 8 (1988), rearg denied 72 N.Y.2d 953

(1988)).
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id. (citing Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 50 N.Y.2d 507, 518-19 (1980).
Id. (citing Waters v. NewYork City Hous. Auth., 69 N.Y.2d 225, 23-31 (1987)).

51.
52.

Id.
Id.

53.

Id. (citing Waters, 69 N.Y.2d at 230).

54.
55.
56.

Id.
Id. at 234.
Id.
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every favorable inference, they had not shown that the gun used to
harm Fox came from a source amenable to the imposition of a duty of
57
care upon the defendants.
The plaintiffs, relying on three cases involving hazardous materials, argued in the alternative that a duty did arise because the gun
manufacturers had a special ability to detect and guard against the
risks associated with their products. 5 8 But, the court observed that the
cases cited by the plaintiffs were based on products liability theory and
were therefore distinguishable. 59 In dismissing the plaintiffs' argument, the court noted that in this case "[the] defendants' products are
concededly not defective-if anything, the problem is that they work
60
too well."
The plaintiffs further argued that a duty of care arose out of the
gun manufacturers' ability to reduce the risk of illegal gun trafficking
by controlling the marketing and distribution of their products. 61 The
district court accepted this argument and suggested a number of
changes in the defendants' marketing procedures that might reduce
the chance that guns would reach the hands of criminals. 62 In rejecting the district court's rationale, the court noted that such changes
would have the unavoidable effect of eliminating a large number of
lawful sales to "responsible" buyers by "responsible" federal firearm
63
licensees.
The court observed that the plaintiffs presented no evidence
showing any significant statistical relationship between particular classes of gun dealers and gun crimes. 64 It said that imposing a duty of
care on gun manufacturers under these circumstances would conflict
with the Waters principle that a duty must be based upon an assessment
that the social benefits will outweigh the burdens and costs imposed by
57. Id.
58. Id. at 234-35 (citing Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480 (11th Cir. 1994);
Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1984); Flint Explosive Co. v.
Edwards, 66 S.E.2d 368 (Ga. 1951)).
59. Id. at 235.
60. Id.
61.
Id.
62. These proposed solutions included limiting the volume of sales to weak gun
control states to prevent firearms from reaching the illicit market; restricting distribution to established retail stores; franchising retail outlets; and barring sales at unregulated gun shows. See Hamilton, 96 N.Y.2d at 236 n.3.
63.
Id. at 235.
64.
Id.
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it.65 The court concluded that such a duty would create both an inde-

terminate class of plaintiffs and an indeterminate class of defendants
whose liability might have little relationship to the benefits of control66
ling illegal guns.
Completing its duty analysis, the court also rejected the plaintiffs'
final argument that because the gun manufacturers had authority over
their "downstream distributors and retailers" a duty arose under the
doctrine of negligent entrustment. 67 The court observed that negligent entrustment liability applies when a supplier of a potentially dangerous instrument has or should have reason to know that the receiver
of the instrument has a propensity for hazardous use.6 8 The court
noted that the plaintiffs failed to present any evidence that the gun
manufacturers had reason to know that specific distributors were engaged in the illegal gun trade. 69 Thus, it concluded that the plaintiffs
were attempting to impose a duty based on broad categories of lawful
sales that occurred within the entire gun manufacturing industry and
70
held that such an extension of duty went too far.
The court began its analysis of the market share question by reviewing Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly &? Co., the first case in which it examined
and adopted the market share theory of liability. 71 At the outset, the
court noted that market share theory is an exception to the general
rule, which states that a plaintiff must prove that a defendant's conduct
72
was the cause-in-fact of their injury.
The court acknowledged that in Hymowitz, plaintiffs who were injured by the miscarriage prevention drug DES were not required to
prove which drug manufacturer injured them. 73 But it observed that
market share liability was necessary in that case because DES was a fungible product and identification of the actual manufacturer that
caused the plaintiffs' injuries was impossible. 74 The court noted that
65.

Id. (citing Waters v. New York City Hous. Auth., 505 N.E.2d 922, 924 (N.Y.

1987)).
66. Id.
67.

Id. at 237 (quoting Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 821 (E.D.N.Y.

1999)).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
24 year

Id.
Id. at 240 (citing Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 73 N.Y.2d 487 (1989)).
Id.
Id. at 240-41.
Id. Approximately 300 drug companies produced DES and marketed it over a
period for the purpose of preventing miscarriages. The offspring of mothers
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market share liability was appropriate in the DES situation for three
reasons. 75 First, the manufacturers acted in a parallel manner to produce a generically identical product.7 6 Second, the plaintiffs manifested injuries many years after the product had been ingested. 77 And
third, the state legislature passed a special bill to revive DES claims that
78
would otherwise have been time-barred.
The court concluded that the circumstances in this case were
markedly different. 79 It held that, unlike DES, guns are not fungible
products;80 and that it is often possible to identify the caliber and manufacturer of the handgun that caused injury to a particular plaintiff. 81
The court further observed that the plaintiffs failed to assert that the
defendants' marketing techniques were uniform.8 2 The court distinguished the gun manufacturers' conduct from that of the defendants
in Hymowitz by noting that here the defendants engaged in a wide vari83
ety of market-based activity thereby creating varying degrees of risk.
Thus, the court concluded that a manufacturer's share of the national
handgun market did not necessarily correspond with the amount of
risk created by its conduct.8 4 While recognizing the difficulty in proving which manufacturer caused a plaintiff's injuries in gun crime cases,
the court held that the inability to locate evidence did not alone justify
85
the extraordinary step of applying market share liability.
Having answered both certified questions in the negative, however, the court expressed a willingness to revisit the issue. 86 As the
court noted in its conclusion, while the record before it was unconvincwho took the drug did not manifest cancer-related injuries until many years later. See
Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 503.
75.
76.

Id. at 240 (citing Hymowitz, 73 N.Y.2d at 507).
Id.

77.
78.

Id.
Id.

79.
80.
81.

Id.
Id.
Id.

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. (citing Healey v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 87 N.Y.2d 596, 601 (1996);
Matter of NewYork State Silicone Breast Implant Litigation, 631 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1t Dep't
1995), affjd, 650 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1" Dep't 1996).
86. Id. at 242.
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ing in this instance, whether a duty
would arise in a different case re87
mained a question for the future.
lV.

CONCLUSION

In Hamilton, the New York Court of Appeals held that gun manufacturers did not owe a duty of care to shooting victims injured by the
handguns they manufacture and distribute. 88 In addition, the court
held that the evidence in this case did not support the imposition of
market share liability on gun manufacturers. 8 9
Thomas E. Kemble

87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 242.

TENNESSEE GAS PIPELINE CO. V URBACEP
(decided May 1, 2001)
I.

SYNOPsis

In a unanimous decision, the New York Court of Appeals reversed
the Appellate Division and held that the Natural Gas Import Tax (Tax
Law § 189),2 which imposed a tax on the importation of gas into the
state for the importer's own use or consumption, violated the Commerce Clause.3 The court found that the law failed to provide any offand
setting credit for out-of-state taxes assessed against the importer
4
taxation.
double
incur
to
importer
the
cause
thus
would
II.

BACKGROUND

Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company ("Tennessee Gas" or "Company"), a natural gas pipeline company, transports its customers' natural gas through pipelines originating in Texas and Louisiana, passing
through New York, onto consumers in New England. 5 In order to
transport the gas through the pipes, the Company maintains a number
of "pumping facilities along its pipeline that increase the pressure on
the line. Ten of these facilities are located in New York. The compres6
sors are powered by natural gas... that is drawn off the line."
The New York Stdte Department of Taxation and Finance ("Tax
Department") determined that Tennessee Gas had failed to pay any
tax, under Tax Law § 189, on the natural gas compressor fuel consumed in New York State during the years 1991-1996 and assessed the
7
Company $1.6 million in back taxes, as well as interest and penalties.
The Company subsequently requested a withdrawal of the Tax Department's assessment, claiming that the tax violated the Commerce
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

96 N.Y.2d 124 (2001).
N.Y. TAX LAv § 189 (McKinney 2001) (to be repealed on Jan 1, 2005).
See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 96 N.Y.2d at 134; see also U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, ci. 3.
See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 96 N.Y.2d at 134.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 128-29.
See id. at 129.
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Clause of the U.S. Constitution.8 The Tax Department refused to withdraw its assessment. 9
Rather than bringing a proceeding before the state Tax Tribunal,
Tennessee Gas initiated a declaratory judgment action against the Tax
Department in New York State Supreme Court, contesting both the
Company's status as a "gas importer" under Tax Law § 189 and the
facial constitutionality of the law itself. 10 Tennessee Gas argued that
the tax discriminated against interstate commerce by imposing an unfair tax burden on out-of-state purchasers of natural gas consumed in
New York that was not equally shared by in-state purchasers of natural
gas.11
The Supreme Court granted the Tax Department's motion for
summary judgment, holding that Tennessee Gas had neither shown
the tax to be facially unconstitutional nor had it adequately pursued all
available administrative remedies before initiating its declaratory action. 12 Tennessee Gas appealed.
The Appellate Division affirmed the granting of summary judgment, 13 recognizing that the tax was in fact designed to "equalize[ ]
14
the tax treatment of out-of-state and in-state suppliers of natural gas."
The court reiterated that "taxing statutes enjoy a presumption of validity and the burden is on the party challenging the statute to demonstrate its unconstitutionality."' 5 Here, the court found that the factual
record was insufficient to sustain a facial attack on the law's constitutionality. 16 Moreover, the Appellate Division agreed that Tennessee
Gas should have pursued the necessary administrative remedies before
seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of the
tax law itself, since the Company's claim, according to the court, "is
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See Tenn. Gas PipelineCo., 96 N.Y.2d at 129; see also N.Y. TAX LAw § 189 (1) (b)
(McKinney 2001) (to be repealed on Jan 1, 2005) (defining a "gas importer" as "every
person who imports or causes to be imported into this state gas services which have
been purchased outside the state for its own use or consumption in this state.").
11. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 96 N.Y.2d at 129-30.
12. See id.; see also Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Urbach, 708 N.Y.S.2d 193, 195,
197(3d Dep't 2001), rev'd 96 N.Y.2d 124 (2001).
13. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. v. Urbach, 708 N.Y.S.2d 193 (3d Dep't 2001), rev'd
96 N.Y.2d 124 (2001).
14. Id. at 196.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 197.

2001-2002]

CASE COMPILATION

with the manner in which the [tax] was applied to its activities during
the tax years at issue." 17 Tennessee Gas appealed.
III. DIscussIoN
The Court of Appeals began its analysis with a brief inquiry into
the legislative purpose and practical effect of Tax Law § 189.18 The
court then considered the arguments set forth by both Tennessee Gas
and the Tax Department in light of the appropriate United States Supreme Court test for determining the constitutionality of a purported
compensatory tax such as § 189.19 The court held that, under Supreme Court jurisprudence, § 189 was indeed a valid compensatory
tax.2 0 However, the court ultimately determined that § 189 violated
the Supreme Court's "fair apportionment" test and was therefore an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.21
A.

The NaturalGas Import Tax (Tax Law § 189): Purpose And Effect

Tax Law § 189 was passed to close a tax loophole that had been in
existence since Congress deregulated the natural gas industry in
1978.22 Before deregulation, New York imposed two taxes on state natural gas utilities. First, Tax Law § 186 imposed a corporate franchise
tax of .75% on state public utilities formed for the primary purpose of
supplying natural gas through pipes.2 3 Second, Tax Law § 186-a assessed a tax of 3.5% on the "gross income" from the sale of natural gas
"for ultimate consumption or use" in New York. 2 4 The utilities, while
not allowed to disclose the existence of these taxes to consumers, ultimately passed the costs of both taxes onto their consumers in the form
25
of higher gas rates.
After deregulation, consumers in New York (primarily industrial
consumers) were able to bypass the higher rates charged by in-state
utilities by purchasing and importing natural gas from out-of-state
26
sellers.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
See Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 96 N.Y.2d at 127-28.
See id. at 129-33.
See id. at 133.
See id. at 133-35.
See id. at 127-29.
Id. at 127-28.
Tenn. GasPipeline Co., 96 N.Y.2d at 127-28.

25.
26.

Id. (noting the common phrase for such a tax is a "pass through" tax).
Id.
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Tax Law § 189 was designed to "recapture those taxes and to
'equalize' the tax burden on all consumers" 27 by imposing "'on every
gas importer a monthly privilege tax ... on the privilege or act of
importing gas services or causing gas services to be imported into this
state for its own use or consumption."' 28 The tax was therefore intended to bring equity into the tax structure by subjecting consumers
of out-of-state gas to a tax equivalent to those "pass through" taxes im29
posed upon in-state consumers.
B.

Analysis

As a preliminary matter, Tennessee Gas argued, and the Tax Department conceded, that § 189 discriminates against interstate commerce by assessing a specific tax exclusively on out-of-state purchases of
gas to be consumed in New York while not imposing the same tax on
gas purchased in-state. 30 Thus, the court agreed that under these circumstances, Commerce Clause jurisprudence demands that such a
31
facially discriminatory state law is "per se invalid."
However, the court noted that even discriminatory laws may still
be constitutional if they serve a legitimate state objective and no other
reasonable alternative exists to further that objective. 32 The Tax Department argued that just such an objective underlies Tax Law § 189;
that is, the tax compensates for the "pass through" taxes imposed upon
in-state purchasers of natural gas by §§ 186, 186-a, thereby equalizing
33
the tax burden among consumers of natural gas in New York.
To determine whether a compensatory tax, such as § 189, is consistent with the Commerce Clause, the court applied the United States
Supreme Court's analysis in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of
Environmental Quality.34 This analysis sets forth three criteria that a
27. Id. at 128.
28. Id. (quoting N.Y. TAX LAW § 189 (2) (a) (McKinney 2001) (to be repealed on
Jan 1, 2005)).
29. See id.
30. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 96 N.Y.2d at 129-30.
31. Id. at 130 (quoting Oregon Waste Sys. v. Department of Envt'l. Quality, 511
U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
32. See id. (citing Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 101).
33. Id.
34. 511 U.S. 93 (1994). In Oregon Waste, the State of Oregon imposed a differential fee structure for out-of-state and in-state solid waste disposal. Out-of-state waste was
subject to a $2.25 per ton fee while in-state waste was subject to only an $.85 per ton fee.
The Supreme Court held such differential treatment to be facially unconstitutional. See
id at 108.
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compensatory tax must satisfy in order to comply with the Commerce
Clause:
First, a compensatory tax must identify the intrastate tax
burden for which it attempts to compensate. Second, the
interstate tax must 'roughly approximate,' but not exceed, the amount of the tax on intrastate commerce.
Third, the events on which both taxes are imposed must
be 'substantially equivalent;' that is they must be sufficiently similar in substance to serve as mutually exclusive
'proxies' for each other.3 5
Regarding the first criterion, Tennessee Gas conceded that the
purpose of Tax Law § 189 was to "equalize" the tax burden on gas purchasers "regardless of the location of their gas source." 3 6
Tennessee Gas argued, however, that § 189 is not a valid compensatory tax under the second criterion because it does not 'roughly approximate' the amount of tax imposed on intrastate commerce by
§§ 186, 186-a, since the former is directly assessed on the importerconsumer while the latter are imposed on the utility-seller and then
passed through to the consumer. 3 7 Therefore, according to the Company, the two taxes are not "'imposed' on consumers in both in38
stances" and cannot be said to "roughly approximate each other."
The Tax Department contended, however, that under such a sce39
nario, the "economic incidence" of both taxes was the same.
Tennessee Gas responded that even assuming the "economic incidence" were the same, this kind of approach would require the court
to engage in a complicated, quantitative market analysis in order to
determine if the interstate tax burden 'roughly approximated' the intrastate tax burden; a difficult task that the court would not be
40
equipped to perform.
The court recognized that both taxes are assessed against the
same activity - the consumption of natural gas in New York. 4 ' Moreover, the court noted that since the "pass through" taxes are based on
income from gas sales - thus reflecting the cost of gas purchased in
New York - and are imposed on a receipt tax basis, they could never be
35.
511 U.S.
36.
37.

Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 96 N.Y.2d at 130 (citing and quoting Oregon Waste Sys.,
at 103).
Id. at 130.
Id. at 131.

38. Id.
39. I&
40. Id.
41.

Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 96 N.Y.2d at 131.
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less than the § 189 import tax on similar quantities of gas. 42 Therefore,
the "practical effect of the statutes is the same - consumers carry the
tax burden for the use of natural gas in New York."'43 Such an effect,
the court reasoned, relieves it of the need to engage in comparative
market analysis in order to determine whether the two taxes roughly
44
approximated each other for Commerce Clause purposes.
The court next considered the third criterion of a valid compensatory tax: whether the "events" upon which the taxes are imposed are
45
"substantially equivalent."

Tennessee Gas argued that § 186 and § 186-a are franchise taxes
(assessed against a corporation for the privilege of doing business in
New York) while § 189 is an import tax.46 Thus, the Company contended, the two taxes are imposed upon significantly different economic events.

47

In contrast, the Tax Department compared § 186 and § 186-a to a
sales tax and § 189 to a use tax. 48 Under this comparison, while "the
taxing events are different (purchase or use), they completely cover
one area of economic activity - the taxation of all tangible property
used or consumed within the State regardless of where the property is
acquired. '4 9 The court, however, was reluctant to approve such a classification because it would essentially create a new category of compensatory tax.50

Instead, the court noted that a new category was not needed,
since, as it had pointed out previously, the taxes concerned two "substantially equivalent" events: "the sale of gas in New York and the use of
imported gas in New York." 5 1 Yet, they were also "mutually exclusive;
the consumer either buys the gas in-State or imports it" - and therefore could not overlap. 5 2 The court held that Tax Law § 189 met the
third criterion for a valid compensatory tax because it concerned a
substantially similar economic event yet did not overlap with §§ 186,
186-a 53 so as to give rise to multiple taxation of the same transaction.
Consequently, the court determined that Tennessee Gas had failed to
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 132.
Id.
Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 96 N.Y.2d at 131.
Id.
Id. at 132-133.
See id at 133.
Id.
Id.
96 N.Y.2d at 131.
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overcome the Tax Department's showing that Tax Law § 189 was a
valid compensatory tax.
C. FairApportionment
Tennessee Gas' final Commerce Clause attack on the import tax
was based on the principle of "fair apportionment." 54 The purpose of
fair apportionment scrutiny is "'to ensure that each State taxes only its
fair share of an interstate transaction,'"5 thus reducing the prospect
of multiple taxation of a single interstate transaction.
To determine whether a tax violates the principle of fair apportionment - in other words, whether it is 'malapportioned' - the United
States Supreme Court uses either an "internal" or "external" consistency test.56 Tennessee Gas argued that Tax Law § 189 violated the
internal consistency test. 57 Under this analysis, a tax does not violate
internal consistency if
the imposition of a tax identical to the one in question by
every other State would add no burden to interstate commerce that intrastate commerce would not also bear.
This test ... simply looks to the structure of the tax at
issue to see whether its identical application by every State
in the Union would place interstate commerce at a disad58
vantage as compared with commerce intrastate.
A tax that violates internal consistency demonstrates that the sponsoring state is attempting to take more than its fair share of an interstate
transaction, in violation of the Commerce Clause.5 9
Under this test, the court assumed hypothetically that each state
had a tax identical to that of § 186.60 If a company such as Tennessee
Gas were then to buy gas in a state other than New York, it would be
though [it] exported the
subject to a similar "pass through" tax "even
61
gas to New York and consumed it here."
54.

Id.

55.

Id. (quoting Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989)).

56.

See id. (citing Oklahoma Tax Commn. v. Jefferson Lines, Inc. 514 U.S. 175,

185 (1995)).

57.

Id.

58.

Id. (quoting Oklahoma Tax Commn., 514 U.S. at 185).

59. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 96 N.Y.2d at 133; see also Oklahoma Tax Commn., 514
U.S. at 185.
60.

Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 96 N.Y.2d at 133-34.

61.

Id. at 134.
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The court concluded that under this scenario, § 189 caused the
importer to incur double taxation - first, at the point of purchase out
of state (through the out-of-state "pass through" tax) and second, at
the moment it is imported into and consumed in New York.6 2 Because
it provided no credit for an out-of-state tax imposed on the purchase of
gas out of state but imported into New York, Tax Law § 189 violated
63
internal consistency.
The court rejected the Tax Department's argument that a provision in the tax law - apparently anticipating such a problem - which
would allow a court to formulate an offsetting credit for any out-ofstate tax incurred, effectively "saves" the law from being judged unconstitutional. 64 The court found the provision invalid because it calls for
the judiciary to assume legislative powers - by rewriting the law in order to save it - and was thus inconsistent with separation of powers
65
principles.
Accordingly, the court held that Tax Law § 189 was inconsistent
with the principle of fair apportionment and impermissibly burdened
66
interstate commerce.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Urbach, the New York Court of Appeals held that the Natural Gas Import Tax (New York Tax Law § 189)
67
violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
The court held that the law, which imposed a tax on the importation
of natural gas into New York for the importer's own use or consumption, was inconsistent with the principle of fair apportionment because
it failed to provide an offsetting credit for taxes imposed on the out-of68
state purchase of natural gas.
Nicholas Kappas

62.

See id.

63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.

66.
67.

Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 96 N.Y.2d at 133-34.
Id.

68.

Id. at 128-35.

CLARA C. V WILLrAM L.'
(decided May 3, 2001)
I.

SYNoPsIs

In writing for the majority, Judge Ciparick, of the New York Court
of Appeals, held that a putative father cannot invoke Family Court Act
§ 516 ("FCA") to prevent a mother from seeking additional child support when the parties had previously entered into a support agreement
that failed to account for the child's needs. 2 After rendering its decision, the court remitted the case back to the family court for further
3
proceedings in accordance with the judgment.
H.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner, Clara C., brought a claim against William L. seeking a
declaration of paternity and a modified order of support.4 In response, William filed a motion to dismiss the claim, asserting that the
5
Family Court Act § 516 barred Clara's claims.
Over ten years ago, in 1986, Clara had commenced an earlier paternity proceeding against William. 6 At that time William made a motion ordering blood tests to ascertain whether he was the father of
Clara's son Thomas. 7 Those tests revealed a ninety-nine percent
probability of William's paternity of Thomas.8 Despite the results of
the blood test, rather than filing a paternity action, Clara and William
entered into an Agreement to settle the support claims. 9
Under the Support Agreement ("Agreement"), William, without
admitting paternity, agreed to pay Clara $275 per month for child support, until Thomas' 21st birthday.' 0 In return, Clara agreed to dismiss
the pending suit and to neither seek child support nor commence any
1.
2.
3.
4.

96 N.Y.2d 244 (2001) ("Clara C. II").
See id. at 247.
See id. at 251.
See Clara C. v. William L., 692 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (Fain. Ct. 1999) ("Clara C. I").

5.

See id.

6.
7.

See id.
See id.

8.
9.
10.

See id.
See id.
See Clara C.I, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
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other paternity actions against William. 1 After the Agreement was
made, William submitted it to the family court requesting approval, as
required by FCA § 516.12 The application for verification of the agreement was heard both in open court and at a proceeding where the
parties, parties' counsel and a representative from Social Services
13
appeared.
In this instant case, where Clara sued William for additional support, William asserted that the Agreement executed between himself
and Clara ten years ago contained language barring future support actions and that FCA § 516 prevented prosecution of Clara's suit. 14 A
Hearing Examiner reviewed William's claims and granted his motion
to dismiss. 15 The Hearing Examiner agreed that FCA § 516 barred
16
Clara's claims.
Clara appealed to the family court.17 During the course of the
appeal, the court appointed a Law Guardian for Thomas.1 8 Both the
Law Guardian and Clara alleged that William failed to comply with the
terms of the initial Agreement, as he was delinquent with his payments.' 9 Second, Clara argued that the judicial process by which the
family court approved the Agreement was inaccurate because the court
did not determine whether the Agreement was adequate for Thomas
20
and because the court failed to provide Thomas with a law guardian.
Clara's most significant argument was that FCA § 516 unconstitutionally violates the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
21
Amendment.
After hearing these contentions the family court affirmed the findings of the Hearing Examiner and dismissed Clara's case. 2 2 Although
11.
Id. Specifically the agreement stated that Clara "will not in the future institute
paternity proceedings in any court in any jurisdiction to establish that William L. is the
natural father of the child." Id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. FCA § 516(c) states that "The complete performance of the agreement
or compromise, when so approved, bars other remedies of the mother or child for the
support and education of the child." Id.
15. See Clara C. I, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
16. See Clara C. II, 96 N.Y.2d at 248.
17. See Clara C. I, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 574.
20.
See id.
21.
See id.
22.
See Clara C. I, 692 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
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the family court acknowledged that the Agreement's verification might
be inadequate, the court refused to invalidate the agreement because
of the strong policy favoring finality of settlements. 23 The court also
noted that William's non-compliance with the agreement was immate24
rial, and that § 516 was constitutional.
Clara then appealed to the Appellate Division of the Second Department. That court affirmed the decision of the family court,25 but
26
granted Clara leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.
On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was the issue of
whether a father may invoke FCA § 516 to bar a mother or child from
seeking additional support where there was an initial agreement that
27
was approved without consideration of the child's needs.
III.

DISCUSSION

The court analyzed two topics to determine the outcome of the
case. First, the court looked at the requirements of FCA § 516 concerning approval of agreements.2 8 Second, the court addressed the
constitutionality of § 516.29 The court found that the Agreement between Clara and William did not meet the requirements of FCA § 516
because the lower court failed to examine the adequacy of the Agreement. Because the court settled the case on that issue, the court found
no reason to look at the constitutionality of FAC § 516.
1.

The Adequacy of the Agreement

FCA § 516 allows an unmarried mother and a putative father to
enter into a binding support agreement in order to settle child support.3 0 This agreement waives future support actions. 31 However, FCA
§ 516 makes clear that the support agreement will only be enforced
when a court has reviewed the agreement and determined that ade23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
248.
31.

See Clara C. I, 96 N.Y.2d at 248.
See id.
See Clara C. v. William L., 716 N.Y.S.2d 573 (2d Dep't 2000).
See Clara C. v. William L., 716 N.Y.S.2d 859 (2d Dep't 2000).
See Clara C. 11, 96 N.Y.2d at 247.
See id. at 249-50.
See id. at 250-51.
See N.Y. FAm. CT. ACr § 516 (Consol. 2002). See also Clara C. II, 96 N.Y.2d at
See N.Y. F~A. GT. Acr § 516(c). See also Clara C. H, 96 N.Y.2d at 249.
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quate support for the child has been made.3 2 New York requires this
review because of its longstanding policy of protecting children born
out of wedlock.3 3 This review also ensures that unmarried mothers do
34
not "contract away" the needs of their children.
FCA § 516 does not provide a specific test for courts to use in order to ascertain whether an agreement adequately provides for a
child. 35 Nonetheless, courts generally look at factors such as "financial
positions, the child's support and educational needs throughout childhood, and the interests of the State" in arriving at a decision.3 6 These
factors ensure that a court arrives at the conclusion that the agreement
37
is both fair and adequate for the child.
In this case, the court determined that the record did not indicate
whether the lower court considered the adequacy of the Agreement
when it approved the Agreement. 38 Rather, the family court made a
perfunctory approval that neither considered the parties' financial situations nor whether the settlement adequately covered Thomas' needs
throughout childhood. 39 Without court approval any agreement for
child support made between a mother and putative father "will not be
40
enforced to preclude a later modification of support."
Furthermore, because the family court improperly approved the
Agreement, it is irrelevant that Clara did not raise any objection to the
Agreement for ten years. 4 1 Without proper court approval, FCA § 516
bars the support agreement from precluding further challenges, so any
lapse in time is irrelevant.4 2 Consequently, William was unable to use
FCA § 516 to prevent Clara from bringing her suit requesting a decla32. See Clara C. II,96 N.Y.2d at 249. Indeed, other jurisdictions have also determined that there must be judicial scrutiny of these agreements. See e.g., Willerton v.
Bassham, 889 P.2d 823 (Nev. 1995); Tuer v. Niedoliwka, 285 N.W.2d 424 (Mich. 1979);
Fox v. Hohenshelt, 528 P.2d 1376 (Or. 1974).
33. See Clara C. II, 96 N.Y.2d at 249. Before § 516 was enacted settlement agreements for children born out of wedlock were made by local welfare officials and did not
require any court approval. Over time the Legislature became increasingly concerned
that these settlements were inadequate to support the child. As such, the Legislature
enacted § 516 to require judicial approval. See id.
34. See Clara C. II, 96 N.Y.2d at 249.
35.

See id.at 250.

36.

See id.

37.
38.

See id.
See id.

39.
40.
41.
42.

See Clara C. II, 96 N.Y.2d at 250.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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ration of paternity and an increased support order to account for
43
Thomas' increasing educational needs.
2. The Constitutionality of § 516
After determining that the Agreement does not comply with FCA
§ 516's requirements, the court turned to the constitutionality of
§ 516.44 The court concluded that there was no need to revisit their
holding in Bacon v. Bacon45 and reevaluate whether FCA § 516 in46
fringes upon the Equal Protection Clause.
Although the majority opinion declined to address the constitutionality of § 516, Judge Levine's concurrence explored the constitutionality of § 516. Judge Levine found that FCA § 516 does violate the
Equal Protection Clause. 47 Judge Levine argued that although judicial
restraint encouraged courts not to address constitutional issues, there
are some instances where the public interest warrants that the court
48
address constitutional matters.
Attacking the constitutionality of FCA § 516 is not a new claim.
Twenty-two years ago a similar attack was brought in Bacon.49 In Bacon,
the court rejected the equal protection attack, concluding that the discriminatory statutory treatment of non-marital children in FCA § 516
was substantially related to a permissible state interest.5 0 Part of the
reason for the decision in Bacon arose from the fact that twenty-two
years ago there were no reliable methods of concluding paternity, and
where paternity could not be ascertained, the determination turned on
witness credibility. 5 1 Thus, the court believed that it had to protect
against the inadequacies of science at that time.
In ClaraH!, Judge Levine concludes, in his concurrence, that in an
intermediate level review of FCA § 516, the developments in the law
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. 46 N.Y.2d 477.
46. See Clara C. I, 96 N.Y.2d at 250. The court reasoned that they were bound by
judicial restraint not to consider constitutional questions unless their decision is necessary to decide the issue on appeal. Since, the court resolved the issue by finding that
the requirements of § 516 were not properly upheld there was no need for them to
address the constitutionality of § 516. See id.
47. See id at 251.
48. See id.
49. See Bacon, 46 N.Y.2d 477; see also Clara C. II, 96 N.Y.2d at 251.
50. See Bacon, 46 N.Y.2d at 480; Clara C. 1I, 96 N.Y.2d at 251-52.
51. See Matterof Commissioner of Social Servs. v. PhillipDe G., 59 N.Y.2d 137, 141-42
(1983).
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52
Sciand genetic technology negate the State's substantial interests.

ence has now developed to the point where genetic testing can, with
almost certainty, establish paternity-thus, problems of proof are now
virtually eradicated and Bacon's premise unfounded. 53 Additionally,
Judge Levine notes that the unconstitutionality of FCA § 516 is so clear
that it remains unconstitutional even where the adequacy require54
ments of the statute are met.

Similar to other statutes that have been found unconstitutional,
FCA § 516 draws distinctions between children of married and unmarried parents. A child of married parents is "never precluded from enforcing a statutory right of support from its father." 55 The child is also
"not precluded from enforcing a statutory right to additional support
by way of modification of the child support terms. '5 6 Conversely, a
child of unmarried parents is "forever barred from seeking either an
initial order of support" or from seeking a modification of that
57
order.
Indeed, even the United States Supreme Court began to strike
down statutory classifications that treat children of married parents
more favorably than children of unmarried parents. 5 8 This began with
a decision in Levy v. Louisiana.59 The jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court illustrates that "a classification based on illegitimacy is unconstitutional unless it bears an "evident and substantial relation to the par60
ticular... interests [the] statute is designed to serve."
The Supreme Court's recent direction and scientific developments do not make the state's interest in assuring parental support and
avoiding paternity litigation substantial enough to survive an intermediate level equal protection review of FCA § 516.61 The states' interests
are now too attenuated to allow different treatment of marital and
52.
53.

See Clara C. II, 96 N.Y.2d at 252.
See id. at 255-56.

54.
55.

See id. at 252.
Clara C. II, 96 N.Y.2d at 253.

56.
57.
58.

Id.
See id.
See Clara C. II, 96 N.Y.2d at 252.

59.

391 U.S. 68 (1968).

60. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983) (quoting United States v. Clark, 445
U.S. 23, 27 (1980)).
61. See Clara C. II, 96 N.Y.2d at 256.
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non-marital children. 62 Consequently, Judge Levine finds that FCA
63
§ 516 is unconstitutional.
Despite Judge Levine's persuasive argument, the majority fails to
address the constitutionality issue, thus leaving § 516 and Bacon's precedent intact. Although the court reasoned that judicial restraint precluded them from deciding the constitutionality, the court's failure to
address the issue neglects the fact that the statute is rooted and premised on uncertainty in determining paternity. However, DNA testing
allows certainty concerning paternity, thus negating primary reasons
behind § 516. Moreover, New York recognizes the certainty of DNA
testing in other statutes .that permit DNA testing by allowing admission
64
of DNA results to prove or disprove paternity.
As a result of not addressing FCA § 516, New York retains a statute
that impermissibly creates a different standard for children of unmarried parents. Under both the modern Supreme Court's precedents
and scientific advancements § 516 no longer serves substantial State
interests. And Judge Levine was correct in finding it unconstitutional.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Clara C. 11 the New York Court of Appeals found that where a
family court had improperly approved a support agreement between a
mother and putative father, the mother was not barred by § 516 from
filing a subsequent suit for paternity declaration and a modified support order.65 However, because the court resolved the case based
upon the Agreement's inadequate approval the court did not consider
66
FCA § 516's constitutionality.
Alioa Vasi

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id. at 257.
See id. at 258.
See id at 256; see also N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 532.
See Clara C. I, 96 N.Y.2d at 247.
See id. at 250.

ALIESSA V. NOVELLO 1
(decided June 5, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the NewYork Court of Appeals held that
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law section 122 violated Article XVII, section 1 of the
New York State Constitution and the Equal Protection clauses of both
the United States Constitution and the New York State Constitution.
Section 122 eliminated State Medicaid for legally admitted aliens until
they have been in the country for five (5) years.2 The court first held
that the scheme violated Article XVII, section 1 of the New York State
Constitution. Utilizing a strict scrutiny analysis, the court also held
that the law violated Equal Protection. The court also suggested that
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution gives the federal government sole control over immigration matters, control that
cannot be delegated to the states.
II. BACKGROUND
New York Social Services Law section 122 was enacted as part of
the New York State Welfare Reform Act, responding to the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
("PRWORA"), 3 passed by Congress in 1996. Title IV of PRWORA deals
with benefits to aliens and Congress stressed that its goals were to promote self-sufficiency and to discourage aliens from immigrating to the
United States to take advantage of welfare and other benefits.4 By passing PRWORA, Congress restricted the eligibility of aliens for federally
funded public assistance and encouraged the states to do the same. 5
New York responded to PRWORA by enacting Social Services Law
section 122.6 Title IV divided aliens into two categories - qualified and
1.

96 N.Y.2d 418 (2001).

2. N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 122 (McKinney 1997).
3. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 26 (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 42

U.S.C.) (1996).
4.
5.

See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 425; 8 U.S.C. § 1601(1)-(2) (1996).
See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 425.

6.

Id. at 427.
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non-qualified aliens. 7 Qualified aliens include, inter alia, green card
holders, those granted asylum, Cuban and Haitian entrants and victims
of battering.8 Qualified residents were further divided into two (2)
categories, the first includes those aliens that were lawfully residing in
the United States before August 22, 1996. 9 The second category included those who entered the country on or after August 22, 1996.
This category was deemed ineligible for Federal Medicaid benefits for
five (5) years. Furthermore, Title IV authorized the states to extend
this period. 10
All other aliens, including permanent residents under color of law
("PRUCOL's"), were deemed to be non-qualified. 1 Section 122 terminated Medicaid benefits for all non-qualified aliens. 12 The law did not,
however, deny benefits to PRUCOL'S who as of August 4, 1997 were
receiving Medicaid and were diagnosed with AIDS or residing in licensed residential health care facilities. 13 Section 122(1)(b)(i) provided Medicaid benefits to those aliens that entered the United States
before August 22, 1996. Those who entered after that date under section 122 would now have to wait five (5) years for coverage, including
14
all lawfully admitted permanent resident plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs were twelve aliens who resided in New York. 1 These
aliens fell into two groups. Some were lawfully admitted residents to
the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act (they
held green cards),1 6 the other group were PRUCOL's. 17 The Plaintiffs
brought a class action suit claiming that section 122 violated Article
XVII, sections 1 and 3 of the New York State Constitution and the
Equal Protection clauses of the United States and New York Constitutions. 18 The New York Supreme Court partially granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and declared that section 122 violated
7. Id. at 425; 8 U.S.C. § 1641.
8. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 425; 8 U.S.C. § 1641 (b)-(c).
9. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 426; 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b) (2) provides Federal Medicaid
to some, but not all, of this group.
10. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 426; see also 8 U.S.C. §§ 1613(a) and 1612(b) (1).
11.
See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 426.
12. Id. at 427; N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 122 (McKinney 1997).
13. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 435; N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 122(1) (c).
14. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 436; N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw § 122(1) (b) (ii).
15.
See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 422.
Id.; See also 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
16.
17. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 422; 8 U.S.C. § 1254; 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a) (14) (A).
These are aliens the INS is aware of, but has no plans to deport.
18. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 422-23.
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Article XVII, section 1 of the New York Constitution 19 and the Equal
20
Protection clauses of the United States and New York Constitutions.
21
Three days later, the appellate division decided Alvarino v. Wing,
which held that Social Services Law section 95 did not unconstitutionally deny resident aliens food assistance because the State enacted the
statute in direct response to a Federal appropriations bill.22 Therefore, the standard for equal protection purposes should be a rational
basis standard rather than strict scrutiny. 23 The supreme court then
granted reargument based on the holding of Alvarino and vacated its
decision that section 122 violated the Equal Protection clauses of the
United States and New York State Constitutions. 24 The court did not
reverse their decision that section 122 violated Article XVII, section 1
of the New York State Constitution. The Appellate Division, First Department then reversed that decision in part and affirmed in part and
held that section 122 did not violate the equal protection clauses,
agreeing with the supreme court, and it also did not violate article
XVII, section 1 of the New York State Constitution, disagreeing with
25
the Supreme Court.
The appellate division held that a mere rationality standard
should apply based upon Alvarino.26 The court followed the rule from
Alvarino that state-made classifications made pursuant to federally
mandated laws are entitled to the same rationality review, as would be
a federally enacted law. 27 The plaintiffs then appealed to the court of
28
appeals as of right.
19.

"The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be

provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such
means, as the legislature may from time to time determine." Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 427-28.
20.
21.

See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 423.
690 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1st Dep't 1999).

22. See Pub. L. No. 105-118, 111 Stat 2386 (1997).
23. Alvarino, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 256; accord, Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976);
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979).
24. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 436.
25.

Id.

26. 690 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1st Dep't 1999).
27. See Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81-83; Washington, 439 U.S. at 501 (holding that state
action is subject to rationality review and not strict scrutiny when a state acts "in re-

sponse to a federal measure explicitly designed to readjust the allocation ofjurisdiction
over Indians.")
28. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 436; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5601 (b) (McKinney 2001).
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DISCUSSION

The court first addressed the issue of whether section 122 violated
Article XVII, section 1 of the New York State Constitution. 29 Care for
the needy in New York State is a "constitutional mandate." 30 The State
argued that the law provides plaintiffs with full safety net protection
and emergency medical treatment. 3 1 The plaintiffs argued that section 122 deprived them of ongoing medical care. Under the scheme
they would have to wait until their conditions reached emergency proportions before they could receive treatment. 32 The United States Supreme Court has said that ongoing medical care is a "basic necessity of
life." 3 3 Judge Rosenblatt listed two ailments as examples that require

ongoing treatment - diabetes and asthma. 34 The court disposed of
this issue and found in favor of the plaintiffs by holding that section
122 violated the "letter and spirit" of Article XVII, section 1 by imposing "overly burdensome" conditions for eligibility that had nothing to
3 5

do with need.

Judge Rosenblatt3 6 then centered his analysis of the equal protection issue on Graham v. Richardson.37 This case involved the manner in
which the State of Arizona administered a federal disability program
under federal law.3 8 Arizona argued that because federal law impliedly
authorized its fifteen year residency period it did not violate the 14th
Amendment. 39 The United States Supreme Court held that the federal government does have the power to distinguish among aliens regarding rules for their admission and naturalization. 40 However,
29.
See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 436.
30. Id. (citing Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7 (1977); Lovelace v. Gross, 80 N.Y.2d
419, 424 (1992); Jiggets v. Grinker, 75 N.Y.2d 411, 416 (1990)).
31.
See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 428.
32. Id. at 429.
33. Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 260-61 (1974) ("To allow a serious illness to go untreated until it requires emergency hospitalization is to
subject the sufferer to the damage of a substantial and irrevocable deterioration in his
health.")
34. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 429.
35.
Id.
36. ChiefJudge Kaye andJudges Smith, Levine, Ciparick, Wesley and Graffeo concurred in the decision.
37. 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (holding that State classifications based on alienage are
subject to strict scrutiny.).
38. See id. at 367.
39.
See id. at 382.
40. Id.

2001-20021

CASE COMPILATION

"Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual states to
violate the Equal Protection Clause." 4 1 As a threshold matter, aliens
are "persons" for purposes of 14th Amendment protection. 42
The plaintiffs argued that strict judicial scrutiny43 should apply to
44
section 122 because it creates a classification based upon alienage.
The state argued that since section 122 merely implemented federal
46
45
immigration policy that a mere rationality standard should apply.
The State did not even attempt to justify section 122 under a strict
scrutiny standard and did not identify a "compelling State interest"
that section 122 would promote. 4 7
The United States Constitution gives Congress the right to "establish [a] uniform Rule of Naturalization." 48 In regards to immigration,
the United States Supreme Court has explained that "over no [other]
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete."49 Congressional power is so strong in this area that it has the
51
50
power to exclude aliens, and it also has the power to deport aliens.
Judge Rosenblatt pointed out in footnote 15 that the states were given
no such power in the United States Constitution.5 2 Immigration policy
is an exclusively federal endeavor and the Congress is granted a wider
41.
42.
43.

See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 434 (quoting Graham, 403 U.S. at 382).
See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 427 (under strict scrutiny a state statute will withstand

an equal protection challenge only when the State shows that the law "furthers a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means practically available) (quoting Bernal
v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 227 (1984)).
44. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 427.
45. For an exposition of rationality review, see McDonald v. Bd. of Election

Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) ("The distinctions drawn by a challenged statute must
bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state end and will be set aside as violative

of [equal protection] only if based on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of that
goal. Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally even if source materials
normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for action othenvise silent, and
their statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to
justify them.")
46. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 431.

47.
48.
49.
214 U.S.
50.
51.
52.

(1982)).

Id.
See Allessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 432 (quoting U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 8, cI. 4).
See Alkessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 432-33 (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,
320, 339 (1909)).
See Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
See Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 592 (1913).
See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 433 (citing Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19.
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latitude in making distinctions between aliens and citizens than state
legislatures.
The Constitution does not prevent Congress from making a distinction between aliens and citizens.5 3 In Mathews v. Diaz,5 4 aliens
challenged a federal statute that denied Medicare to those aliens who
had been in the United States for less than five years. The Supreme
Court showed its true superiority over immigration policy when it
stated that the "decision to share our bounty with our guests may take
into account the character of the relationship between the alien and
this country; Congress may decide that as the alien's tie grows stronger,
so does the strength of his claim to an equal share of that munificence." 55 That case was distinguished from the instant case because it
was a federal welfare program, whereas here it was a state program and
thus the federal control over immigration policy is clear.
When federal welfare policies are administered jointly with the
states, Congress may direct the states to implement immigration objectives as long as the "[f] ederal government has by uniform rule prescribed what it believes to be appropriate standards for the treatment
of an alien subclass. '56 The United States Supreme Court has cautioned the states regarding state regulation that discriminates against
lawful immigrants as being "impermissible if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress.

'5 7

The State argued that based on the above law, section 122 did
exactly what Title IV allowed it to do. The court of appeals disagreed
with this analysis and followed Graham v. Richardson.5 8 The United
States Supreme Court in Graham stated explicitly that a "congressional
enactment construed so as to permit state legislatures to adopt divergent laws on the subject of citizenship requirements for federally supported welfare programs would appear to contravene [the] explicit
constitutional requirement of uniformity. '59 Judge Rosenblatt was
concerned with uniformity in state laws and under the State's argument there appeared the possibility of fifty different State laws regarding requirements for legally admitted aliens to receive Medicaid. This
53. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d
54. 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
55.
See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d
56. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d
57. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d
n.6 (1976)).
58. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
59.
See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d

at 432.
at 433 (quoting Mathews, 426 U.S. at 80).
at 435 (quoting Plyer at 219 n. 19).
at 433 n.16 (quoting DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358

at 434 (quoting Graham, 403 U.S. at 382).
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could, in theory, lead to a "race to the bottom," with each state passing
more harsh laws denying aliens welfare benefits.
The Court then held that Title IV is constitutionally flawed because of its lack of uniformity in immigration policy, a uniformity that
the United States Constitution requires. 60 It falls directly under Graham because it allows states to adopt divergent approaches on welfare
policies in regards to immigration, an outcome that Graham disavowed. 6 ' Judge Rosenblatt attacked Title IV when he stated: "in the
name of national immigration policy, it impermissibly authorizes each
state to decide whether to disqualify many otherwise eligible aliens
from State Medicaid."6 2 Therefore, Title IV gives section 122 no special protection from strict scrutiny. Since the State showed no compelling interest for the policy, the court held that section 122 is
unconstitutional because it is a distinction based on alienage, violating
the equal protection clauses of both the United States Constitution
and the New York State Constitution. 63 Although he stopped short of
declaring Title IV of PRWORA unconstitutional, Judge Rosenblatt
made clear that under Graham and the United States Constitution, Title IV was flawed because it did not reflect a uniform federal policy on
immigration matters and actually encouraged non-uniform laws.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Aliessa, the New York Court of Appeals held that section 122 of
the New York Social Services Law was unconstitutional on two grounds.
First, it violated Article XVII, section I of the New York State Constitution because it imposed upon plaintiffs overly burdensome eligibility
conditions for medical care that had nothing to do with need. Second,
it violated the Equal Protection Clauses of both the New York and
United States Constitutions by denying legal aliens Medicaid benefits
solely on their status as aliens. Furthermore, the Court held that the
proper standard of review was strict scrutiny because distinctions based
60. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 435 ("Considering that Congress has conferred upon
the States such broad discretionary power to grant or deny aliens State Medicaid, we are
IV reflects a uniform national policy. If the rule were
unable to conclude that title
uniform, each State would carry out the same policy under the mandate of Congress the only body with authority to set immigration policy."); see also U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8,
cl. 4 ("[The Congress shall have the power] to establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization.").
61. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 435; Graham, 403 U.S. at 382.
62. See Aliessa, 96 N.Y.2d at 436.
63. Id.

534
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upon alienage were present. Because immigration policy is clearly a
federal endeavor, and the United States Constitution and case precedents demand uniformity, section 122 must be analyzed under strict
scrutiny. Section 122 could not pass muster under this test because
there was no compelling state interest identified.
This case provides an excellent example of the federalism battle
that is currently occurring in America. States rights advocates may argue that the states should have the right to determine what kind of
benefits that they give to aliens within their borders. On the other
hand, opponents of such laws see immigration policy as the exclusive
domain of the federal government. It is an interesting battle that is
also being waged in other areas of law and one that is far from being
resolved.
ChristopherDeCicco

PEOPLE V ARNOLD'
(decided June 12, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the NewYork Court of Appeals held that
prospective jurors who disclose prior experiences or opinions that may
prejudice their verdicts must be disqualified from serving as jurors, unless they unequivocally state that they can nevertheless render impartial verdicts.2 Additionally, the court held that prospective jurors with
"expert" backgrounds are not automatically disqualified to serve as jurors.3 Jurors, however, cannot use their professional or technical expertise to introduce facts and conclusions into jury deliberations that
4
were not developed at trial.
II.

BACKGROUND

The defendant in this case was indicted and tried on charges relating to the stabbing of his girlfriend. 5 Ajury found the defendant guilty
6
of criminal assault.
The defendant appealed his conviction claiming that the trial
court erred by refusing to grant his motion to exclude one of the prospectivejurors for cause during voir dire.7 The defendant argued that
the prospective juror made statements that clearly indicated she could
not decide the case fairly. 8
The prospective juror minored in women's studies and researched
the issue of battered women's syndrome while in college. 9 In response
to a question posed by the prosecutor, the prospective juror stated that
she had done a lot of research on domestic violence and battered
women's syndrome. She added "I have a problem with that."1 0 De1.
2.
3.
4.

96 N.Y.2d 358 (2001).
See id. at 362-64.
Id. at 364-68.
See id.

5.
6.

Id. at 361.
Id.

7.

See People v. Arnold, 708 N.Y.S.2d 762, 763 (4" Dep't 2000).

8.
9.
10.

See id. at 764; Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d 358, 360 (2001).
Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d at 360.
See id.; see also Arnold, 708 N.Y.S.2d at 764.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

fense counsel then asked the prospective juror if she might discuss
what she knew about domestic violence with other jurors during deliberations and if that might make otherjurors rely on her as an expert.'1
The prospective juror responded, "I think so," and counsel suggested
that it might be better if she served as a juror on a different type of
12
case.
The prosecutor objected to defense counsel's motion to exclude
the prospective juror for cause. 13 The prosecutor argued that the prospective juror never stated that she "wouldn't be able to listen to the
law and would be unfair."1 4 The prosecutor also mentioned that the
juror could "be advised as to what she can or cannot do."15 Ultimately,
the trial court refused to exclude the juror for cause, and the defendant was forced to use a peremptory challenge.1 6 The defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges before the jury selection process
concluded. 17 Thus, if the trial court had excluded the prospective juror for cause, the defendant would have had one additional peremptory challenge with which to shape the jury.
In a 3-2 decision, the appellate division reversed the judgment of
the trial court.18 The majority held that "once the prospective juror
expressed doubt regarding her ability to be impartial or indicated that
she might be an unsworn expert witness in thejury room, it was incumbent upon the court to ascertain that her prior state of mind would not
influence her verdict and that she would render an impartial verdict
based upon the evidence." 19 The majority indicated that the court
failed to determine if the prospective juror could be impartial despite
her prior knowledge and experiences. 20 The majority dismissed the
2
charges against the defendant without prejudice. '
Two judges dissented from the majority opinion because they believed that the prospective 'Juror did not evince a state of mind that
would likely preclude her from rendering an impartial verdict based
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d at 360.
Id.
Id. at 361.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Arnold, 708 N.Y.S.2d 762, 763.
See id.
Id. at 764.
Id.
Id.
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upon the evidence." 22 The dissenting opinion noted that all of the
prospective jurors, including the prospective juror at issue, collectively
indicated that they would follow the law and base their verdict on the
23
evidence alone.
The New York Court of Appeals granted the People's request for
24
Leave to Appeal and affirmed the judgment of the appellate division.

III.

DIscussIoN

The court of appeals began its analysis by repeating the old maxim
that a defendant in a criminal trial has the right to be tried by an impartial jury.2 5 The court, however, recognized that a defendant does
not have the right to a "perfect" trial or a "perfect" jury.26 The court
explained that a prospective juror is not automatically disqualified
from serving on a jury simply because he or she comes to court with
life experience. 27 It would be unrealistic and undesirable to expect
28
jurors to render verdicts without reference to their life experiences.
Unavoidably, all jurors come to court with the knowledge and experiences that they have acquired over the course of their lives. 29 Jurors
must use these tools to assess the strength of evidence and legal
arguments. 30
Each juror, however, must be ready to decide a particular case
without favoring one party over the other, and must be dedicated to
31
deciding the case solely on the law and evidence introduced at trial.
The court stated that New York's Criminal Procedure Law provides
"that a party may challenge a prospective juror for cause if the juror
'has a state of mind that is likely to preclude him from rendering an
impartial verdict based upon the evidence.' "32 The court cited People
v. Culhane for the general principle that jurors must clearly express
22.

Id.

23. Arnold, 708 N.Y.S.2d. at 764.
24. People v. Arnold, 95 N.Y.2d 888 (2000) (granting Leave to Appeal); Arnold, 96
N.Y.2d 358.
25. Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d 358.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.

30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 361-62 (citing N.Y. C.P.L. § 270.20 (1) (b) (Consol. 2001).
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that any prior experiences or opinions that they bring to the jury room
33
will not preclude them from rendering a fair verdict.
The court then discussed how it applied this general principle in
past cases. In People v. Johnson, the court held that the trial court improperly denied a defendant's challenge to disqualify a juror for cause
after the juror stated he would favor police testimony.3 4 Additionally,
in People v. Reyes the court reversed the trial court's decision to deny a
challenge to disqualify a juror for cause even though the juror stated
that she could only try to be fair deciding a drug-related case
35
impartially.
The court noted that prospective jurors who themselves indicate
that they might be biased in a particular case, must unequivocally indicate that they can decide the matter impartially if they are to serve on
the jury. 36 If a prospective juror promises to decide a case fairly despite his or her prior experiences or opinions, a trial court may allow
37
the prospective juror to serve if the court finds the promise credible.
With these cases in mind, the court held that the appellate division correctly reversed the trial court's decision to deny the defendant's challenge for cause. 38 The court noted that the prospective
juror's statements "revealed that, because of her [educational] background, the juror herself questioned whether she could be impartial in
any domestic violence case ....
Accordingly, the trial court should
have granted the challenge for cause unless the juror unequivocally
indicated that she could be fair despite her background."3 9 Since the
trial court did not elicit unequivocal assurances of impartiality from
the prospective juror, the trial court should have granted the challenge
for cause. 40 Agreeing with the appellate division, the court stated that
it was not enough that the entire jury collectively stated that it would
be impartial. 41 The trial court should have disqualified the prospective
juror for cause unless she personally stated that she could decide the
42
case impartially.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 362 (citing People v. Culhane, 33 N.Y.2d 90, 106 (1973)).
Id. (citing People v. Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d 600, 611 (2000)).
Id. (citing People v. Reyes, 681 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1998)).
Id. (citing People v. Williams, 63 N.Y.2d 882, 884-85 (1984)).
Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d 358.

38.

Id.

39.

Id. at 358-59.

40.

Id.

41.
42.

Id. at 362-63.
Id. at 363.
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Next, the court addressed the defendant's contention that the
trial court should have questioned the prospective juror further because she indicated that her study of domestic violence might make
her an unsworn "expert" in the jury room. 43 Citing a United States
Supreme Court opinion and several New York cases, the court noted
that "the jury must reach its verdict solely on evidence received in open
court, not from outside sources," and "courts have at times found it
necessary to reverse convictions where jurors have been exposed to
prejudicial, extra-record facts." 44
The court remarked that it had overturned convictions in prior
cases when jurors tainted the deliberative process by conducting unauthorized experiments and the jury treated the results of those experiments as evidence. 4 5 In People v. Stanley and People v. Brown, the court
reversed convictions because jurors conducted unauthorized experi46
ments or recreations to test the credibility of eyewitness testimony.
In People v. Legister, the court reversed a conviction where two jurors
simulated the lighting conditions of the crime scene in a hotel room
and then informed the rest of the jury of the results of their
experiment. 47
The court recently addressed the issue of "expert"jurors in People
v. Maragh.4 8 There, the court overturned a conviction because two
nurses on the jury used their professional knowledge to calculate the
49
victim's blood loss and reach conclusions about the cause of death.
The nurses presented their conclusions, which contradicted the conclusions of the experts who testified at the trial, to the rest of the jury.50
Although a court will not generally impeach a verdict by examining the details of a jury's deliberative process, the court "recognized
that a narrow exception exists where there has been a showing of "improper influence" on the jury."5 1 In Maragh, the court held that the
43.

Id.

44. Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d at 363 (citing Shepard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351 (1966);
People v. De Jesus, 42 N.Y.2d 519, 523 (1977); People v. Hommel, 41 N.Y.2d 427
(1977)).

45.

Id.

46. Id. (citing People v. Stanley, 87 N.Y.2d 1000 (1996)); People v. Brown, 48
N.Y.2d 388 (1979)).
47. Id. (citing People v. Legister, 75 N.Y.2d 832 (1990)).
48. Id. at 364 (citing People v. Maragh, 94 N.Y.2d 269 (2000)).

49.
50.

Id.
Id.

51.

Id. (quoting Maragh, 94 N.Y.2d at 573).
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potential for a biased verdict exists when jurors use their professional
expertise to form conclusions about the material issues involved in a
case. 5 2 The "expert"juror's conclusions are not part of the trial record
and, ultimately, might even contradict the evidence developed at
trial. 53 The "expert"juror may also inform other jurors of his or her
54
opinions or conclusions, tainting the entire deliberative process. Jurors "are likely to defer to the gratuitous injection of expertise ...over
and above their own everyday experiences, judgment and the proofs
55
adduced at trial."
The court established a test in Maragh for determining when a
juror with a professional expertise has improperly influenced the
jury.5 6 "Overall, a reversible error can materialize from (1) jurors conducting personalized specialized assessments not within the common
ken of juror experience and knowledge (2) concerning a material issue in the case, and (3) communicating that expert opinion to the rest
of the jury panel with the force of private, untested truth as though it
were evidence. ''57 Jurors may not "engage in experimentation, investigation and calculation that necessarily rely on facts outside the record
and beyond the understanding of the average juror."5 8 The court
stated that this principle is violated when jurors use their expert knowledge to conduct scientific analyses and then communicate the results
of those analyses to other jurors. 59 Such communication necessarily
influences the jury to render a verdict based upon information beyond
60
the evidence presented at trial.
However, in the instant case the court held that the principles
enunciated in Maragh were not violated and the trial court was not
required to exclude the juror for cause based upon Maragh.6 1 The
record did not disclose that the prospective juror had any special expertise concerning an issue that was material to the case. 62 The court
did not believe that the juror's knowledge of domestic violence issues
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. (quoting Maragh, 94 N.Y.2d at 574).
See id.
See id. at 364-66.
Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d at 364 (quoting Maragh, 94 N.Y.2d at 574).
Id.
Id. (quoting Maragh, 94 N.Y.2d at 574).
Id. at 365.
Id.
See id. at 364-65.
Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d at 365.
Id. at 365.
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was relevant to the trial. 63 Furthermore, the court declined to hold
that merely studying a subject in college qualified the juror as an expert. 64 Finally, since the defendant used a peremptory challenge to

in a position to communicate any "exexcuse the juror, she was never
65
pert" information to the jury.
On a final note, the court cautioned trial courts to address any
concerns about prospective jurors early in the proceedings. 66 Trial
courts must inform jurors that they are to decide cases impartially and
solely on the evidence adduced at trial. 67 If a prospective juror indicates "a willingness to consider facts outside the record, the court
should remind the juror what is and is not permissible." 68
IV.

CONCLUSION

In People v. Arnold, the New York Court of Appeals unanimously
held that trial courts must grant challenges for cause during voir dire if
prospective jurors indicate that they lack impartiality. 69 A juror who
indicates that he or she may be biased in a particular matter should be
excluded for cause, unless the prospective juror unequivocally states
that he or she will decide the matter impartially and based upon the
evidence alone. 70 Additionally, the court held that jurors should not
automatically be excluded from a jury because they possess professional expertise or knowledge. 7 1 Ajuror, however, may not use professional knowledge or expertise to insert facts and conclusions that were
72
not presented at trial into the jury's deliberative process.
ChristopherP. Massaro

63.

Id.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 365-66.
Id.

69.

Arnold, 95 N.Y.2d 888.

Id.

70. See id.
71. Id
72. Id.

NEW YORK STATE ASS'N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE
LAWYERS V. KAYE'
(decided June 14, 2001)
I.

SYNoPsis

In an opinion per curiam, the New York Court of Appeals held that
Judiciary Law § 35-b grants the court not only the power to approve,
but also the ultimate administrative rule-making power to promulgate
schedules of fees for qualified counsel for defendants in capital cases. 2
11.

BACKGROUND

In 1995, the New York Legislature reinstated the death penalty.3
Simultaneously, it enacted Judiciary Law § 35-b in order to offer indigent defendants subject to the death penalty representation by qualified counsel. 4 Judiciary Law § 35-b creates the Capital Defender
Office, which is governed by a three-member board of directors: one
appointed by the Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, one
member appointed by the temporary President of the Senate, and one
member appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly. 5
In order to ensure that qualified attorneys are available, Judiciary
Law § 35-b also creates a four member screening panel in each Judicial
Department: two appointed by the board of directors of the Capital
Defender Office, and two appointed by the Presiding Justice in each
Judicial Department. 6 Judiciary Law § 35-b requires that each screening panel establish and update a roster of attorneys qualified for appointment as lead counsel and associate counsel to represent indigent
defendants in capital cases. 7 In addition, Judiciary Law § 35-b requires
that each screening panel promulgate and periodically update, in consultation with the Administrative Board of the Courts, a schedule of
1.

96 N.Y.2d 512 (2001).

2.

Id.

3. New York State Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Kaye, 703 N.Y.S.2d 349,
351 (Sup. CL Albany County 1999).
4. N.Y. JUD. LAw § 35-b(1)-(2) (McKinney 1983); New York State Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Kaye, 710 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (3d Dep't 2000).
5. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 35-b(3); Kaye, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 351.
6. N.Y. JuD. LAw § 35-b(5) (a).
7. Id.
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fees for qualified counsel for defendants in capital cases, which fee
schedules are subject to the approval of the court of appeals. The
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals and the Presiding Justices of each of the four Judicial Departments comprise the Adminis8
trative Board of the Courts.
In December 1995 and January 1996, screening panels initially
submitted proposed fee schedules to the court of appeals. 9 In March
1996, after consideration of public comments relating to the proposed
fee schedules, the court of appeals, acting as an administrator requested further data, documentation, analysis and consideration from
the screening panels. 10 After receiving further input, the court of appeals concluded that counsel's fees should be established at uniform
statewide rates. Lead counsel and associate counsel compensation
would be capped at an hourly rate higher than $175 and $150. Incourt and out-of-court work would receive the same rate of compensation. Compensation for certain legal and paralegal assistants would be
approved at an hourly rate no more than $40 for legal assistants and
$25 for paralegal assistants. 1
Thereafter, the four screening panels revised, promulgated, and
submitted identical fee schedules, and on November 21, 1996, the
court of appeals issued Orders approving such fee schedules. 12 Pursuant to the approved fee schedules, the fees for in-court and out-ofcourt work would be the same.1 3 Additionally, the hourly rates for lead
counsel and associate counsel would not be higher than $175 and
$150, respectively. 14 Furthermore, the hourly rates for legal assistants
and paralegal assistants would not be higher than $40 and $25,
respectively. 15
On September 22, 1997, the court of appeals directed the screening panels to re-examine the fee schedules in view of the available empirical data at that time. 16 The screening panels, in consultation with
the Administrative Board of the Courts, proceeded accordingly. 17 The
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

N.Y. JUD. LAW § 210(2) (McKinney 1983).
Kaye, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 352.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Administrative Board of the Courts believed that fees should be uniform statewide; that the fees for in-court and out-of-court work should
be the same; that different fees should be applied to pre-death-notice
and post-death-notice work; and that the hourly rates for lead counsel
should not be higher than $125 for post-notice work, and $100 for prenotice work; and that the hourly rates for associate counsel should not
be higher than $100 for post-notice work, and $75 for pre-notice
work.18
Eventually, the screening panels of all but the First Department
agreed to the revised fee schedules urged by the Administrative Board
of the Courts. 19 The decisions of the screening panels of the Third
and Fourth Departments were unanimous, while one member of the
screening panel of the Second Department dissented.20 The screening
panel of the First Department, however, was evenly divided with two
members favoring the old fee schedule and two members favoring the
revised fee schedule urged by the Administrative Board of the
2
Courts. '
After inviting and reviewing public comments and studying additional data, on December 16, 1998, the court of appeals issued an Order approving the revised fee schedules promulgated by the screening
panels of the Second, Third and Fourth Departments. 22 The Order
also approved the same revised fee schedule submitted only by two
23
members of the screening panel of the First Department.
In April 1999, petitioners, four attorneys certified to accept capital
cases and the NewYork State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
on behalf of its members so certified, filed a petition under CPLRArticle 78 to annul the December 16, 1998 Order,24 contending that the
court of appeals exceeded its administrative power when it revised the
fee schedule for the First Department, and that the reduced fee schedules did not meet the standards of Judiciary Law §35-b for adequate
compensation. 25 The Supreme Court, Albany County, dismissed the
18.
19.

Id.
Id. at 353.

20.

Id.

21.

Id.

22.
23.

Id.
Id.

24.

NewYork State Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Kaye, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 148

(3d Dep't 2000).
25. New York State Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Kaye, 96 N.Y.2d 512
(2001).
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petition, holding that petitioners failed to meet the burden of establishing that the Order was irrational, arbitrary, or an abuse of discretion 26 even though petitioners had standing. 27 The Appellate
Division, Third Department, affirmed, holding that petitioners lacked
standing because petitioners' claimed injuries of reduced fees and increased caseload did not fall within the zone of interest of ensuring
that qualified attorneys are available to represent defendants in capital
cases, 28 and because petitioners' alleged harm was insufficient to enti29
tled judicial intervention.
Petitioners then filed a motion to disqualify Judges Kaye, Smith,
Levine, Ciparick and Wesley of the court of appeals from participating
in the decision of petitioners' motion for leave to appeal from the appellate division's decision.30 The court of appeals dismissed the mo32
tion,3 1 but granted the motion for leave to appeal.
III.

DISCUSSION

The court of appeals did not address the issue of standing, as it
assumed that petitioners had standing.33 Instead, it affirmed the dis34
missal of the petition on three grounds.
First, the court concluded that contrary to what the petitioners
claimed, the wording "promulgate" used in Judiciary Law § 35-b (5)(a)
ordinarily has many meanings, and in the present case, in view of the
legislative intent, it merely means to make known or public the terms
of a proposed fee schedule.3 5 Thus, the court believed that Judiciary
Law § 35-b(5) ascribes a role for the screening panels subordinate to
36
that of the court in setting the fee schedules.
In deliberations, the court noted that the legislature elected to
incorporate a public comment period, preceding the exercise of final
rule-making, in Judiciary Law § 35-b(5) (a), which is comparable to
26.

Kaye, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 358-59.

27.

Id. at 355.

28.

Kaye, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 149.

29.

Id.

30.

New York State Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers v. Kaye, 95 N.Y.2d 556, 559

(2000).
31.

Id. at 562.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Kaye, 95 N.Y.2d 770 (2000).
Kaye, 96 N.Y.2d at 516.
Id. at 517-20.
Id at 517.

36.

Id.
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those required for an administrative agency under the State Administrative Procedure Act § 202(1) (2). 37 The court also took notice that
the public comment period begins after the screening panels both
publish the fee schedules and complete their work, but before the
court acts pertaining to them.3 8 The court believed that this sequence
was significant and indicated that the legislature wanted the court to
have the ultimate administrative rule-making power in setting the fee
schedules. 39 The court reasoned that had the legislature wanted the
screening panels to have the ultimate administrative rule-making
power, it would have given the screening panels rather than the court
40
the benefit of the outside input from the public comment period.
Next, the court pointed out that petitioners' interpretation is contrary to the overall statutory scheme. 4 1 The court noted that the capital offense statute assigns to the court very broad administrative
responsibilities including the most important administrative responsibility of fulfilling the State's constitutional responsibility to provide
competent counsel to capital defendants and to provide a system of
compensation for that representation. 42 The court reasoned that in
order to properly carry out these broad administrative responsibilities,
its authority should include not only the narrow readings of powers
expressly conferred by the capital offense statute, but also the implied
powers that are necessary for properly carrying out its responsibilities. 43 The court believed that the ultimate administrative rule-making
power to promulgate schedules of fees is one of the necessary implied
powers it should have. Otherwise, the court could not properly carry
out even its most important administrative responsibility because the
whole fee setting process would come to a halt if, for example, at the
initial stage of the capital defense fee schedule process any screening
panel could not make a majority determination. 44
Finally, the court rejected petitioners' argument that the reduction in fees jeopardizes the legislature's intent to provide adequate
qualified counsel to capital defendants and held that it was arbitrary
37.

Id.

38. Id at 518.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43.

Id.

44.

Id. at 518-19.
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and capricious. 45 The court pointed out that the 1996 capital counsel
fees should be reduced only after it considered public comments,
surveys, and responses from the screening panels and other empirical
46
data and documents.
More particularly, the court pointed out that one of the documents it reviewed was an April 1998 report prepared for the American
Bar Association detailing fees for capital representation in each of the
38 states having the death penalty, which indicated that the reduced
fees in New York State were still higher than the corresponding fees in
at least 36 of the other 37 states. 47 Another document the court reviewed was a 1998 report prepared by a subcommittee of the United
States Judicial Conference on fees for capital representation in federal
death penalty cases. 48 The report stated that the maximum federal
hourly rate of up to $125 was sufficient to attract competent defense
counsel, and that the hourly rate for federal death penalty representation ranged from a high average of $115.82 in 1991 to a low of $79.92
in 1994, with the most recent reported average of $108.84 in 1997.
Thus, the court pointed out that the approved reduced rates exceeded
the average rate of compensation actually paid for in federal capital
representation. 49 In addition, the court noted that unlike other jurisdictions, additional state funds were available to pay uncapped expenses for necessary export and investigative services. 50 In view of
these findings, the court concluded that the reduced fees still exceeded the average rate of representation nationwide. 5 1 Therefore,
the reduced fees were neither arbitrary nor capricious. 5 2 In addition,
in view of these findings, the court concluded that the reduced fees
would continue to attract adequate qualified counsel to represent capi53
tal defendants.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The New York Court of Appeals held that Judiciary Law § 35-b
grants the court not only the power to approve, but also the ultimate
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id at 519.
Id.
Id.
Id at 520.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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administrative rule-making power to promulgate schedules of fees for
54
qualified counsel for capital defendants.
Douglas D. Zhang

54.

Id.

LEVI-N V YESHIVA UNIVERSITY'
(decided July 2, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

This case involved several students enrolled at Yeshiva University's
Albert Einstein College of Medicine who were each denied on-campus
housing with their lesbian partners. 2 With one dissenting opinion, the
New York Court of Appeals held that several students enrolled at
Yeshiva University's Albert Einstein College of Medicine, who were
each denied on-campus housing with their lesbian partners, did not
state a valid claim of marital status discrimination in violation of New
York State and City Human Rights Laws. 3 However, the court held that
the students did state a valid cause of action of "disparate impact discrimination based on sexual orientation as proscribed under the New
4
York City Human Rights Law."
II.

BACKGROUND

Yeshiva University's Albert Einstein College of Medicine (hereinafter "AECOM"), which is located in the Bronx, provides numerous
apartments, of various sizes, near its campus for the housing of its students. 5 These apartments are offered below market rates. 6 The

school's housing policy restricts such apartments to medical students,
their spouses, and any dependent children. 7 Even though vacancies
are "filled from a waiting list on a first-come, first-served basis," in some
circumstances, married couples are given priority to the apartments. 8
1. 96 N.Y.2d 484 (2001).
2. Id. at 496.
3. Id. The New York State Human Rights Law is codified as Executive Law § 296.
Id. at 489. Additionally, the New York City Human Rights Law is codified as New York
City Administrative Code § 8-107. Id.
4. Id. at 496.
5. Id. at 489.
6. Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 691 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1999).
7. Levin, 96 N.Y.2d at 489.
8. Id. AECOM's housing policy makes distinctions based on the size of the apartment. Id. For studio apartments, married couples always receive priority. Id. "One-

bedroom apartments must be shared by a minimum of two students or a married
couple. Two-bedroom apartments must be shared by a minimum of three individuals,

with married couples having one or more children receiving priority. See id.
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In order to receive housing priority, however, married couples must
provide "acceptable proof of marriage" to the university's housing
office. 9
Prior to attending her first year at AECOM, plaintiff Sara Levin
requested housing for herself and her lesbian partner of five years.' 0
AECOM, under its policy, requested that Ms. Levin provide them with
"proof of marriage in order to live with a non-student."'" Levin was
unable to produce such proof and, as a result, lived with two other
students in an on-campus three-bedroom apartment. 12 The following
year Levin once more requested housing with her partner, but again
her request was denied. 1 3 Ms. Levin and her partner ultimately moved
14
into an off-campus apartment located in Brooklyn.
In addition, AECOM denied a request from plaintiff MaggieJones
to live in student housing with her partner. 15 Consequently, during her
first year, she lived with another AECOM student in a one-bedroom
apartment. 16 Eventually, she too moved off campus in order to live
17
with her partner.
In 1998, Ms. Levin and Ms. Jones filed suit against AECOM. i8 The
plaintiffs filed seven causes of action.' 9 Claims one through five alleged that AECOM's housing policy violated the marital status sections
of the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws by allowing married spouses of AECOM students to live in on-campus housing while forbidding non-married partners of students from doing the
same. 20 The plaintiffs' sixth cause of action claimed that the school's
housing policy violated New York State Real Property Law § 235-f (the
9. Id.
10. Id.
11.
Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Levin, 96 N.Y.2d at 489.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id. A third named plaintiff, Gilda Wildfire, secretary and treasurer of a
lesbian and gay student organization whose members included Levin, Jones, and other
students adversely affected by the housing policy, also joined the suit. Id. at 489-490
n.1. All claims with respect to her were barred for lack of standing. Id. at 496.
19. Levin, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 281.
20. Id. For examples of the sections of the New York State and City Human Rights
Laws that make it unlawful to discriminate on the basis of marital status, see Executive
Law § 296(2-a), (4), (5)(a)(1) and the N.Y.C. ADMIN. CoDE § 8-107(5).
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"Roommate Law"), which, among other things, prohibits a landlord
from restricting the "occupancy of residential premises to a tenant and
the tenant's immediate family." 21 The plaintiffs' seventh and final
cause of action alleged that, under the New York City Human Rights
Law, the school's housing policy had a disparate impact against homosexuals. 22 The plaintiffs argued that because homosexuals, unlike
heterosexuals, are unable to marry their partners, they are thus absolutely prevented from living in on-campus housing with their
23
partners.
AECOM did not answer the plaintiffs' allegation, but, instead,
moved to dismiss the complaint.24 The Supreme Court of New York
granted AECOM's motion and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint in its
entirety. 25 The Appellate Division, First Department unanimously
26
affirmed.
As to the first five causes of action, the appellate division found
that, because the plaintiffs were "unmarried women who were denied
permission to live with their life partners," AECOM's housing policy
did not discriminate against them on the basis of marital status as
such. 27 The appellate division also upheld the dismissal of the sixth
cause of action because the court found that the Roommate Law was
not applicable. 28 According to the court, the Roommate Law placed
restrictions only on a tenant's primary residence.2 9 The court reasoned that because a full-time student's primary residence does not
30
change by living in temporary student housing, the law did not apply.
As to the seventh claim, the appellate division held that the plaintiffs
failed to establish that the housing policy had a disparate impact on
homosexuals because it had the same effect on non-married, hetero21. Levin, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 281. "[This] statute further provides that any rental
agreement must permit occupancy by the tenant, the immediate family of the tenant,
one additional occupant and the dependent children of the occupant." Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs' seventh cause of action alleged a violation of
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (5) and (17). Id. at 281; Levin, 96 N.Y. 2d at 490.
24. Levin, 96 N.Y.2d. at 490. The motion to dismiss was filed pursuant to New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 3211(a) (7). Id.
25. Levin, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
26. Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 709 N.Y.S.2d 392 (lst Dep't 2000).
27. Id. at 392.
28. Id. at 393.
29. Id.
30. Id.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

sexual students as it had on non-married, homosexual students.3 ' The
plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their claims, except for the sixth
32
cause of action, to the court of appeals.

III.

DIscussIoN

The court of appeals agreed with the lower courts that the claim
of discrimination on the basis of marital status was properly dismissed.3 3 However, the court also "modif[ied] the order of the appellate division and remit[ted] the case to the supreme court for further
proceedings" because the plaintiffs "pleaded allegations sufficient to
raise an issue of fact as to whether defendant's housing policy [had] a
3 4
disparate impact on the basis of sexual orientation."
A.

Marital Status Discrimination

The court of appeals first examined the plaintiff's claim that
35
AECOM's housing policy discriminated on the basis of marital status.
The court found that AECOM's housing policy did not discriminate on
its face.3 6 In reaching this conclusion, the court heavily relied upon
two of its prior cases, Manhattan Pizza Hut v. New York State Human
Rights Appeal Bd.3 7 and Hudson View Properties v. Weiss.38 The court
stated that these two cases stood for the proposition that "for the purposes of applying [a] statutory proscription, a distinction must be
made between the complainant's marital status as such, and the existence of the complainant's disqualifying relationship - or absence
39
thereof - with another person."
The court then analogized AECOM's housing policy to the lease
at issue in Hudson View. 40 In Hudson View, the court upheld a lease
provision that limited the occupancy of an apartment to the tenant
and those in a legal, family relationship with the tenant.4 1 The validity
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Levin, 96 N.Y.2d at 490.
Id.
Id. at 490-91.
Id.
Id.
434 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1980).
463 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1983).
754 N.Y.2d at 490.
Id.
See Hudson View, 463 N.Y.S.2d 428.
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of the lease provision did not turn on the marital status of the tenant.4 2

Likewise, the court found that "AECOM's housing policy is restricted
43
to those in legally recognized, family relationships with a student."
As a result, according to the court, the applicability of the restriction in
AECOM's housing policy did not depend on whether the student was
married. 44 Therefore, by limiting on-campus housing to students,
their spouses, and dependent children, the court held that the housing policy did not "facially discriminate on the basis of marital status."4 5 Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiffs' first five

causes of action, claiming discrimination on the basis of marital status
as prohibited by the New York State and New York City Human Rights
46
Laws, were properly dismissed by the courts below.

B. DisparateImpact on Homosexuals
The court began the discussion of this issue with an overview of
the applicable statutes.4 7 The court first noted that § 8-107(5) (a) (1)
of the New York City Administrative Code makes it unlawful for any
public or private institution to refuse housing to any person because
of, among other things, that person's sexual orientation. 48 Further,
the court noted that § 8-107(17) creates a cause of action for "an unlawful discriminatory practice based upon disparate impact."49 Thus,
"a claim of discrimination based on sexual orientation can be stated
where a facially neutral policy or practice has a disparate impact on a
protected group."50
42.

See id. In Hudson View, the tenant was living with a man with whom she had a

loving relationship, i.e., a person who was not a member of her immediate family. See
id. The fact that, by marriage, he could become a member of her immediate family and
therefore legally live in the apartment was irrelevant to the question of whether the
restrictive covenant was valid. Id. The court reasoned that the applicability of the restriction did not depend on her marital status as such because, "[iw]ere the additional
tenant a female unrelated to the tenant, the lease would be violated without reference
to marriage." Id. Thus, the restriction did not discriminate on the basis of marital
status. Id.
43. Levin, 96 N.Y.2d at 490-91.
44.

Id at 491.

45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.

48. Id.
49. Levin, 96 N.Y.2d at 491 (citing N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(17)).
50. Id. (citing N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §8-107(17) (a)). In any such claim, if it shown
that a defendant's policy or practice results in a disparate impact, the defendant, under
§ 8-107[17] [a] [2] of the New York City Administrative Code, may "plead and prove" as
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According to the court, "[h]ow this impact is measured is obviously a critical determination."5 ' For guidance in this regard, the court
looked at the United States Supreme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke
Power.52 In Griggs, African-American employees of the defendant utility
company alleged that the company's hiring policy, which required all
applicants for certain positions to have a high school diploma and/or
pass a standardized test, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. 53 The plaintiffs argued that, even though the policy was neutral
on its face, statistically it disqualified African-Americans at a higher
rate than it did white candidates. 54 The Court agreed with the plaintiffs and found that the policy excluded African-Americans more frequently than similarly situated white applicants. 55 According to the
Supreme Court, a prima facie case of disparate impact is established
when it is shown that a test, policy, or practice "select[s] applicants for
hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that
'56
pool of applicants.
The court of appeals found that the lower courts' disparate impact
analysis rendered the standard articulated in Griggs and its progeny
meaningless. 57 The appellate division held that AECOM's housing
policy did not have a disparate impact on the plaintiffs on the basis of
sexual orientation. 58 In analyzing any disparate impact, the intermediate court excluded married students from consideration for purposes
of comparison between benefited and excluded classes.59
an affirmative defense that the policy or practice "bears a significant relationship to a
significant business objective." Id. at 1103 n.3. However, if (1) the plaintiff produces
"substantial evidence of an alternative policy or practice with less disparate impact" and
(2) the "defendant fails to prove that the alternative policy or practice would not serve
defendant's significant business objective as well as the complained of policy or practice" then the affirmative defense will be defeated. Id.
51.
Id. at 492.

52.

401 U.S. 424 (1971).

53. See id. at 426.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 431.
56. Id. at 425. This language comes from the Supreme Court's interpretation of
Griggs in a subsequent case, Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 402, 425 (1975).
57. See Levin, 96 N.Y.2d at 493.
58. Levin, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
59. Id. (holding that the plaintiffs "failed to establish that defendants' policy had a
disparate impact on homosexuals since it had the same impact on non-married, heterosexual medical students as it had on non-married, homosexual students.") (emphasis
added).
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The court of appeals found this methodology to be erroneous as a
matter of law. 60 According to the court, because married students
were eligible to live with non-students in on-campus housing, married
students constituted a significant portion of beneficiaries under the
school's housing policy. 61 In order to determine whether the housing
policy had a disparate impact on the basis of sexual orientation, the
court reasoned that "there must be a comparison that includes consideration of the full composition of the class actually benefited under the
challenged policy."62 Therefore, the disparate impact analysis in this
case must include married persons. 63 Otherwise, "any realistic exami64
nation of the discriminatory effects of [the] policy" will be obscured.
The court of appeals concluded that because the appellate division failed to include married students in its disparate impact methodology, the plaintiff's seventh cause of action was improperly
dismissed. 65 As a result, the court ordered the claim "reinstated and
66
remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings."
VI.

CONCLUSION

The court of appeals held that lesbian students at AECOM who
were each denied university housing with their life partners did not
state a valid cause of action of marital status discrimination under the
60. Levin, 96 N.Y.2d at 496.
61. Id. at 493-94.
62. Id. at 496.
63. Id.
64. Id. To illustrate this point, the court used the facts of Giggs, 401 U.S. 424. If
the plaintiffs in Giiggs were precluded from "analyzing the racial composition of those
actually offered employment under the company's policy," then, the court noted," the
only comparison would have been between those blacks and whites without high school
diplomas or passing test scores." See Levin, 96 N.Y.2d at 493. Because all members of
the compared classes would not be recipients of favorable treatment, no disparate impact would have been established. See id.
65. See id.
at 496. The court stated that, by excluding married students from the
equation, the Appellate Division must have accepted one of AECOM's two following
arguments: (1) Because the distinction the housing policy makes based on marital relationships is a lawfil one (citing Hudson Vi/ew), married students are not similarly situated to other students and (2) the housing policy discriminates on its face on the basis
of sexual orientation because marriage, under the law, is the union of a man and a
woman and therefore married students are not similarly situated with the groups to be
compared. See id. at 493-496. The court flatly rejected both arguments relying on its
own interpretation of the law and United States Supreme Court precedent. Id.
66. Id. at 496.
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New York State and City Human Rights Laws. 67 Nevertheless, the
court additionally found that the plaintiffs did state a valid claim of
disparate impact based on sexual orientation under the City Human
68
Rights Law.
Gregory G. Gomez

67.
68.

Id. at 491.
Id. at 496.

MASON V. U.E.S.S. LEASING CORP., ET AL. 1
(decided July 2, 2001)
I.

SY,NOPSIS

In a memorandum decision, the New York Court of Appeals ruled
on a question certified by the appellate division. The question certified to the court was whether the appellate division correctly held that
a question of fact existed as 1) to whether the defendants negligently
permitted plaintiffs attacker into her apartment building if the attacker was known to security personnel as a possible troublemaker and
2) to whether plaintiffs opening of her door without looking through
the peephole was an intervening act which relieved defendants from
liability.2 The court of appeals held that the appellate division properly reversed the supreme court's order granting defendants' motions
for summary judgement.3 The court reasoned that landlords have a
duty to take minimal precautions to protect tenants from foreseeable
injury and that on a motion for summary judgement a plaintiff only
needs to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether a defendant's con4
duct proximately caused plaintiff's injuries.
II.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Yolanda Mason, resided in a Queens apartment building
that is part of a larger complex called Lefrak City.5 Defendant,
U.E.S.S. Leasing Corporation and Builders and Realtors Corporation,
Inc., owned the complex and defendant, Mid-City Security Service Inc.,
provided security for the complex. 6 On July 11, 1992, just after 7:00
a.m., plaintiff was phoned by her live-in boyfriend who told her that he
would come up to the apartment in five minutes. 7 A few minutes later,
the apartment doorbell rang and plaintiff opened the door thinking it
was her boyfriend.8 She did not first look through the peephole or ask
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

96 N.Y.2d 875 (2001).
Mason v. U.E.S.S. Leasing Corp., 712 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1st Dep't 2000).
Mason, 96 N.Y.2d at 877.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 877.

6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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who was at the door. 9 Third-party defendant Lawrence Toole was at
plaintiff's door and forced his way inside.10 Toole then dragged plaintiff to the bedroom where he beat, raped and sodomized her at
knifepoint."1
In the first cause of action, plaintiff argued that defendants negligently allowed Toole to enter the building and gain access to her
apartment. 12 In the second cause of action, plaintiff alleged that defendant Mid-City Security Service Inc. negligently performed its security contract.' 3 Plaintiffs third cause of action maintained that
defendants violated RPL § 235-b and breached the implied warranty of
habitability by failing to properly staff the security desk or secure the
complex.14
The supreme court granted the defendants' motions for summary
judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs complaint. 15 The supreme
court found that plaintiffs deposition testimony indicated that defendants had taken minimal security precautions and that plaintiff failed
to show that defendants' negligence was a proximate cause of her
16
injuries.
A divided appellate division reversed the supreme court order,
reasoning that a question of fact existed as to whether defendants negligently permitted plaintiffs attacker to enter the building. 17 A majority of the appellate division also held that a factual issue existed as to
whether plaintiff's act of opening the door without first looking
18
through the peephole was an independent intervening act.
The appellate division majority stated that
[i] n premises security cases ... the necessary causal link
between a landlord's culpable failure to provide adequate
security and a tenant's injuries resulting from a criminal
attack in the building can be established only if the assailant gained access to the premises through a negligently
maintained entrance. Since even a fully secured entrance
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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would not keep out another tenant, or someone allowed
into the building by another tenant, plaintiff can recover
only if the assailant was an intruder.1 9
The appellate division majority noted that the landlord had a security
guard stationed in the common lobby and the Lefrak City complex
had an intercom system and locked inner and outer doors. 20 Despite
these security provisions, the appellate division majority held that a
question of fact existed as to whether or not the defendants negligently
allowed plaintiffs attacker into her building when it was widely known
by security personnel and other residents that the attacker was a nonresident and local troublemaker. 2 ' The attacker's photograph was also
in a photo book containing pictures of persons previously arrested in
22
the apartment complex.
The appellate division majority distinguished the facts of this case
23
In the first case, Elie v. Kraus,24
from several other peephole cases.
the plaintiff lived in a garden apartment complex in a series of twostory buildings with access provided through a ground-level door
which led to two units. 2 5 "Locks on the buildings' outer doors had

been previously removed in favor of new inner apartment doors with
an extra deadbolt and peephole." 2 6 "The Court held that the individual tenant's apartment doors were the main line of defense against
intruders and therefore plaintiff's act of buzzing open his door after
dark without checking who it was or looking out the peephole was an
intervening cause of the attack."27 The court held that this intervening
28
act severed the landlord's liability for the plaintiffs injuries.
In the second case distinguished by the appellate division majority, Benitez v. Paxton Realty Corp,2 9 the court held that there was no evidence as to the manner in which the plaintiffs attacker gained access
to the building.8 0 Therefore, plaintiff could not prove that defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries.3 ' The court
19. Mason, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 466-67 (citing Burgos v. Aqueduct Realty Corp., 92
N.Y.2d 544, 550-551 (1998)).
20. Id. at 467.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 631 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1st Dep't 1995).
25. Mason, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 467.

26.

Id.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
637 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1st Dep't 1996).
Mason, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
Id.
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relied on Elie and stated that plaintiffs acts of opening the door without asking and checking the peephole was an intervening cause that
severed any liability of the landlord for failure to provide adequate security. 32 The appellate division majority noted that these two cases
predated Burgos v. Aqueduct Realty Corp. 33 The appellate division majority also pointed out that while they may decide as a matter of law the
issue of whether an intervening act severs the causal relationship between the landlord's negligence in providing security and the ability of
plaintiff's attacker to gain access to her apartment, it is best to leave
34
the issue for a jury given the facts of this case.
In analyzing the legal cause of plaintiff's injuries, the appellate
division majority stated that a number of factors might be relevant
where acts of third persons intervene between the defendant's conduct
and the plaintiff's injury.35 The defendant's liability may turn upon
whether the intervening act of a third person is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant's negligence. 36 If the intervening act is not foreseeable or is far removed
from the defendant's conduct, a superceding act may indeed break the
causal chain. 37 Issues concerning what is foreseeable are generally for
the fact finder to resolve, although there are certain instances where
only one conclusion may be drawn from the established facts and
38
where the question of legal cause may be decided as a matter of law.
Those cases typically involve independent intervening acts that operate
39
upon, but do not flow from, the original negligence.
The appellate division majority reasoned that plaintiffs opening
of her apartment door, without looking through the peephole or asking who was at the door, was an independent intervening act which did
not flow from defendants' alleged negligence in allowing a known
troublemaker to enter the complex and gain access to plaintiff's apartment. 40 Therefore, the appellate division majority held that as a matter of law, defendants were not relieved of liability. 4 1 Comparing this
case to the facts of Burgos v. Aqueduct Realty Corp., the majority noted
32.
33.
can only
34.
35.
(1980)).
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
92 N.Y.2d 544, 550-551 (1998) (holding that in landlord liability cases plaintiff
recover if the assailant was an intruder).
Mason, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
Id. at 468 (citing Derdiarian v. Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 314-315
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(citing
(citing
(citing
(citing

Derdiarian,51
Derdiarian, 51
Derdiarian, 51
Derdiarian, 51

N.Y.2d
N.Y.2d
N.Y.2d
N.Y.2d

at
at
at
at

314-15).
314-15).
314-15).
314-15).
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that the plaintiff could have just as easily opened her door without
looking through the peephole if she were leaving for work or taking
out the garbage. 4 2 However, issues relating to intervening acts, proximate cause and comparative negligence are best left to a jury to decide. 43 Therefore, the appellate division majority dismissed the
supreme court's order granting defendants' motions for summary
judgement, reinstated plaintiff's complaint and remanded for further
proceedings. 44
Judge Tom of the appellate division dissented from the majority
45
opinion and recounted several facts not discussed by the majority.
The dissenting judge noted that the plaintiff's boyfriend had keys to
the entrance of her building and to one of the two locks on her apartment door. 46 Also, plaintiff's attacker Lawrence Toole was well known
in the complex because he grew up on the premises and his family
currently resided there. 47 Toole's name was in a photo book identifying persons arrested on the premises, but at the time of the incident,
Toole was not restricted from the complex. 48 Plaintiff's building "was
equipped with an intercom and a door buzzer system, which were functioning on the day of the attack."49 A security guard was stationed in
the front lobby of the building and plaintiffs apartment door was
equipped with two locks and a peephole. 50
The dissenting judge noted that the lower court found that the
landlord had taken the necessary minimal security precautions required by law. The judge stated that "landlords have a common law
duty to take minimal precautions to protect tenants from foreseeable
harm," including foreseeable criminal conduct by a third party.51 The
court found in similar circumstances that "furnishing a security guard
in the lobby, and installing functioning locks and peepholes on doors,
could constitute reasonable security measures." 52 The dissenting
judge argued that a tenant must establish that the injury was proximately caused by the landlord's breach of its duty of care. 53 Further42.

Mason, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 468.

43.

Id.

44.
45.

Id.
Id. at 468-69.

46.

Id. at 469.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.

49.
50.

Id.
Id.

51.
52.

Id. (citingJacqueline S. v. City of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 288, 293-94 (1993)).
Id. (citing S.M.RK, Inc. v. 25 W.43"' St. Co., 673 N.Y.S.2d 119 (1st Dep't

1998)).
53.

Id. (citing Burgos, 92 N.Y.2d at 548).
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more, a tenant also has a responsibility to act reasonably when giving
54
entrance to a third party.
In dissent, Judge Tom also asserted that the court has
consistently held that a plaintiff's own conduct of responding to a knock or a ring by opening a locked apartment door that contains a peephole without first looking
through the peephole to ascertain who is on the other
side constitutes intervening and superceding causation
that breaks the causal chain and severs the landlords
55
liability.
The causal chain may be severed even when a landlord's own security measures are not reasonable and even when the tenant's con56
duct is readily explainable.
The dissenting judge also discredited the majority's conclusion
that Burgos v. Aqueduct Realty Corp. requires the application of a new
standard because it was decided after the two peephole cases, Benitez
and Elie.57 Judge Tom argued that Burgos addressed the different case
of a landlord's duty to exclude intruders. 58 Judge Tom stated, "[I]n
Burgos and pre-Burgos case law, intruders were characterized generally as non-residents who often, though not necessarily, were unknown."5 9 In this case, the assailant did not logically fit that description
because he had family residing in the complex which he presumably
visited. 60 Despite Burgos, courts have still held that tenants have a duty
to ascertain who is at the door. 6' The law is clear that if a tenant fails
to look through the peephole and identify who is at the door, the land62
lord's liability is severed as a matter of law.
III.

DISCUSSION

The court of appeals began its analysis by briefly recounting the
facts of the case and the procedural history.63 The court restated the
issue as whether the appellate division correctly held that a question of
fact existed as: (1) to whether the defendants negligently permitted
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. (citing
Id. (citing
Id. (citing
Id. at 470.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mason, 96

S.M.RK., Inc., 673 N.Y.S.2d 119).
Benitez, 637 N.Y.S.2d 11; Elie, 631 N.Y.S.2d 16).
S.M.R.K, Inc., 673 N.Y.S.2d 119).

N.Y.2d at 877.
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plaintiff's attacker to enter her apartment building, and; (2) to
looking
whether plaintiff's act of opening the door without first
64
through the peephole was an independent intervening act.

In analyzing the first issue, the court stated that "landlords have a
common-law duty to take minimal precautions to protect tenants from
foreseeable harm, including foreseeable criminal conduct by a third
person." 65 If a landlord is alerted to the possibility of criminal conduct
by third persons based on past experience, the "landlord has a duty to
minimize the foreseeable danger." 66 The extent that criminal activities
by third parties in a housing complex are foreseeable "will depend on
the location, nature and extent of previous criminal activities and their
67
similarity, proximity or other relationship to the crime."
The court held that on a motion for summary judgement, the
plaintiff must only raise a triable issue of fact concerning whether the
defendant's conduct proximately caused plaintiff's injuries.68 The
court stated that in this case, questions of fact still existed as to whether
the defendants negligently failed to exclude plaintiffs attacker from
the building complex. 69 Plaintiff s assailant, Lawrence Toole, had
been involved in numerous criminal acts in the complex, including
robbery, attempted rape and assault. 70 Toole had also been arrested
on the premises and defendants kept an arrest photo of him. 7 1 The
court held that it could not conclude that Toole's involvement in criminal activity within the complex was not a foreseeable possibility. 72 The
court argued that more discovery was needed to determine how foreseeable a risk Toole was and what security measures defendants used to
73
deal with him.
In response to the second issue, the court's response was very
brief. The court also agreed with the appellate division majority that
the plaintiff s acts of opening her apartment door without first looking
through the peephole or asking who was there were not independent
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 878 (citingJacquelineS., 81 N.Y.2d at 293-94; Burgos, 92 N.Y.2d at 548).
Id.
Id. (citingJacquelineS., 81 N.Y.2d at 295).
Id.
Id. at 878.

70.
71.

Id.
Id.

72.

Id.

73.

Id.
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intervening acts that excused defendants of culpability.7 4 Therefore,
the court answered the certified question from the appellate division
in the affirmative.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Mason, The New York Court of Appeals held that a question of
fact existed as: (1) to whether defendants negligently permitted plaintiff's attacker into her building, and; (2) to whether plaintiff s act of
opening her door without looking through the peephole or asking
who was at the door was an intervening act which relieved defendants
from liability. 75 The court confirmed that these issues could not be
resolved as a matter of law and therefore answered the certified ques76
tion from the appellate division in the affirmative.
Erin L. Roberts

74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id at 877.
Id at 878.

PEOPLE V DEPALLO'
(decided July 2, 2001)
I.

SYNoPSIS

In a decision by Justice Wesley, the New York Court of Appeals
unanimously affirmed an order of the Appellate Division, Second Department, which held that a defendant's right to testify at trial did not
include a right to commit perjury, that the Sixth Amendment right to
the assistance of counsel did not compel counsel to assist or participate
in the presentation of perjured testimony, and that defendant was not
deprived of his right to be present at a material stage of trial. 2
II. BACKGROUND
Defendant and his accomplices performed a calculated attack
upon a 71-year-old man.3 Before bludgeoning him to death with a
shovel, they ransacked his home and stabbed him repeatedly with a
knife and scissors. 4 Evidence tying defendant to the scene included his
blood and fingerprints both on the victim's clothing and at the victim's
home. 5 Defendant made several incriminating statements upon his arrest that placed him at the scene. During pre-trial proceedings, he
admitted to forcing one of his accomplices to participate in the crime
6
under threat of death.
Prior to defendant's trial, his defense counsel advised him that he
was not required to take the stand, but if he did decide to testify, he
must do so truthfully. 7 Defendant confirmed counsel's statements to
the court and insisted on testifying.8 Over numerous objections by defense counsel, defendant testified that he was home the entire evening
of the crime, and that his contrary statements to the police were induced by promises that he could return home.9
1.
2.
3.
4.

96 N.Y.2d 437 (2001).
People v. DePallo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 755 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2000).
People v. DePallo, 96 N.Y.2d 437 (2001).
Id at 439.

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

9.

DePallo, 96 N.Y.2d at 439.
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Later, after both sides had rested, defense counsel addressed the
court in chambers ex parte and explained that while preparing for
trial, defendant indicated that he was going to deny his participation in
the crime while on the stand.1 0 This was contrary to past conversations
that counsel had with defendant, so counsel warned defendant that he
could not participate in any kind of perjury and that defendant should
not perjure himself.1 1 Defense counsel did not refer to Defendant's
12
trial testimony during summations.
The trial court noted that counsel had complied with the procedures for such circumstances as outlined in People v. Salquerro.13 Defendant was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder, two counts
of first-degree robbery, two counts of first-degree burglary, and one
14
count of second-degree robbery.
Defendant appealed his convictions on two grounds: (1) that he
was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel when his attorney
informed the court that defendant intended to perjure himself on the
stand, and (2) that he was deprived of his right to be present at material stages of trial when his attorney conveyed this information during
court conferences at which the defendant was not present.1 5 The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the judgment of the
16
trial court, and this court granted leave to appeal.
III.

DISCUSSION

The court began by explaining that the first issue presented by
this case is far from novel. 17 In fact, defense attorneys have dealt with
the ethical dilemmas of client perjury since the late 19' Century when
the disqualification of criminal defendants to testify in their own defense was abolished by statute in federal and most state courts.' 8 The
appropriate role of counsel when caught in this situation is hard to
define with any degree of precision because of the competing considerations involved. 19 A lawyer with a potentially perjurious client must
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 43940.
Id. at 440.
Id.
Id.; see also People v. Salquerro, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
DePallo, 96 N.Y.2d at 440.
DePallo, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
Id. at 755.
DePallo, 96 N.Y.2d at 440.
Id.
Id.
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balance the "duties of zealous advocacy, confidentiality and loyalty to
the client on one hand, and a responsibility to the courts and our
20
truth-seeking system of justice on the other."
However, in spite of these competing considerations, two points
are very clear: (1) a defendant's right to testify at trial does not include
a right to commit perjury, and (2) the Sixth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel does not compel defense counsel to assist or par21
ticipate in the presentation of perjured testimony.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that when faced with
this dilemma,
"counsel must first attempt to persuade the client not to
pursue the unlawful course of conduct. If unsuccessful,
withdrawal from representation may be an appropriate response, but when confronted with the problem during
trial, as here, an attorney's revelation of his client's perjury to the court is a professionally responsible and ac22
ceptable response."
This approach has been codified under New York's Code of Professional Responsibility, in section DR 7-102.23 The court found that
defense counsel acted consistent with these responsibilities when he
first attempted to dissuade defendant from testifying falsely. 24 Since
Defendant insisted on taking the stand and proceeded to perjure him25
self, counsel properly notified the court.
Defendant's contention that his counsel should have withdrawn
himself from the case was also rejected.2 6 The court failed to see how
substitution of counsel would have resolved the problem and noted
that it could have actually facilitated Defendant's fraud.2 7 The rest of
counsel's representation was more than competent, and because there
was no breach of any recognized professional duty, it follows that De28
fendant was not deprived of his right to assistance of counsel.
Next, the court dealt with the second issue raised by Defendant:
that his right to be present during a material stage of trial was violated
20.

Id.

21.

Id. at 441.

22.

DePallo,96 N.Y.2d at 441.
Id.; see also 22 N.Y.C.R.R. § 1200.33.
DePao, 96 N.Y.2d at 441.
Id.
Id. at 442.
Id.
Id.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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by his absence from the ex parte communication between the court
and his attorney. 29 A defendant's constitutional and statutory right to
be present at all material stages of trial when he may have something
valuable to contribute or when presence would have a substantial effect on his ability to defend himself does not extend to matters of law
or procedure that have no potential for meaningful input from a
30
defendant.
The court explained that the ex parte communications at issue
here are precisely one of those situations in which Defendant's presence was not mandated and had no bearing on his ability to defend
against the charges or on the outcome of the jury trial. 3 1 The purpose
of the ex parte meeting was simply to memorialize counsel's ethical
dilemma for appellate review or any possible inquiry into his professional ethical obligations. 32 The meeting was merely procedural and
33
defendant had no right to be present.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In DePallo, the New York Court of Appeals held that the Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel does not compel coun34
sel to assist or participate in the presentation of perjured testimony.
Therefore, defense counsel does not violate that right by informing
the court of a defendant's perjury during trial.35 In addition, the court
also held that when the subject matter of ex parte communications
between the court and defendant's counsel involves matters of law or
procedure with no potential for meaningful input from a defendant,
36
defendant has no right to be present.
Amy St. Jude Wichowski

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id. at 443.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 441.
DePallo, 96 N.Y.2d 442.
Id. at 443.

PEOPLE V EDWARDS'
(decided July 5, 2001)
I.

SYNoPSiS

With one justice dissenting, the New York Court of Appeals held
that a voluntary, intelligently made plea of guilty to an indictment for
first-degree murder entered under the then applicable law did not automatically become invalid after ajudicial decision holding the particular section of the statute under which the plea was made
unconstitutional. 2 The court did not reach the issue of defendant's
waiver of the right to appeal on assertions of constitutional infirmities.3
Additionally, the court dismissed defendant's appeal upon the ground
that he was not adversely affected by the appellate division order
4
within the meaning of New York Criminal Procedure Law § 450.90.
II.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Daniel Edwards was arrested on May 20, 1997, and subsequently indicted for murder in the first degree and several lesser
crimes, for the shooting death of Frank Arroyo.5 Defendant's brother
and his brother's girlfriend were indicted for the same crimes. 6 The
District Attorney pursuant to CPL § 250.40, filed a notice of intent to
seek the death penalty for all three defendants in January 1998, subsequently withdrawing the notice as to defendant's brother. 7 Defendant
pleaded not guilty and trial was set to commence on November 9, 1998
in county court of Schoharie County, New York.8
In October, 1998, defendant and the District Attorney entered
into plea negotiations. 9 The plea agreement entered into and approved by the county court provided that defendant would plead guilty
to murder in the first degree in full satisfaction of the indictment and
1.

96 N.Y.2d 445 (2001).

2. Id. at 454.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 456.
Id.; see N.Y. CGlM. PROC. LAw § 450.90 (Consol. 2001).
People v. Edwards, 712 N.Y.S.2d 71 (3d Dep't 2000).
People v. Edwards, 690 N.Y.S.2d 404 (1999).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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cooperate with the prosecution, in return for which the District Attorney would agree to the plea and withdraw the notice of intent to seek
the death penalty. The proposed sentence was to be 25 years to life, or
alternatively, if defendant failed to cooperate, a maximum sentence of
life without parole, if it was found to be appropriate by the court.1 0
Additionally, defendant waived his right to appeal except in regard to
the suppression of his statement made to police. This statement, admitting his guilt, was made while being interviewed by the police, but
prior to his arrest." Defendant then proffered his plea to the county
court and made a complete allocution, at which point the prosecutor
withdrew her notice of intent to seek the death penalty. 12 The court
3
subsequently accepted the guilty plea and allowed it to be entered.'
At the time of defendant's guilty plea, New York's Criminal Procedure Law Sections 220.10(5) (e) and 220.30(3) (b) (vii) both provided
that a defendant, against whom a notice of intent to seek the death
penalty was pending, could only enter a plea of guilty to the crime of
first-degree murder with the consent of the people and the permission
of the court, and only when the sentence that was agreed upon was life
imprisonment without parole or a term of years.' 4 The result was that
the death sentence could only be imposed if the accused pled not
guilty and exercised his Sixth Amendment right to ajury trial.' 5 After
entry of defendant's guilty plea, but prior to his sentencing, the New
York Court of Appeals decided Hynes v. Tomei, 16 following Supreme
Court precedent, declaring the two above-noted sections of the New
York Penal Law facially unconstitutional and excising them. 17 The
court also construed the remaining portions of the two statutes to prohibit entry of a guilty plea to first-degree murder while a notice of intent to seek the death penalty was pending. 18
In February, 1999, defendant moved the county court to withdraw
his plea of guilty to murder in the first degree, arguing that the court
of appeals' decision in Hynes v. Tomei' 9 declaring the plea provisions of
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Edwards, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
Id.
Edwards, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
Id.
Edwards, 96 N.Y.2d at 449.
Id.
92 N.Y.2d 613, cert. denied 527 U.S. 1015 (1999).
Edwards, 96 N.Y.2d at 449.
Id.
92 N.Y.2d 613.
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G.P.L. §§ 220.10 (5) (e) and 220.30(3) (b) (vii) unconstitutional, rendered his plea invalid.20 After reviewing the plea agreement and transcripts of the pre-plea conferences and the allocution, the court found
that defendant's plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.2 ' The trial court further held that the court of appeals had
explicitly stated, in its Hynes decision, that its holding would not prevent guilty pleas to first-degree murder when no notice of intent to
seek the death penalty was pending.2 2 In the instant case, the court
reasoned that because the notice of intent to seek the death penalty
had been withdrawn prior to entry of the guilty plea, it was constitutionally valid.2 3 The trial court had interpreted the court of appeals'
mandate as referring to the time of entry of the plea as opposed to the
time of the admission and allocution in open court.2 4 Consequently,
because the only issue that defendant raised regarding his plea was its
invalidity following the Hynes decision, the court denied defendant's
25
motion.
Subsequently, defendant appealed to the Appellate Division,
Third Department, where the People argued that defendant's waiver
of his right to appeal precluded appellate review. 26 Defendant simultaneously appealed the denial of his motion to suppress his statement of
guilt

27

The appellate court found that defendant's waiver could not

have been knowingly made because the constitutional infirmity in the
penal law only came to light afterwards, and further that the right to
appeal the validity of a plea based upon a statute that suffered such a
constitutional infirmity was of a class of rights that could not be
waived. 28 The court went on to decide the issue of the validity of defendant's guilty plea, finding it invalid. 29 The court vacated defendant's plea and sentence, restored the indictment to the pre-plea
stage, and reinstated the notice of intent to seek the death penalty.3 0
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Edwards, 690 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
Id.
Id at 406.
Id.
Id.

25.

Id. at 405.

26.

Edwards, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 74.

27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 75.

29.

Id. at 75-76.

30. Id. at 77.
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The court also affirmed the lower court's denial of defendant's motion
31
to suppress his statement.
Leave was granted to both the People and defendant to appeal the
32
appellate division's order.
III.

DISCUSSION

The Court of Appeals framed the issue to be decided on appeal as
whether ". . .as a matter of Federal constitutional law, defendant's plea
of guilty to first degree murder was invalid as having impermissibly burdened his Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights." 33

The court analo-

gized its decisions in Hynes v. Tomei and the instant action to the
Supreme Court's decisions in United States v. Jackson3 4 and Brady v.
United States35 to analyze the issues and reach its conclusion.
In United States v. Jackson, the Court held that the death penalty
provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act, "impermissibly burdened
capital defendant's Fifth Amendment Rights against self incrimination
and Sixth Amendment Rights to trial by jury... ,".36 The Jackson Court
construed the Federal Kidnapping Acts death penalty provision to create a two-tiered penalty structure by limiting the imposition of the
death penalty to defendants who insisted on ajury trial. 37 Therefore, a
defendant who pled guilty to the applicable crime could not be subjected to the death penalty.3 8 The Court found that while Congress
could mitigate the severity of capital punishment, it could not impose
the death penalty in ". . .a manner that needlessly penalizes the assertion of a constitutional right."3 9 The Court further found that the statute needlessly encouraged guilty pleas and tended to discourage
40
defendants from claiming innocence and demanding trial by jury.
However, the court stressed that this holding did not imply that every
defendant who entered a guilty plea under the Act did so involuntarily. 41 Additionally, the Court ruled that, since the death penalty provi31.

Id.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Edwards, 96 N.Y.2d at 445.
Id. at 451.
390 U.S. 570 (1968).
397 U.S. 742 (1970).
Edwards, 96 N.Y.2d at 449.
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).

38.

Id.

39.

Id. at 583.

40.
41.

Id.
Id.
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sion had been added to the Act subsequently, excising that provision
would leave the statute a cohesive whole while removing the constitu42
tional infirmity.
Similarly, thirty years later, the New York Court of Appeals, in
Hynes v. Tomei, 43 found that the plea provisions of New York Criminal
Procedure Law sections 220.10 and 220.30 imposed a two-tiered penalty structure on defendants indicted for first-degree murder. 44 The
court felt compelled by the Supreme Court's Jackson ruling to hold
that these plea provisions likewise impermissibly burdened defendant's
constitutional rights. 45 To clarify its position, the court distinguished
plea bargaining from these plea provisions which needlessly encouraged guilty pleas, and which the Jackson Court prohibited. 46 After
examining legislative purpose and the remaining statute's cohesiveness, should the capital pleading provisions be excised, the court
found the plea provisions to be severable, and struck them. 47 The
Court further construed the resulting statute to provide that a defendant could not plead guilty to first-degree murder while a notice of
intent to seek the death penalty was pending. 48 However, it is important to note that the Supreme Court in its Jackson decision was construing the actual death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act,
while the New York Court, in its Hynes decision, was construing certain
49
plea provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law.
The other one-half of the New York Court of Appeals' analogy was
to a case that came before the Supreme Court one year after that
Court had invalidated the death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act.50 Defendant Brady was indicted under the Federal Kidnapping Act, the death penalty provisions of which had been found
unconstitutional in U.S. v. Jackson.5 1 Unlike the instant defendant who
had moved to withdraw his guilty plea to first-degree murder on the
ground that it was invalid under Hynes v. Tomei,5 2 defendant Brady
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 585-86.
92 N.Y.2d 613.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id. at 636.
Id.
See id. at 622.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
Id.
92 N.Y.2d 613 (1999).
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sought review claiming that his plea of guilty was not voluntarily given
because the then valid death penalty provisions of the Federal Kidnap53
ping Act operated to coerce his plea.
The Brady Court extensively discussed the requirements Jackson
imposed upon review of guilty pleas under the Federal Act, finding
that decision ". . .neither fashioned a new standard for judging the
validity of guilty pleas nor mandated a new application of the test
theretofore fashioned by courts, and since reiterated that guilty pleas
are valid if both 'voluntary' and 'intelligent.' 5 4 The voluntariness of a
guilty plea, as was mandated by precedent, must be determined by consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding it, only
one of which was the possibility of a death sentence after a guilty verdict.55 The record, in Brady's case, was replete with circumstances indicating that his decision to plead guilty was competently weighed
against the strength of the government's case against him and the
probability of damaging testimony by his codefendant. 56 Brady's plea
was voluntary under this standard and the Supreme Court affirmed the
denial of his request for relief by the United States Court of Appeals
57
for the Tenth Circuit.
The instant defendant, however, sought relief based upon the rule
of constitutional adjudication that states with newly declared constitutional rules should be applied to criminal cases pending on direct review. 58 This Supreme Court precedent enunciated the view that the
Court was bound by judicial integrity to apply the current best understanding of governing constitutional principles to all similar cases
pending on direct review, and overruled prior precedent. 59 The court
of appeals, in the instant matter, however, likened the circumstances
surrounding defendant Edward's guilty plea under constitutionally infirm provisions subsequently excised from a statute to defendant
Brady's plea of guilty under subsequently declared constitutionally in60
firm provisions of the Federal Kidnapping Act.
The court found, as the Supreme Court had in Brady, that their
prior decision holding the statutory provisions constitutionally defec53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Brady, 397 U.S. at 744.
Id. at 747.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Edwards, 96 N.Y.2d at 445.
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987)
Edwards, 96 N.Y.2d at 454.
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five under which defendant Edwards had previously pled guilty, did
61
not fashion a new standard for judging the validity of guilty pleas.
Closely paralleling the Supreme Court's analysis in Brady, the New
York court ruled that defendant Edward's guilty plea was not automatically invalidated because its subsequent decision in Hynes may have
shown ".. .that the plea rested on a faulty premise."62 Maintaining that
the instant case was procedurally and analytically identical to the Brady
case, the New York court held that defendant Edward's guilty plea,
63
standing alone, did not violate his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights.
Accordingly, the Appellate Division's Order on the People's Appeal
was reversed because it was based solely on the premise that defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated. Defendant's
guilty plea was reinstated, and the case was remanded to the appellate
division for a factual review of the record. 64 Additionally, the court
dismissed defendant's appeal holding that he was not adversely affected by the appellate division order, which is a requisite for review
under CPL § 450.90(1).65
The New York judges relied on the Supreme Court's many decisions vacating death sentences imposed before its Jackson decision,
while leaving undisturbed guilty pleas under the excised provisions of
the Federal Kidnapping Act, to support its reasoning and ultimate conclusion. 66 However, the Supreme Court's Jackson decision invalidated
the death penalty provisions of the Federal Kidnapping Act; whereas
the New York Hynes decision invalidated certain plea provisions of New
York Criminal Procedure Law. Nevertheless, the New York court focused on the coerciveness of the excised provisions and their effect on
67
the voluntariness of defendant's guilty plea.
Consequently, the New York Court did not even touch upon the
issue of the retroactive application of a new constitutional rule to defendant Edward's direct appeal, except in reply to a rather strong dissent by Judge Smith.6 8 In a contrite response to the dissent, the court
again invoked Supreme Court precedent, arguing that a voluntary,
knowing and intelligently made guilty plea subsequently waived a de61.
62.

Id. at 452.
Id.

63.

Id. at 454.

64.

Id. at 456.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 453-54.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 454-55.
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fendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, and that defendant may
not thereafter raise claims of prior deprivation of those constitutional
69
rights.
Judge Smith's dissent objected to the instant decision because acceptance of defendant Edward's guilty plea was violative of both statutory and fundamental constitutional principles. 70 He concluded that
the guilty plea was invalid after the court's Hynes decision, based upon
both New York State and Supreme Court precedent enunciating the
principle that defendant was entitled to the benefits of the new constitutional rule while his case was on direct appeal. 7 1 Additionally, the
dissent found the majority's reliance on the Brady case to reach its decision unfounded because of the difference in the provisions of the
two statutes that had been declared unconstitutional. 72 Judge Smith
disagreed with the adjudication of the issue of voluntariness of the plea
rather than the issue of whether a plea is valid when the statutory pro73
visions under which it was made are declared unconstitutional.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Edwards, the New York Court of Appeals held that subsequent
adjudication declaring certain plea provisions of New York Criminal
Procedure Law unconstitutional did not alter the standard for judging
the voluntariness of guilty pleas, nor did it automatically invalidate a
plea of guilty in a capital murder case that had been entered prior to
such adjudication of unconstitutionality.
Gail Goldfarb

69.
70.

Id. at 455.
Id. at 456.

71.
72.

Id. at 458-59.

73.

Id. at 460.

Id. at 459.

SHELDON SILVER V. GEORGE E. PATAK1
(decided July 10, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a 6-1 majority decision, the New York Court of Appeals held
that the Speaker of the New York State Assembly has the capacity and
standing as a Member of the Assembly to seek judicial redress where a
legislative vote was allegedly unconstitutionally nullified. 2 The lone
dissent disagreed stating that only a sufficient voting bloc or the entire
3
legislature itself may make a valid vote nullification claim.
II.

BACKGROUND

InJanuary 1998, Governor George Pataki submitted the 1998-1999
executive budget along with various proposed budget bills to the New
York State Legislature. The Legislature rejected many of the Governor's proposals and enacted its own budget bills that removed, reduced and added provisions to his proposals. When the revised bills
were submitted to the Governor, he exercised his line item veto power,
4
including fifty-five line item vetoes in the non-appropriation bills.
Sheldon Silver, the Speaker of the New York State Assembly, brought
an action in the Supreme Court of New York seeking a declaratory
judgment. Silver alleged that Governor Pataki violated Article IV § 7 of
the New York State Constitution by using the line item veto in the nonappropriation bills. 5 Silver asserted that the Governor could only utilize his line item veto power in appropriations bills, but had to accept
or reject non-appropriations bills in their entirety. The Governor filed
a motion to dismiss claiming that Silver lacked the capacity and standing to bring such an action and in the alternative to transfer venue
from New York County to Albany County. Silver cross-motioned for
summary judgement.
1.

96 N.Y.2d 532 (2001).
See id. at 538.
3. See id. at 547.
4. A non-appropriation bill contains specific instructions on how to allocate
funds within an appropriation bill. They generally include sources, schedules and suballocations for funding.
5. See Silver v. Patali, 684 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1999).

2.
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After a detailed discussion of modem cases regarding standing in
the context of challenges to legislative actions, the court noted a "loosening of the standing restrictions, particularly in situations where a failure to permit standing could be an insurmountable wall against any
judicial review of a challenged act."' 6 The court's main concern was
that if a legislator is denied standing to sue in order to uphold acts of
the legislature against an unconstitutional use of the veto power, the
legality of the vetoes could avoid judicial scrutiny entirely. 7 Ultimately,
the court denied Pataki's motions and held that Silver was an appropriate party with both the capacity and standing to bring a suit claiming
unconstitutional use of the Governor's veto power. 8 In addition, the
court held the plaintiff's cross motion in abeyance. 9
Governor Pataki appealed the supreme court's decision. The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed and entered ajudgement
for the Governor dismissing the complaint. 10 The appellate division
noted that the Speaker of the Assembly had no authority to institute
the litigation on behalf of the legislature and lacked the capacity to
bring this action. 1 ' The legislature could have authorized the litigation, thus granting Silver the capacity to sue on behalf of the institution, but it did not. 12 The court said, however, that even if Silver did
have inherent authority to bring the action on behalf of the legislature,
he did not have the standing to bring this suit.13 According to the
court, "the Speaker has made no allegation of any personal harm nor
14
any remediable interference with the performance of his duties."
There was only a potential institutional injury in this case that did not
5
confer standing to the Speaker.'
The policy underpinning the court's decision was that if a legislator was granted a cause of action under these facts, it would "needlessly
propel the judiciary into future political conflicts."1 6 In addition, if an
individual legislator could sue the Governor, then there would be no
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
Id.
Id.
Id.

14.

See id.

15.

Id.

16.

See id. at 403.

at 862.
at 863.
at 864.
Silver v. Pataki, 711 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1st Dep't 2000).
at 409.
at 408.
at 409.
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"principled reason to decline to adjudicate disputes between legislators
of the same house or between legislators of each house."1 7 A judicial
option to sue here would stifle the ability of the legislature to enact
laws while its members were involved in litigation against one
another.1 8
Justice Williams' dissent was based on a finding that legal capacity
to sue in this case need not be expressly granted, but may be implied as
a matter of law. 19 He relied on various New York Court of Appeals and
United States Supreme Court decisions reflecting a more "liberal view
toward standing" to determine that the appellee Silver had capacity
and standing to bring this suit.2 0 Given these cases, the dissent found
the requirement that all legislators whose votes were nullified be par2
ties to an action in order to have standing to be preposterous. '
Plaintiff Silver appealed based on the dissent's reasoning. The
New York Court of Appeals affirmed the portion of the Appellate Division's decision which held that Silver had no representative authority
22
as Speaker to engage in litigation on behalf of the entire legislature.
The court, however, modified the lower court's decision denying the
motion to dismiss in so far as it was brought by the plaintiff as an individual member of the legislature. 23 It ruled that Silver, as a member of
the state assembly, lacked the authority under the New York Constitution to sue on behalf of the assembly without a resolution expressing
its will that he do so, but that he did have the capacity and standing to
sue individually in this case.

III. DIscussION
The court framed the limited threshold issue on appeal as
whether "Mr. Silver, as a Member or Speaker of the Assembly, has capacity and standing to bring this action?" 24 With regard to capacity, the
court noted that it can be "expressly conferred or inferred as a neces17. Id. at 408.
18. See id.
19. Id. at 410.
20. See id To demonstrate his point, Justice Williams relied on Boryszewski v.
Brydges, 37 N.Y.2d 361 (1975), Morganthau v. Cooke, 56 N.Y.2d 24 (1982), Sulivan v.
Siebert, 417 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1979), Winner v. Cuomo, 580 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1992), and Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
21. See id. at 410-11.
22. See Silver v. Pataki, 96 N.Y.2d 532 (2001).
23. See id.
24. See id. at 536.
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sary implication from powers and responsibilities.. .within the zone of
interest to be protected. '25 Since Silver has a responsibility to consider
and vote on legislation, that responsibility "necessarily includes
continuing concern for protecting the integrity of one's votes and implies the power to challenge in court the effectiveness of a vote that has
allegedly been unconstitutionally nullified." 26 If this were not so, a legislator's vote, and therefore the will of the people he or she represents,
would be meaningless in cases where the vote was nullified without
express constitutional power to do so. Since a legislator would clearly
have capacity to sue if he or she was precluded from voting on legislation before the assembly, he or she should have capacity to sue after
27
With
the legislation passed where their vote was allegedly nullified.
this reasoning, the court concluded that Silver has capacity to sue as a
member of the Assembly.
The court went on to say, however, that Silver does not have the
inherent capacity to bring litigation on behalf of the legislature. 28 The
New York Constitution does not grant the Speaker representative authority and the Assembly did not pass a resolution committing the
Speaker to engage in litigation as its representative. 29 Thus, the court
found this portion of the appellate division's analysis correct and upheld this narrow part of their decision.
The issue of Silver's standing was addressed next. The Court
stated the test as, "a plaintiff has standing to maintain an action upon
30
alleging an injury in fact that falls within his or her zone of interest."
In the context of "legislator standing" cases fall into three general categories: lost political battles, nullification of votes and usurpation of
power. 3 1 A suit based on a lost political battle will never confer standing. Vote nullification as alleged here, however, may do so when
brought by the appropriate party under credible facts. In order for
Silver to have standing to bring suit here, he must show that he as an
individual suffered an injury in fact such that he "has an actual legal
stake in the matter being adjudicated." 32 As noted, the court found
that Silver the individual suffered an injury in fact when his vote was
25.

Id. at 537.

26.

Id.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See id.
Id. at 538.
Id.
See id. at 539.
Id.
Id.
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nullified by the Governor's line item veto. 33 On the other hand, his
claim that the Assembly as a whole suffered an injury is an allegation of
"political harm... that fails to rise to the level of a cognizable injury in
fact." 34 Silver is conferred standing to sue only as an individual, but not
on behalf of the legislature.
The court relied mainly on the United States Supreme Court case
Coleman v. Miller3

5

for its reasoning. In that case, twenty members of

the Kansas State Senate challenged the ratification of an amendment
to the US Constitution where the vote was a 20-20 deadlock broken by
the Lieutenant Governor's vote. 36 The Supreme Court determined
that the legislators there had a direct interest in maintaining their vote
and had suffered an injury in fact such that their standing to sue was
recognized.3 7 Coleman was distinguished by two other cases mentioned
throughout the supreme court and appellate division decisions, Matter
of Posner v. Rockefeller (heavily relied upon by the appellate division)
and Raines v. Byrd.3 8 In both of those cases, legislators lost their political battles in the legislature when legislation was validly enacted over
their opposition.3 9 There was no vote nullification, and no direct harm
suffered by the legislators. "Thus, each lacked the standing to sue" in
40
those cases.
The court went on to expressly reject the requirement that a "controlling bloc" of legislators are necessary parties in order to confer
standing in a vote nullification suit. Following Coleman where the fact
that all Senators that cast votes were plaintiffs was not critical, the court
said, "plaintiff's [Silver] injury in the nullification of his personal vote
continues to exist whether or not other legislators who have suffered
the same injury decide to join in the suit."41 The court also rejected

the idea that potential vote nullification was not established in this case
because Silver had a remedy within the political process including a
legislative override of the Governor's veto and a suit by others ag33.

Id. at 540.

34.

Id.

35.
36.
37.
38.
(1997).
39.
40.
41.

307 U.S. 433 (1939).
See id.
See id.
Posner v. Rockefeller, 26 N.Y.2d 970 (1970); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811
See id.
See Silver, 96 N.Y.2d at 540.
See id. at 541.
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grieved by the contested vetoes. 42 Following another federal case,
Campbell v. Clinton,43 the court said "the existence of other possible
political [or judicial] remedies does not negate the injury in fact or
defeat standing. '44 It was noted that if this were not the case, unconsti45
tutional conduct might otherwise be insulated from judicial review.
Finally, the court addressed the appellate division's concern that if
Silver was granted standing to sue, it would open the "floodgates" to
litigation over legislative disputes crippling the lawmaking branch and
dragging the judiciary into political battles. 46 According to the court,
this decision announces "nothing new" it simply confirms, "what was
assumed before: in limited circumstances, legislators do have standing
and capacity to sue when conduct unlawfully interferes with or usurps
47
their duties as legislators.
Judge Graffeo's dissent focused on the fact that Silver's complaint
alleged no personal injury to him as an individual and emphasized the
institutional harm rather than individual injury caused to him as a legislator. 48 He saw this as "clearly an institutional claim" where Silver had
no explicit authority to sue and no inherent or implied authority to
bring a suit as the majority determined. 49 He found no legal basis for
capacity to sue in this case without "collective authorization" from the
legislature. 50 In addition, he advocated the "voting bloc" requirement
in order to grant standing in a suit to redress vote nullification. 51 The
dissent construed Posner, Coleman, and Raines completely opposite to
the majority and would have held that the plaintiff lacked capacity and
52
standing to bring suit in this case as a Member of the Assembly.
This decision does not greatly expand the law beyond where it was
prior to this case. It simply clarifies it. Now there is precedent for an
individual legislator to have the capacity and standing to bring a suit
for vote nullification in New York. Its most significant impact may likely
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id.
52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Silver, 96 N.Y.2d at 541.
See Silver, 96 N.Y.2d at 541.
See Silver, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
Silver, 96 N.Y.2d at 542.
See id. at 543.
Id. at 544.
Id.
See id. at 547.
Id.
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be in limiting the New York Governor's use of the line item veto in
similar instances.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The NewYork Court of Appeals held that in the context of unconstitutional vote nullification or usurpation of power, an individual leg58
islator has the capacity and standing to bring suit for judicial redress.
Additionally, the court held that the Speaker of the Assembly is not
constitutionally authorized to bring a suit on behalf of the institution.
54
He or she must be explicitly authorized by the legislature to do so.
Jeffrey Dodes

53.
54.

See id. at 538.
Id.

PEOPLE V. VERNA.CE 1
(decidedJuly 10, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's
order that the State established good cause for its significant delay in
prosecuting defendant, Robert Vemace. 2 The court found that the
District Attorney made a good faith determination to delay prosecution for sufficient reasons and therefore the defendant was not de3
prived of due process even if there was some prejudice to him.
Furthermore, the court found that the appellate division's inference of
witness fear had ample support in the record, placing the good cause
4
issue beyond further review.
II.

BACKGROUND

This case involves a 1981 double murder at the Shamrock Bar in
Queens, New York. 5 The two bar owners were shot at point blank
range on April 11, 1981 after defendant's cohort allegedly became enraged over a spilled drink.6 Three individuals linked to organized
crime were thought to be suspects: defendant, Robert Vernace (aka
"Pepe"), Frank Riccardi (aka "Frankie the Geech"), and Ronald Barlin
(aka "Ronnie the Jew").7 The Shamrock bartender had identified all

three assailants by their nicknames8 as all three had been patrons at
another Queens neighborhood bar where the bartender had worked. 9
The bartender identified Riccardi from a high school yearbook photograph and Barlin from a mug shot taken on a prior arrest.1 0 The FBI
furnished two important leads regarding the defendant Vernace. This
included information that showed Vernace frequented a certain social
1.

96 N.Y. 2d 886 (2001).

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 888.
See id.

7.

See id.at 887.

8.
9.

See id. at 888.
See id.

10.

See id.
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club known as an organized crime hangout, and that he lived at a specified location with a named girlfriend 1 led to the bartender's identification of him from surveillance photographs of the comings and
2
goings of the social club.1
The photographs were then shown to Vernace's girlfriend on September 30, 1981, who confirmed that it was the defendant and that he
was actually her husband. 13 She claimed no knowledge of the defen14
dant's whereabouts and refused any further cooperation.
In addition to the bartender, Linda Gotti was the only other person present at the Shamrock during the shootings that was able to
identify all three assailants from photographs shown to her by the police.' 5 Furthermore, virtually all of the 20 to 25 people allegedly in the
16
bar at the time of the murders, denied seeing the crime.
The Homicide Bureau of the Queens county District Attorney's
Office stated in a memorandum dated March 25, 1982 that it wished to
present "the case of People v. Barlin, Riccardi and Vernace" for Grand
17
Jury consideration of two counts of murder in the second degree.
However, for reasons not known at the time of the "Singer" hearing,
the District Attorney never pressed charges against Vernace.18 Consequently, the Grand Jury, voted to indict only Riccardi and Barlin for
the Shamrock homicides. 19
Shortly after the murders, the main witness for the prosecution
20
either fled the jurisdiction or hid from the police.
Consequently, the case against Barlin was dismissed on motion of
the District Attorney in May 1983 because Linda Gotti was unable to
identify him at the Wade hearing. The other defendant, Riccardi, was
not located and still remains at large. 2 1 Following the 1982 indictment,
there was a total absence of any action by the prosecutor or any other
law enforcement authorities for fourteen years toward establishing defendant Vernace's criminal responsibility for the Shamrock
11.

See id.

12.

See id.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

People v. Vernace, 96 N.Y. 2d 886, 888 (2001).
id.
id.
id. at 887.
id. at 889.
id. at 889.
id.
id. at 887.
id.
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murders. 22 Defendant Vernace was indicted on November 19, 1998,
seventeen years after the incidents occurred.2 3 Defendant objected
that he was subjected to an unreasonable delay and the Supreme
Court, Queens County granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the
indictment because the preindictment delay violated his right to a
3 24
speedy trial

III. DISCUSSION
In a six to one decision, the court of appeals found in favor of
upholding the appellate division's determination that the People established good cause for the delay in prosecuting the defendant as it is
a mixed question of law and fact for which there is sufficient support in
the record.2 5 The court stated that in New York, "'we have never
drawn a fine distinction between due process and speedy trial standards' when dealing with delays in prosecution." 26 When determining
if a defendant's rights have been abridged the factors utilized are the
same whether the right,asserted is a speedy trial right or the due pro27
cess right to prompt prosecution.
The court determined that the factors involved are not only the
extent of the delay but also the reasons for the delay, the nature of the
underlying charge, whether there has been an extended period of pretrial incarceration, and whether there is any indication that the defense has been impaired by reason of the delay. 28 In applying the
factors to the defendant's particular case, the Court agreed that the
delay had in fact been extensive but balanced the other factors in favor
29
of the prosecution.
The nature of the underlying charge is two counts of murder in
the second degree.3 0 In addition the vicious manner of shooting the
two men at point blank range in a crowded bar added to the seriousness.3 ' Furthermore, the record shows that there was virtually no pre22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id. at 889.
New York v. Vernace, Lexis 2002 N.Y. Misc. 122, *2.
New York v. Vernace, 711 N.Y.S.2d 492 (2000).
See Vernace, 95 N.Y.2d at 887.
See id. (quoting People v. Singer, 44 N.Y.2d 241 (1978)).
See id. (citing People v. Staley, 41 N.Y.2d 789 (1977) ).
See id. (citing People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442 (1975)).
See id. at 888.

30.

See id.

31.

See id.
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trial incarceration3 2 and the court found that the defense had not
been impaired. 33 Moreover, the court identified that the defendant
had enjoyed significant freedom with no public suspicion attendant
upon an untried accusation of crime, and the record does not demonstrate undue prejudice to the defense. 3 4 The court even went so far as
to say that the delay in this instance has made the case against the
defendant more difficult for the prosecution to prove beyond a reason35
able doubt.
Justice Levine, the sole dissenter voted to reverse the appellate division's holding and found that there was a total absence of any justification for the pre-accusatory prosecutorial delay and believes that the
majority opinion undermines the principles of due process and funda36
mental fairness.
Justice Levine noted in his dissent that New York case law was well
settled with respect to the effect of inordinate pre-accusatory
prosecutorial delay.3 7 In contrast to the holding of the Supreme Court
of the United States under the Due Process Clause of the 14' Amendment,3 8 "an unjustified, protracted pre-indictment delay in prosecution, even one far shorter than 14 years, has been held as a deprivation
of a defendant's State constitutional right to due process, without re39
quiring a showing of actual prejudice."
Furthermore, the dissent discussed that "where there has been a
prolonged delay, we impose a burden on the prosecution to establish
good cause" 40 The dissent describes in the opinion some conflicting
facts that cast doubt on to the "good cause" established by the
prosecution.
The prosecution's main justifications for the delay was the allegations that the defendant was in hiding to avoid arrest and that the
Shamrock bartender was unable to identify the defendant in May of
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
Vernace, 96 N.Y. 2d at 888.
id. at 891.
id. at 889.
id. (citing United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977), cert. denied, 434

U.S. 881).
39. See id.; see also People v. Lesiuk, 81 N.Y.2d 485 (1993); People v. Fuller, 57
N.Y.2d 152 (1982); People v, Singer, 44 N.Y.2d 241 at 253-54 (1978); People v. Staley, 41
N.Y.2d 789 (1977); see also N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6).
40. See id. at 889 (citing Lesiuk, 81 N.Y.2d at 490).
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1983, the time of Barlin's case, because he had fled or was in hiding.4 1
However the dissent discusses that the lower court rejected these contentions based on sufficient evidence presented at the Singer hearing. 42 The dissent also points to the District Attorney's actions in
misplacing both a gun fired at the homicides and the complete origi43
nal file folder on the case.
Conversely, the majority through the weighing of multiple factors
discussed above affirmed the order that prosecution of the defendant
14 years later was not a deprivation of the defendant's State constitutional right to due process. The Court held that the evidence of witnesses' fear and reluctance to testify supported the appellate division's
finding and was justification for not moving forward promptly with the
prosecution." 4
IV.

CONCLUSION

The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the appellate division's
order that the State had met their burden is establishing good cause
for its significant delay in prosecuting the defendant. 45 Because the
prosecution made a good faith determination to delay prosecution for
sufficient reasons, defendant was not deprived of due process even if
there was some prejudice to him. 46 The court affirmed that in New
York the courts do not draw a fine distinction between due process and
speedy trial standards when dealing with delays in prosecution. 47
Courtney E. McGuinn

41.
42.
43.
44.

See id. at 890.
See id.
See id. at 890-91.
See id. at 890.

45.
46.
47.

See id. at 887.
See id.
See id.

PEOPLE V ENPJQUEROJAS'
(decided October 25, 2001)
I. SYNOPSIS
In a 6-1 majority decision, the New York Court of Appeals held
that the prosecution could introduce evidence of a prior alleged crime
to refute the defendant's contention made during his opening state2
ment and cross-examination of a prosecution witness.
II.

BACKGROUND

While in custody in the Onondaga Justice Center jail the defen3
dant, Enrique Rojas, allegedly attempted to assault another inmate.
The jail personnel put the defendant in segregated custody because
they felt the defendant was dangerous.4 As a part of the jail's policy,
the defendant was required to wear paper clothing instead of fabric
clothing. 5 After the defendant refused to change his clothes, several
guards entered his cell to supervise his exchange of clothing.6 During
this process, the defendant punched one of the guards in the face,
dislocating his jaw.7 The grand jury indicted the defendant for both
assaults. The County Court granted the defendant's motion to sever
the charges and only the assault on the guard is at issue in this case. 8
In the pre-trial proceeding the defense moved to preclude the
prosecution from introducing proof of defendant's alleged attempted
assault on the inmate because such proof constituted inadmissible propensity evidence. 9 The prosecution argued that some explanation of
the defendant's status was necessary to avoid giving the jurors the impression the defendant was mistreated.' 0 The court ruled that the
prosecution could not discuss the defendant's alleged assault on the
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

97 N.Y.2d 32 (2001).
Id. at 32, 41.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 35.
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inmate." The prosecution could, however, explain to the jurors that
the defendant's status was changing and that status required a change
12
of clothing.
At trial, the defense's opening statement concentrated on the
hardships of segregated detention and stated that the defendant had
done nothing wrong and was bewildered by having to wear paper
clothing. 13 On cross-examination the defense elicited testimony from
Deputy Keith Betsey, a corrections officer, who addressed the hardships of segregated detention, such as not being able to have pens,
pencils, or sheets.' 4 Sergeant Walter Rys testified that the defendant
was "a problem" and was involved in an altercation with another inmate where the defendant stabbed the inmate with a pencil. 15 The
defendant objected to this testimony, but the court overruled his objection because the defense had "opened the door" in its opening
statement and cross-examination of Deputy Betsey. 16 The court instructed the jury that this evidence was important to explain why the
defendant was in segregated custody, but it should not be used as evidence of his guilt as to these specific charges.' 7 The defendant moved
for a mistrial arguing under People v. Molineux18 that the prosecution's
witnesses had improperly mentioned the defendant's prior attempted
assault on the inmate. 19 The court denied the defendant's motion for
a mistrial because the defense counsel misled the jurors by portraying
20
the defendant as a victim of unjust treatment.
The jury convicted the defendant of two counts of assault in the
second degree for striking the guard. The Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, unanimously affirmed the conviction on the grounds that
the defendant opened the door to the testimony by portraying the defendant as the victim of abusive guards and seeking an acquittal on the
grounds of fairness. 2 1 The defendant appealed and the issue decided
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 36.

18.
19.

168 N.Y. 264 (1901).
Rojas, 97 N.Y.2d at 36.

20.

Id.

21.

See People v. Rojas, 717 N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (4' Dept. 2000).
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by the court of appeals was whether the challenged evidence was ad22
missible under a Molineux exception.
III.

DISCUSSION

The court began its analysis by addressing the defendant's contention that "evidence of the prior attempted assault does not fall within
any of the Molineux exceptions." 23 The court explained that the defendant initially benefited from a "favorable ruling barring introduction
of the prior alleged stabbing, and then sought to use that ruling as a
sword, to his advantage, by mischaracterizing the purpose of his solitary confinement." 24 The court also explained the Molineux excep25
tions are an illustrative list and are not exhaustive.
The court acknowledged that the evidence arguably became admissible under Molineux when introduced to justify defendant's confinement and the guards' actions.2 6 The evidence was used to refute
the defendant's contention that he was the victim of unjustified restraint by the guards. The court stated that evidence of prior crimes
27
could be introduced "to refute defendants' contentions at trial."
On this issue, the court concluded that because the defendant
abused the initial favorable Molineux ruling, it was unnecessary for the
court to create another Molineux exception in this case. 28 The court
noted that evidence of a prior crime is not only admissible if it "passes
through the Molineux prism," 29 but that the prosecution is authorized
to introduce evidence of a prior crime if the defendant denies it or if
30
the defendant offers evidence of good character.
Next, the court addressed the defendant's opening statement.
The defense's opening statement strongly suggested that "the jury
should acquit defendant because, having done nothing wrong, he was
22.

See Rojas, 97 N.Y.2d at 36.

23. Id. The Molineux exceptions allow evidence of other crimes to prove the specific crime charged when it "tends to establish (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the absence of
mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission of two
or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the others;

(5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial." Molineux, 168 N.Y. at 293.
24. Rojas, 97 N.Y.2d at 36.
25. Id. at 37.
26. Id. at 38.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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abused and mistreated, culminating in a scuffle with guards who surrounded him in his cell." 3 1 The defense also used its cross-examination "to further the impression that the guards were not performing a
lawful duty in supervising his exchange of clothing."32 The court
stated that the defense "converted the shield of the preclusion order
into a sword by arguing the People should not be allowed to supply
that justification.13 3 If the prosecution did not refute the defendant's
misleading assertions, the jury could have acquitted the defendant
"based on the erroneous belief that he was unjustly confined and
'3 4
mistreated.
Lastly, the court addressed the dissent's arguments. The dissent
argued that defendant was seeking to show that he lacked intent to
injure the officer and, therefore, did not open the door to the challenged testimony. 35 The court noted that the record indicated,
"neither the defendant's opening statement nor cross-examination of
Deputy Betsey even touched on defendant's lack of intent to injure the
jail guard. '3 6 Additionally, the defendant need not have acted intentionally to injure the police officer to be guilty of assault in the second
degree. The defendant must only act intentionally to prevent a police
37
officer from performing a lawful duty.
The dissent's second argument was that the defendant was only
charged with attempted assault on the inmate and had not been convicted of that charge.38 The court stated that the distinction between
the charge and the conviction was irrelevant because the alleged attempted assault gave the prison authorities a valid basis to confine the
39
defendant to segregated custody.
Finally, the court distinguished People v. Betts 40 and People v.
Bennett. 4 1 Those cases dealt with the defendant's Fifth Amendment
rights and held that the prosecution "may not cross-examine defen31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 39.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id.
People v. Betts, 70 N.Y.2d 289 (1987).
People v. Bennett, 79 N.Y.2d 464 (1992).
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dants about pending crimes to impeach their credibility." 42 The case
at hand does not involve the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.
The prosecution "adduced the challenged evidence by examining
their own witness, and therefore did not invite defendant to incriminate himself."43
IV.

CONCLUSION

The New York Court of Appeals held that because the defendant
opened the door to the evidence of a prior alleged crime based on the
combination of his opening statement and cross-examination of a prosecution witness, the evidence was properly admitted. 44
Princess M. Tate

42.
43.

44.

Rjas, 97 N.Y.2d at 40.
Id.
See id. at 32.

MARTINEZ V CY OF SCHENECTAD

1

(decided November 19, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision,2 the New York Court of Appeals held
that plaintiffs asserting a constitutional tort claim must establish
grounds that entitle them to a damages remedy and must prove that
3
their constitutional rights have been violated.
In addition, the court held that where a felony conviction is reversed because the evidence that was the basis for the conviction was
obtained by use of a faulty search warrant, there is no favorable termi4
nation necessary for purposes of malicious prosecution.
Finally, the court held that "the existence of probable cause serves
as legal justification for an arrest and is an affirmative defense to the
5
claim" of false imprisonment.
II.

BACKGROUND

On September 21, 1987, a confidential informant advised investigators from the Schenectady Police Department that the informant
could obtain drugs from the home of Melody Martinez. 6 Arrangements were made for an uncontrolled drug buy, where the confidential informant purchased seven grams of cocaine, which were turned
over to the police. 7 On September 22, 1987, the confidential informant placed an arranged telephone call to Ms. Martinez, which was recorded by the police.8 During the telephone call the informant and
Ms. Martinez discussed a drug purchase. 9 A search warrant for Ms.
Martinez' residence was issued on the basis of information provided by
1. 97 N.Y.2d 78 (2001).
2. Opinion by ChiefJudge Kaye. Judges Smith, Ciparick, Wesley and Rosenblatt
concur. Judges Levine and Graffeo took no part.
3. Martinez, 97 N.Y.2d at 83.
4. See id. at 84.
5. Id. at 85.
6. See People v. Martinez, 572 N.Y.S.2d 946 (3d Dep't 1991).
7. Id. at 947.
8. Id. at 948.
9. Id.
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the confidential informant.' 0 The home of Melody Martinez was
searched by police officers; during the search cocaine was discovered.1 1 Ms. Martinez was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance.1 2 Ms. Martinez was convicted and sentenced to 15
3
years to life in prison.'
During the trial Ms. Martinez made a motion to suppress certain
evidence obtained during the police search of her residence. 14 Ms.
Martinez claimed that the "search warrant application was insufficient
16
u5
Ms. Martinez' motion was denied.
to establish probable cause.'
On appeal the Appellate Division, Third Department, upheld the
denial of Ms. Martinez' suppression motion. 17 The court found that
the "affidavits supplied by the confidential informant provided proba8
ble cause for the issuance of the search warrant.'
The court of appeals reversed the conviction decision, concluding
that the submitted affidavits did not sufficiently establish the reliability
of the informant.1 9 After four years of incarceration, Ms. Martinez'
conviction was reversed and she was released from prison in December
of 1992.20
After her release, Ms. Martinez brought an action in federal court
against both the police officers involved in the investigation and the
City of Schenectady. 2 1 Ms. Martinez alleged a cause of action under 42
U.S. § 1983 and state law claims for false imprisonment and malicious
22
prosecution.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Ms. Martinez'
claim under 42 USC § 1983, after which she brought an action in state
court alleging false imprisonment, malicious prosecution; and a state
10.
11.
12.

Id.
Id.
See Martinez v. Schenectady, 714 N.Y.S.2d 572(3d Dep't 2000).

13.
14.

See id.
See Martinez, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 948.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id.
See Martinez, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
Id.
See Martinez, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
See People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 549 (1992).

20.
21.
22.

See Martinez, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 573.
Id.
See id.

2001-2002]

CASE COMPILATION

constitutional tort cause of action for violations of the Equal Protec23
tion and Search and Seizure Clauses of the New York Constitution.
Ms. Martinez based her tort action upon the Court of Appeals'
decision in Brown v. State of New York, 24 recognizing a private right of
action to recover damages against the state for violations of the State
Constitution. 25 In Brown, every non-white male in the city of Oneonta
was stopped and questioned by police during their search for a black
man suspected of assault-2 6 In Brown none of the claimants were
27
prosecuted.
The police officers and the City of Schenectady each made a motion for summary judgment, which the New York Supreme Court
granted.2 8 Ms. Martinez appealed and the appellate division affirmed,
noting that the existence of probable cause is a relevant factor to both
malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, and rendered both
29
claims meritless.
The appellate division then distinguished Ms. Martinez' case from
Brown, noting that Ms. Martinez was charged with a crime as a result of
the search of her residence, her suppression motion was ultimately
granted and her conviction reversed.30 Therefore, the court found Ms.
Martinez had received an adequate remedy for the violation of her
3
liberty interest. '
III.

DISCUSSION

The court began its discussion by addressing Ms. Martinez' tort
claim based on alleged violations of the State Constitution. 3 2 The court
found that the "narrow remedy established in Brown 33 was not applica34
ble to Ms. Martinez' facts.
23.

Martinez v. Schenectady, 115 F.3d 111, 114 (citing NY CONST. art. I, § 11 and

§ 12).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

89 N.Y.2d 172 (1996).
See Martinez, 97 N.Y.2d at 83.
See Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 176.
Id.
See Martinez, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 572.
Id. at 573.
Id.
Id.
Martinez, 97 N.Y2d at 81.
Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 192.
Martinez, 97 N.Y.2d at 83.
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The court stated that the remedy authorized by Brown recognized
two interests. 3 5 First, the "private interests that citizens harmed by constitutional violations have an avenue of redress," and second the "public interest that future violations be deterred." 36 The court noted that
in Brown, "neither declaratory nor injunctive relief were available to
'3 7
the plaintiffs.., it was damages or nothing.
The court reiterated the principle that the "tort remedy is not
boundless." 38 "Claimants must establish grounds that entitle them to a
damages remedy, in addition to proving that their constitutional rights
have been violated. '39 In analyzing this issue the court determined that
"recognition of a constitutional tort claim," in Ms. Martinez' case was
"neither necessary to effectuate the purposes of the state constitutional
protections she invoked, nor appropriate to ensure full realization of
40
her rights."
In reaching this determination the court concluded that "the cost
to society of exclusion of evidence and the consequent reversal of Ms.
Martinez' conviction. . . will serve the public interest of promoting
greater care in seeking search warrants." 41 The court felt that the "deterrence objective" of Brown was satisfied by the exclusion of incrimi42
nating evidence.
The court then addressed whether Ms. Martinez had "demonstrated how money damages were appropriate in ensuring full realization of her asserted constitutional rights." 43 The court determined that
Ms. Martinez had failed to do so based upon her inability "to distinguish her case from that of any criminal defendant who has been
granted suppression of evidence, or reversal of a conviction, based on
technical error at the trial level."44 The court added that Ms. Martinez
had received a "substantial benefit from the dismissal of her indictment and release from prison," and had failed to show any facts war45
ranting a damages remedy.
35.
36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 83.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Martinez, 97 N.Y.2d at 84.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Therefore, while Ms. Martinez' liberty interests were violated
through an unconstitutional search and seizure, the court nonetheless
affirmed the motions for summary judgment because Ms. Martinez
failed to demonstrate that she was entitled to a pecuniary remedy.
The court equates the constitutional violation with a technical error at trial and thus diminishes the sanctity of the rights afforded to
the people of New York, both criminal defendants and not, by their
state constitution.
The court then addressed Ms. Martinez' malicious prosecution
and false imprisonment claims. 4 6 To prove malicious prosecution, Ms.
Martinez would have to establish that "a criminal proceeding was commenced, that it was terminated in favor of the accused, lack of probable cause and that the proceeding was brought out of actual malice." 47
The court's discussion of malicious prosecution focused on the
"favorable termination" factor.
The court stated that the cause of action must fail because the
criminal proceeding was not terminated in Ms. Martinez' favor. 48 The
court held that "a criminal defendant has not established favorable termination when the outcome of the criminal proceeding is inconsistent
with the innocence of the accused." 49 The court relied heavily on the
fact that Ms. Martinez' conviction was not reversed based upon a lack
of guilt but because of a faulty search warrant. 50 In fact, the court added that Ms. Martinez' guilt was proven "beyond a reasonable
doubt"'"1
Finally, the court briefly addressed Ms. Martinez' false imprisonment claim. The court highlighted the elements needed to establish
false imprisonment: defendant must intend to confine, plaintiff must
be conscious of the confinement and must not have consented to the
confinement, and that the confinement must not have otherwise have
52
been privileged.
The court stated that "probable cause serves as a legal justification
for the arrest and an affirmative defense to the claim."5 3 The court

found that the facts of Melody Martinez' case provided an "ample
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Martinez, 97 N.Y.2d at 85.
Id., (citing Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 452, 457, (1975)).
Id.
Id. at 86.
Id.

51.
52.

Id.
Id.

53.

Id. at 87 (citing Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d at 458).
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showing for probable cause," and therefore it affirmed the motion for
54
summary judgment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The New York Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs asserting a
constitutional tort claim must establish grounds that entitle them to a
damages remedy and prove that their constitutional rights have been
55
violated.
In addition, the court held that where a felony conviction is reversed because the evidence that was the basis for the conviction was
obtained by use of a faulty search warrant, there is no favorable termi56
nation for purposes of malicious prosecution.
Finally, the court also held that "the existence of probable cause
serves as legal justification for an arrest and an affirmative defense to
57
the claim" of false imprisonment.
Stacey Mesler

54.
55.
56.
57.

See
Id.
See
Id.

id. at 87.
at 83.
id. at 84.
at 87.

iN RE ESTATES OF COVERT 1
(decided November 20, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the NewYork Court of Appeals held that
when the will of a murder victim bequeaths property to the family of
the wrongdoer, the family members are viewed as "innocent distributees," and are not automatically disinherited because of their relation2
ship to the offender.
II.

BACKGROUND

Edward and Kathleen Covert executed a joint will on December
14, 1995. This will provided that, upon the death of the first spouse,
the surviving spouse would inherit all of the property. Further, upon
the death of the surviving spouse, the couple's residuary estate would
be bequeathed in three equal shares: one-third to each set of parents,
and one-third to be divided among all siblings.3 Edward also had two
life insurance policies and a retirement plan.4 He listed Kathleen as
the primary beneficiary, with his parents as the contingent beneficiaries. 5 On April 3, 1998, Edward shot and killed his wife, and then
proceeded to kill himself.6 The will was admitted to probate on May
21, 1998. 7 Kathleen's sister, Kelly Hawley, was designated the executrix
by the will.8 She petitioned the surrogate's court to assist in the estate
distribution. 9 Edward was survived by his parents and three siblings
("The Coverts").' 0 Kathleen was survived by her parents and two siblings ("The Millards").'1
1. In re Estates of Covert, 97 N.Y.2d 68 (2001).
2. See id.
3. Some of the jointly owned property, including a time share and jewelry, was
bequeathed to Kathleen's sister, Kelly Hawley. See id. at 73.
4. Id. at 73.
5. Id.
6. See id. at 72.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 73.
9. See id.
10.

See id.

11.

Id.
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The Covert's argued in their answer to Hawley's petition that the
will should be construed under a "strict compliance" approach, so that
the express terms of the will would be adhered to. 1 2 They wanted the
estates to be divided into the three equal shares designated by Kathleen and Edward. 13 Conversely, the Millards argued in their answer
that the will should not be executed simply as written, and that the
Coverts should be precluded from taking under the will since Edward
intentionally caused the death of Kathleen.1 4 The Covert's moved for
summaryjudgment to dismiss the Millards' answer, and requested that
5
the court compel distribution based on the express terms of the will.'
The surrogate's court granted summary judgment to the Millards
based on the precedent established in Riggs v. Palmer.16 This case set
forth the doctrine that a wrongdoer, such as a killer, should not be
able to benefit from the death of the victim.' 7 The surrogate's court
precluded the Coverts from taking any property under Kathleen's estate based on Riggs. However, Edward's individual property (including
his life insurance policies and pension plan) would be distributed according to the provisions of his will and designation of contingent
beneficiaries. 18
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Third Department, disagreed
with the order of the surrogate's court and modified it.' 9 The appellate division held that the Coverts were not disqualified from taking
their share of Kathleen's estate, and treated Edward as if he had predeceased Kathleen. 20 Since all of Edward's property would then go to
Kathleen's estate, and be distributed according to the terms of the will,
the court ruled that the joint property of Kathleen and Edward Covert
21
should pass through Kathleen's estate and be divided in equal thirds.
Thus, under the terms of the will, the Coverts are entitled to their
12. Id. at 73.
13. "Strict Compliance" refers to a court construing a testator's will by the actual
written words. See id. (citing In re Bailey, 91 N.Y.2d 520, 525 (1998) and Williams v.
Jones, 166 N.Y. 522 (1901)).
14. Id.
15.

See id.

16. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889). The Court found that a grandson who
murdered the testator was enjoined from receiving any of the property left to him in his
grandfather's will.
17. Id. at 513.
18. In re Estates of Covert, 97 N.Y.2d at 73.
19. In re Estates of Covert, 717 N.Y.S.2d 392 (3'd Dep't 2000).
20.
Id. at 395.
21. Id. at 394.
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share. 22 In addition, the court also found that since Edward was the
actual owner of his life insurance policies and retirement fund, he had
the ability to distribute it as he wished, and the proceeds should go to
23
his contingent beneficiaries.
The Millard's appealed this ruling, and the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the appellate division on different
grounds. The court noted that Edward's survivors, the Coverts, are
24
mere innocent parties, and thus the Riggs standard does not apply.
The court also affirmed the decision of the appellate division that the
proceeds of the insurance and retirement plans should go to the beneficiaries designated by Edward since that property does not belong to
25
the victim.
III.

DISCUSSION

The court began its analysis with a discussion of will construction
and testamentary distribution. "This Court has long recognized that
testamentary instruments are strictly construed so as to give full effect
to the testator's clear intent."2 6 However, despite this deference accorded the testator, there is also a conflicting principle that prevents a
wrongdoer from benefiting from a crime.2 7 In Riggs v. Palmer,the New
York State Court of Appeals barred the grandson from taking a gift
from his grandfather's estate since he would be profiting from his
crime. The grandson was deprived of an interest in the estate because
he murdered his grandfather. 28 However, the court did permit the
estate to pass to the grandson's mother and sisters, since they were also
beneficiaries of the deceased. 29 In the present case, the court had to
determine whether this doctrine should apply in the situation of Kathleen Covert, in which her will specifically made a bequest to the relatives of her murderer.
First, the court refused to adopt the rationale of the appellate division to treat Edward as if he had predeceased Kathleen, finding that
the Riggs doctrine unequivocally precludes Edward from taking any be22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id.
See id.
In re Estates of Covert, 97 N.Y.2d at 74-75.
Id. at 76-77.
Id. at 74.
See id. (citing Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889)).
Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889).
See id. at 515.
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quest made by Kathleen to him. This property automatically passes
30
into the residuary.
Next, the court addressed the Millard's argument that the Riggs
doctrine voids the gift to the Coverts and that since the residuary is
invalid, the estate should pass under intestacy.3 1 The court emphasized that Riggs is inapplicable unless the Coverts are not innocent distributees.3 2 Further, the fact that Kathleen actually made a will gives
rise to a presumption against intestacy. 33 The court concluded that
Kathleen's will and residuary is valid, and that no part of the estate
34
should pass by intestacy.
To illustrate this point more clearly, the court divided the property at issue into three categories. The first category included the
property owned individually by Kathleen and Edward.3 5 The court
ruled that this property automatically passes by the will of the deceased, regardless of Riggs.36 Thus, the individually owned property
should be distributed in equal thirds among Edward's parents, Kath37
leen's parents and their siblings.
With regard to the property owned jointly by Kathleen and Edward, the court considered the effect of the vesting on Edward's property rights. 38 In analyzing this issue, the court looked to Civil Rights
Law § 79-b, which states "[a] conviction of a person for any crime, does
not work as a forfeiture of any property, real or personal, or any right
or interest therein. '39 However, as applied to this case, the court
found that Edward cannot profit from killing Kathleen. 40 Thus, he is
not entitled to take the property under the typical survivorship rights
that he would have if Kathleen died naturally. The court ruled that the
joint property should be divided evenly between the two, but that Edward is not entitled to Kathleen's share. 4 1 It passes directly to Kath42
leen's estate.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

In re Estates of Covert, 97 N.Y.2d at 75.
Id.
See id. at 74-75.
See id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id.at 75.
Id.at 76 (citing N.Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 79-b (Consol. 2001)).
See id.
Id.
See id.
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The final category of property addressed by the court was the proceeds of the life insurance policies and pension plans.4 3 Comparing
these to contracts, the court posited that since the terms are clear and
unambiguous, and since the primary beneficiary (Kathleen) is deceased, the proceeds should go to the contingent beneficiaries designated by Edward - his parents.44 The court did not accept the
argument that its ruling in Petrie v. Chase Manhattan Bank45 precludes
this outcome. 46 Petrieinvolved a disposition to an alternative beneficiary of the victim's trust chosen by the wrongdoer. 47 The court ruled
that the disqualification of the offender extended to his nominee for
trust beneficiary as well.48 Here, the court distinguished Kathleen's
estate because the insurance policies and pension plan were the actual
property of Edward (not the victim). Thus, his contingent beneficiaries
49
are entitled to take their share as innocent distributees.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The NewYork State Court of Appeals held that Edward Covert was
not entitled to receive any property from his wife based on Riggs v.
Palmer. However, the property he would have received would pass directly into the residue, and be distributed according to the terms of
the joint will of Kathleen and Edward Covert. According to Riggs, the
relatives of Edward are not prohibited from taking their share of the
estate because it was the intent of Kathleen that they be the residual
beneficiaries. The rights of the Coverts are not diluted because of
their relationship to Edward. The couple's joint property passed to
their respective estates, and the life insurance and pension proceeds
passed to the contingent beneficiaries of Edward.
Nicole M. Fantigrossi

43.

See id.

44.

Id.

45.

352 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Ct. App. 1973).

46.

In re Estates of Covert, 97 N.Y.2d at 76.

47.
48.

See id.
Id.

49.

See id. at 77.

LEADER V. MARONEY, PONZ1NI & SPENCER'
(decided November 20, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the NewYork Court of Appeals held that
a showing of reasonable diligence in attempting to effectuate service is
not a threshold factor that must always be established to grant a motion pursuant to C.P.L.R. 306-b for an extension of time to serve a
summons and complaint. 2 The court noted that, while C.P.L.R. 306-b
gives the courts two separate standards under which to consider an
application for an extension of time to effectuate service "upon good
cause shown" or "in the interest ofjustice," 3 only the "good cause" standard requires a showing of reasonable diligence. 4 Thus, the Court of
Appeals clarified that under the "interest ofjustice standard," reasonable diligence is not required to satisfy C.P.L.R. 306-b.
II.

BACKGROUND

Three issue-related proceedings - based on Article 3, Section 6 (b)
of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules - were merged by the
court of appeals for Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer.5 In the first
case, plaintiff Susan Leader sued defendant law firm, Maroney, Ponzini
& Spencer ("Maroney"), for legal malpractice in the handling of her
divorce. 6 Leader pro se filed a summons with notice approximately two
months before the expiration of the statute of limitations and before
retaining counsel. 7 However, Leader never served the defendant with
a summons with notice. 8 Her newly-retained counsel was told that
Leader had filed a summons with notice and that the defendant had
1. 97 N.Y.2d 95 (2001).
2. See id. at 103.
3. See N.Y. G.P.L.R 306-b (McKinney 2001).
4. See Leader, 96 N.Y.2d at 104-05.
5. Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, 97 N.Y.2d 95 (2001); see also N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 306-b (McKinney 2001). The three cases are Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini &
Spencer, 718 N.Y.S.2d 374 (2d Dep't 2000); Scarbaggio v. Olympia &York Estates Co.,
718 N.Y.S.2d 392 (2d Dep't 2000); and Hafkin v. North Shore Univ. Hospital, 718
N.Y.S.2d 379 (2d Dep't 2000).
6. Leader, 97 N.Y.2d at 100; see also Leader, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 375-76.
7. Leader, 97 N.Y.2d at 101; see also Leader, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
8. Id.
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not been served. 9 However, the attorney erroneously followed the former version of C.P.L.R. 306-b and allowed the 120-day period for service to expire.10 He commenced a second action by filing a new
summons and complaint after the statute of limitations had expired.1 1
Subsequently, Maroney was promptly served. 12 Maroney moved to dismiss the second action based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations. 13 Leader moved for an extension of time to serve in the first
action.14
The Supreme Court, Westchester County, granted Maroney's motion to dismiss the second action based upon the expiration of the
statute of limitations.' 5 The court also granted Leader's motion for an
extension of time to effect service of the summons with notice in the
first action. 16 Maroney appealed. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed, noting that "the Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs motion for an extension
7
of time to effect service in the first action."'
In the second issue-related proceeding, plaintiff Kathryn
Scarabaggio, sued defendant property owner Olympia & York Estates
Co. for personal injuries sustained as the result of a slip and fall on
defendant's property.1 8 Although Scarabaggio properly filed a summons and complaint, Olympia was never served.' 9 Here, the
"[p]laintiffs process server attempted to serve Olympia at its lastknown business address, but was unable to do so because Olympia had
relocated." 20 However, [t]he process server did not inform plaintiff's
counsel of the failure.2 1 Scarabaggio discovered the failure weeks after
the 120-day period had expired. 2 2 As a result of this, Scarabaggio
23
promptly moved for an extension of time to serve.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

14.

See Leader, 97 N.Y.2d at 101-02; see also Leader, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 376.

15.
16.

See Leader, 97 N.Y.2d at 101; see also Leader, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
Id.

17.

Leader, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 378.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See Leader, 97 N.Y.2d at 102.
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 102.
See id.
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The Supreme Court, Richmond County, granted plaintiff's mo-

tion for both "good cause" and "the interest ofjustice." 24 Olympia appealed. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed noting
that the supreme court "providently exercised its discretion in granting
the plaintiff's motion pursuant to C.P.L.R. 306-b.. .in the interest of
25
justice."
In the third issue-related proceeding, plaintiff Rhoda Hafkin sued
Defendant hospital, North Shore University Hospital ("NSUH"), for
medical malpractice. 26 Hafkin commenced the action in January,
1998.27 Hafkin filed a summons and complaint one day before the
expiration of the statute of limitations. 2 8 NSUH was never served in
the action. 2 9 Similar to Leader, plaintiff commenced a second action
by filing a summons and complaint in September of 1998 after the
expiration of both the limitations period and the statutory 120-day pe3
riod.30 After this second filing, Hafkin properly served the NSUH. 1
Defendant moved for a dismissal of the second action on statute of
limitations grounds.3 2 In February 1999, plaintiff cross-moved for an
extension of time to serve the summons and complaint in the first
33
action.
The Supreme Court, Nassau County, "granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss the second action and denied as academic plaintiff's
34
cross-motion" for an extension of time to serve in the first action.
NSUH appealed. The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed, noting that the second action "was neither timely commenced
nor timely served" and, "[t]hus, it was properly dismissed as timebarred." 35 With regard to the first action, the appellate division noted
that the "plaintiffs proffered no explanation or excuse for their initial
failure to have served the defendant within the 120-day period.. ." and
24.

See Leader,97 N.Y.2d at 102; see also Scarabaggio v. Olympia & York Estates Co.,

718 N.Y.S.2d 392, 392-93 (2d Dep't 2000).
25.
26.
N.Y.S.2d
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Leader, 97 N.Y.2d at 103; see also Ha/kin v. North Shore Univ. Hospital, 718
379, 380 (2d Dep't 2000).
Leader, 97 N.Y.2d at 103.
Id.
See id.
See Leader,97 N.Y.2d at 102; see also Hajkin, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 380-81.
See Leader,97 N.Y.2d at 103; see also Ha/kin, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
See id.
Id.

34. Id.
35.

Hakin, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 381.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

"[f] urther, they did not proffer any explanation or excuse for the delay
of almost eight months between the expiration of the 120-day period
36
and the date of their cross requesting an extension of time.1
III.

DISCUSSION

As mentioned above, all three combined proceedings are based
on C.P.L.R. 306-b. The New York Court of Appeals noted that the
cases required it "to determine the standards by which a court may
exercise its discretion to extend a plaintiffs time to effectuate service
37
pursuant to C.P.L.R. 306-b."
The court began its discussion by addressing the history of
C.P.L.R. 306-b. 38 The statute's original enactment in 1992 transformed
New York from a "commencement-by-service" jurisdiction to a "commencement-by-filing" jurisdiction. 39 Under the original version of
C.P.L.R. 306-b, the filing plaintiff was given a 120-day period within
which to serve the defendant. 40 If proof of service was not filed within
120 days, "the action was automatically 'deemed dismissed' without
prejudice." However, the plaintiff was given a second 120-day period
41
to commence a new action and effectuate service.
Criticism of both peremptory dismissal and the requirement of
filing proof of service led to the Legislature's enactment of the modem
version of C.P.L.R. 306-b in 1997.42 The modem version eliminated
the requirement of filing proof of service. 43 Further, if service is not
effected within the 120-day period, the action is no longer "deemed
dismissed."4 4 Instead, "the court, upon motion, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant, or upon good cause shown
or in the interest of justice, extend the time for service." 4 5 Any deci36. Id.
37. Leader, 97 N.Y.2d at 100.
38. See id. For a more complete articulation of the history of C.P.L.R. 306-b. See
Leader, 718 N.Y.S.2d 374 (2d Dep't 2000), and authority cited therein.
39. Leader, 97 N.Y.2d at 100.
40. See id.
41. Id. N.B.: Plaintiff received this second period even if the Statute of Limitations had expired.
42. Id.
43. See Leader, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 376.
44. See Leader, 97 N.Y.2d at 101.
45. Id.; see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 306-b (McKinney 2001).
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sion to extend the time for service is a matter within the court's
46
discretion.
The court of appeals first applied principles of statutory construction and interpretation and then looked to the legislative history of
C.P.L.R. 306-b. The court determined that C.P.L.R. 306-b provides the
courts with "two separate standards by which to measure an application
for an extension of time to serve." 47 From a standpoint of statutory
interpretation, the court of appeals noted that meaning and effect
should be given to every word of a statute. 48 Following this guideline,
the court of appeals noted that the Legislature's use of the disjunctive
"or" indicated that there are two separate and distinct criteria. 49
The court of appeals augmented this analysis with an examination
of the legislative history of C.P.L.R. 306-b. This history is "unequivocal
that the inspiration for the new C.P.L.R. 306-b provision was its Federal
counterpart." 5° The purpose of the revision was "to offer New York
courts the 'same type of flexibility' enjoyed by the Federal Courts
under Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." 51 The Federal rule provides two alternative grounds for an extension of time to
serve. 52 The first ground is good cause and the second ground is an
"unspecified discretionary basis for extension 'even if there is no good
cause shown.' "-s
In recognizing two distinct standards, the Court rejected defendants' arguments that, "although the statute provides that an extension
may be granted for 'good cause' or in the 'interest of justice', under
either standard a plaintiff must show reasonable diligence in attempting to effect service as a prerequisite to a court's exercising its discretion to grant an extension."5 4 The court of appeals agreed with the
plaintiffs' assertion that the defendants' interpretation "would render
46. See Leader, 97 N.Y.2d at 101.
47. Id. at 104.
48. See id. at 104-05; see also Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 75 N.Y.2d 95, 100
(1989) (holding that "words are not to be rejected as superfluous where it is practicable
to give each a distinct and separate meaning").
49. See Leader, 97 N.Y.2d at 104.
50. Id. at 105.
51. Id. (internal citations omitted).

52.

Id.

53.
54.

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 103-04.
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the interest of justice [standard] meaningless and would, in effect,
55
merge the two standards into one."

Since the "good cause" standard was not at issue in the three combined proceedings, the court of appeals then addressed the factors
that are to be considered when applying the interest of justice standard. The court of appeals noted that any such analysis is highly fact
specific and requires a balancing of the interests of the litigating parties.5 6 While the plaintiff "need not establish reasonably diligent efforts at service," the court may consider diligence, or the lack thereof,
as a factor.5 7 Other factors identified by the Court to be considered
are the expiration of the statute of limitations, the merits of the cause
of action, the length of the delay in service, the promptness of the
request for an extension, and the possibility of prejudice to the
58
defendant.
Finally, the court of appeals applied these factors to the cases sub
judice. The court affirmed the judgment in Leader, noting that the appellate division properly applied the interest ofjustice standard.5 9 The
Leader plaintiff made no attempt to serve during the first 120-day period because counsel erroneously followed the old version of the
C.P.L.R. and, hence, was unable to show good cause. 60 Nevertheless,
plaintiff qualified for an extension on the separate "interest ofjustice"
ground because the case had merit, the defendant was unable to show
prejudice, and the statute of limitations had expired. 6 1 Further, the
court implied that an extension could be given merely for an attorney's error.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment in Scarabaggio,noting
again that the appellate division properly considered the relevant factors for a determination of the interest of justice. 62 The court noted
that the plaintiff promptly moved for an extension after learning of the
55. Id. at 104. Note that this is true because the good cause standard has been
interpreted as requiring reasonable diligence. For a discussion, see Leader, 718 N.Y.S.2d
374, 376-77. See also, Alexander, Practice Commentaries, C.P.L.R. 306-b at 483 (Consol.
2000 & Supp. 2000).
56. See Leader, 97 N.Y.2d at 105.
57. Id. at 106.
58. Id.
59.
Id. at 106.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
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failure of the process server. 63 Also noteworthy to the court, was that
64
the defendant failed to show prejudice.
Similarly, the court affirmed the judgment in HaJkin, noting that
while the trial court denied the extension, it properly applied the interest ofjustice standard. 65 Hafkin failed to offer any explanation for
either the failure to serve or the delay in making the motion for an
extension. 66 The Ha/kin plaintiff simply argued that, like the Leader
plaintiff, Hajkin properly followed the old provision. 67 The court,
however, distinguished the two, noting that "unlike in Leader, plaintiffs
did not assert that they were unaware of section 306-b's amendment. '68

The court also inferred prejudice to the defendant, who had no notice
of plaintiff's claims for nearly three years after the accrual of the
69
claim.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer, the New York Court of
Appeals held that the interest ofjustice standard for granting an extension of the time to effectuate service does not require, as a dispositive
factor, a showing of reasonable diligence. Rather, C.P.L.R. 306-b contemplates promoting the furtherance ofjustice through a careful analysis of case-specific facts and a balancing of the competing interests of
the parties. Factors such as diligence (or lack thereof), the expiration
of the statute of limitations, the promptness of the request for an extension of time, the possibility of prejudice to the defendant, and the
meritorious nature of the cause of action were provided in the court's
non-.exhaustive list of factors to be considered in deciding a motion on
this ground. Therefore, Leader v. Maroney, Ponzini & Spencer clarifies
C.P.L.R. 306-b.
Robert F. Jordan

63.

See id.

64.

See id.

65.

See id. at 107.

66.
67.
68.
69.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id. at 107-08.
id. at 107.

BLOOMFIELD V BLOOMFIELD'
(decided November 27, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the New York Court of Appeals held that
a prenuptial agreement executed over 30 years ago is not void, and
does not constitute a waiver of maintenance, but must be reviewed by
the trial court to determine whether it is unconscionable. 2 In addition, the court held that the validity of support waivers in marital
agreements should be governed by the newly enacted version of the
3
General Obligations Law § 5-311, and not the repealed version.
I.

BACKGROUND

On May 30, 1969, plaintiff-husband, now a 62-year-old practicing
attorney, and defendant-wife, now a 55-year-old self-employed antiques
dealer, were married. 4 In January 1995, the parties separated. 5 Prior
to their marriage, the plaintiff requested that the defendant sign a prenuptial agreement that he had drafted. 6 In this agreement, the defendant ,waived her spousal property and elective rights. 7 Specifically, the
agreement stated that the defendant agreed to,
Waive and renounce any and all rights that, and to which, [she]
would otherwise be entitled to because of such marriage, whether present or future rights, to any and all property which [plaintiff] has now,
or which he may acquire in the future, whether the same be real, personal, [or] mixed property, or any kind or nature and wherever
8
situated.
When the agreement was executed, the plaintiff was a 30-year-old
practicing attorney, and the defendant was a 24-year-old who had completed one year of college. 9 Plaintiff claims that the parties were at his
1.
2.
3.
4.

97 N.Y.2d 188 (2001).
Id. at 191.
Id. at 192.
Id. at 191.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 192.
Id.
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father's office when the agreement was signed, while the defendant
claims that they were alone in her apartment when she signed the
agreement. 10 The parties do not dispute that the defendant was not
represented by counsel in the negotiating, drafting, or signing of the
document, nor that she signed the document.11 In 1995, the plaintiff
initiated the divorce proceedings and the defendant answered and
counterclaimed demanding equitable distribution. 12 Two years into
discovery, the plaintiff raised the existence of the prenuptial agree3
ment as a defense to the defendant's claim for equitable distribution.1
The Supreme Court, Bronx County, held that the prenuptial
agreement was unenforceable. 14 The husband appealed and on grant
of reargument, the Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the
supreme court's holding that, at the time the agreement was signed, it
was void under the law in effect, since it violated the 1969 version of
the General Obligations Law § 5-311 and it did not comply with the
execution formalities under the current Domestic Relations Law
§ 236(B) (3). 15 The Appellate Division, First Department, found that
the prenuptial agreement contained broad waiver language which constituted an impermissible waiver of support. 16 In addition, the appellate division further held that even if the agreement was not void on its
face, the parties' marriage would toll the Statute of Limitations,
thereby allowing the defendant to challenge the validity of the agree7
ment on other grounds.'
III.

DISCUSSION

The court began its analysis by stating that the defendant is not
time-barred from challenging the validity of the prenuptial agreement,
since the agreement arises from, and directly relates to the plaintiff's
claim that the agreement precludes equitable distribution of his assets. 18 In making this determination, the court relied on the well established principle that claims and defenses that arise out of the same
transaction as a claim asserted in the complaint are not barred by the
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bloomfield v. Bloomfield, 723 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2001).
Bloomfield, 97 N.Y.2d at 192.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 192-193
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Statute of Limitations, even though an independent action by the defendant might have been time-barred at the time the action was
commenced. 19
The court relied on the holding of Sunshine v. Sunshine2° for the
principle that duly executed prenuptial agreements are accorded the
same presumption of legality as any other contract. 2 1 The court also
noted that there is a "strong public policy favoring individuals ordering
'22
and deciding their own interests through contractual agreements.
Additionally, the court followed the holding in Roldolitz v. Neptune Paper Prods. Inc.,2 3 and concluded that it will assume that a deliberately
prepared and executed agreement reflects the intention of the parties. 24 Furthermore, the court held that while it is concerned with the
parties' intent, it generally will consider their intent to the extent it is
evidenced by their writing2 5 When evidence is lacking that both parties intended to violate the law, and both a lawful and unlawful construction of a written agreement are possible, preference will be given
6
to the construction that does not violate the law.2

The court applied the above mentioned settled principles and
held that the plain language of the prenuptial agreement indicates
that the defendant waived only her right to distribution of the property
either then owned or later acquired2 7 In addition, the court noted
that the agreement neither expressly or implicitly refers to a release of
the plaintiff's support obligations to the defendant, since a waiver of
rights to present and future interests in the plaintiff's property, with8
out more, does not constitute a waiver of the right to receive support2
Furthermore, the court held that the lower courts incorrectly con19. Id. at 193; see also McKinney's CPLR 203(d); 118 East 60th Owners, Inc. v.
Bonner Props., Inc., 677 F.2d 200, 200, 202-204 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Rebeil Consulting
Corp. v. Belle Levine, 617 N.Y.S.2d 830, 831 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1994); Maders v. Lawrence, 49 Hun 360; see generally, 1 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y. Civ Prac 203.25, at 2-

140 to 2-142.
20. 381 N.Y.S.2d 260 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1976).
21. Bloomfield, 97 N.Y.2d at 193 (citing Sunshine, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 261-62, affd, 40
N.Y.2d 875 (1976)).
22. Id. (quoting In re Estate of Greiff, 92 N.Y.2d 341, 344 (1998)).
23. 22 N.Y.2d 383 (1968).
24. Bloomfield, 97 N.Y.2d at 193.
25. Id. (citing Rodolitz, 22 N.Y.2d at 387).
26. Id. at 193 (citing Galuth Realty Corp. v. Greenfield, 478 N.Y.S.2d 51 (App. Div.

1984); Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Delmar Co., 283 U.S. 686, 691 (1931)).
27. Id. at 193.
28. Id.
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strued the provision to be a waiver of the right to receive support,
which consequently would have invalidated the agreement under the
1969 version of the General Obligations Law § 5-311.29 The court
stated that this construction "belies the intent of the parties, who never
contested plaintiff's duty to provide support until the courts below
voided the agreement by grafting into the property waiver an additional waiver of support."3 0 In making its determination, the court also
considered the fact that in 1969, under New York law, wives had no
legal interest in their husbands' property, and held that the agreement
simply waived any present interest she may have had to the plaintiffs
property when the agreement was executed and also any future prop31
erty rights she might acquire through subsequent changes in the law.
The court then stated that even if the appellate division correctly
concluded that the defendant's waiver encompassed her right to receive support, the validity of support waivers in marital agreements is
governed by the newly enacted version of the General Obligations Law
§ 5-311, rather than the old version of the law that was repealed by the
New York State Legislature. 32 The court asserted that it would have
applied the version of the General Obligations Law § 5-311 that was in
33
effect at the time the plaintiff attempted to enforce the agreement.
In making this determination the court relied on the general principle
that the validity of a contract depends upon the law that existed at the
time the contract was made and does not appertain to variations of the
law that are made due to changes in public policy.3

4

Additionally, the

court noted that noncompliance with the execution formalities contained in Domestic Relations Law § 236(B) (3) will not invalidate the
prenuptial agreement, since the agreement was made prior to the ef35
fective date of that subdivision.
In conclusion, the court stated that the supreme court did not
address the issue of unconscionability, and although the appellate division concluded that "it also appears that the agreement could be held
unconscionable" and was "manifestly unfair," these considerations
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
1982)).
35.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Goldfarb v. Goldfarb, 450 N.Y.S.2d, 214-215 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
Id.
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were not necessary to its ruling. 36 Therefore, the court held that the
defendant is permitted to contest the conscionability of the prenuptial
37
agreement before the trial court.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Bloomfield, the New York Court of Appeals held that a prenuptial agreement executed over 30 years ago, in which the defendant
agreed to,
Waive and renounce all rights that, and to which, [she]
would otherwise be entitled to because of such marriage,
whether present or future rights, to any and all property
which [plaintiff] has now, or which he may acquire in the
future, whether the same be real, personal, [or] mixed
property, or of any kind or nature and wherever
38
situated,
is not void and does not constitute a waiver of maintenance.3 9 Rather,
the court determined that it must be reviewed by the trial court as to
whether it is unconscionable. 40 In addition, the court held that the
validity of support waivers in marital agreements should be governed
by the newly enacted version of
the General Obligations Law § 5-311,
41
and not the repealed version.
Monique D'Errico

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 191-92.
Id. at 192.
Id.
Id. at 194.

A
L[GHTMAN V FLAUM

(decided November 27, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the NewYork Court of Appeals held that
the "clergy-penitent privilege" does not create a fiduciary duty of confidentiality upon members of the clergy which can subject them to civil
liability for the disclosure of confidential communications. 2 The court
stressed constitutional implications, the intent of the Legislature in enacting CPLR 4505, and the lack of clergy licensing in its opinion upholding the decision of the appellate division. 3
II.

BACKGROUND

Chani Lightman, an Orthodox Jewish woman, initiated a divorce
proceeding against her husband and sought an order granting her
temporary custody of the couples' four children. 4 In the proceeding,
her husband Hylton Lightman submitted affirmations from two rabbis
to show that his wife was endangering the OrthodoxJewish upbringing
of the children.5 Tzvi Flaum, a rabbi in the Lightmans' synagogue,
stated that the plaintiff told him she had stopped engaging in religious
purification laws and was seeing a man socially. 6 Rabbi David Weinberger, an acquaintance of the Lightmans, said the plaintiff told him
that she stopped her religious bathing to avoid sexual relations with
7
her husband.
The plaintiff later initiated a suit against the rabbis, claiming an
action for breach of fiduciary duty in violation of the CPLR 4505
"clergy-penitent privilege."8 She also claimed a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation. 9 The defen1.

Lightman v. Flaum, 97 N.Y.2d 128 (2001).

2. Id.
3. Id.
4.

Id. at 131.

5.
6.

Id.
Id.

7.

Id.

8.
9.

Id.
Id.
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dant rabbis motioned to dismiss the case. 10 The supreme court
converted the motion into one for summary judgment and requested
further evidence from the parties.1 1
Tzvi Flaum submitted two additional affirmations in which he
claimed that Hylton Lightman revealed marital problems to him several years earlier, and that afterwards, he had a confrontation with the
plaintiff and her mother during which the plaintiff admitted her deviations from Jewish religious practices.1 2 Flaum argued that because the
plaintiff never asked for spiritual guidance, the confessions were not
confidential under Jewish law. He further claimed that Jewish law required him to relay the information to the plaintiffs husband to prevent him from engaging in sexual relations with his wife.
Furthermore, Weinberger gave a doctrinal explanation for revealing
the plaintiffs admissions. In one of his affidavits, he indicated that
during their conversations a friend accompanied her, and because of
this he believed that the conversations were not confidential. The
plaintiff contradicted this testimony, characterizing her interactions
with the defendants as "spiritual counseling" and disagreeing with
their interpretation of religious law.13 The supreme court granted partial summary judgment, dismissing the claim of defamation but allowing the causes of action for intentional infliction of emotional
14
distress and breach of fiduciary duty.
The appellate division, in a decision with two dissentions, dis15
missed the emotional distress and the fiduciary duty causes of action.
In doing so, the appellate division held that CPLR 4505 did create a
fiduciary duty of confidentiality but that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she had not waived the privilege.1 6 The two dissentions
would have sustained the cause of action for a breach of fiduciary duty
and left the issue of whether the plaintiff had waived the clergy-peni17
tent privilege to the jury.
The plaintiff appealed the judgment of the appellate division on
the issue of the fiduciary duty of confidentiality. 18 The defendants,
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Lightman v. Flaum, 717 N.Y.S.2d 617 (2d Dep't 2000).
Id.
Lightman, 97 N.Y.2d at 132.
Id. at 132.
Id. at 132-33.
Id. at 133.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 132.
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supported by amici curiae submitted by the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs, maintained that requiring a fiduciary
duty of confidentiality against the standards of religious law would be
an unconstitutional interpretation of CPLR 4505.19
The lengthy concurrence of Judge Miller, partially dissenting
from the rest of the appellate court, indicated some of the unusual
procedural background of the case. After the supreme court converted the motion for dismissal and asked for affidavits, the parties set
a schedule for submission of the evidence. 20 The parties stipulated
that the submissions would be simultaneous with no right of reply. After the defendants submitted their affidavits, they objected to the
2
plaintiffs submission a week later as untimely. '
The parties then set a new schedule extending the deadline for
submissions and both sides made additional affirmations. 22 The initial
supreme court decision, however, considered only the first affidavit
submitted by the defendants, and was recalled by a stipulation of the
parties. The supreme court then issued a ruling which Judge Miller
argued intended to sustain the plaintiffs cause of action for breach of
a fiduciary duty, pending the defendants' proof of their defenses.
Judge Miller's concurrence pointed out that some of the defendants'
critical arguments came in their final submissions, and the plaintiff was
thus precluded from responding to them. It then noted the impropriety in shifting the burden of proof of a particular material fact to the
23
plaintiff when the plaintiff had no opportunity to respond.
Judge Miller disputed the majority's suggestion that there were no
factual issues necessary to decide the case. He argued that the lack of a
right of reply, the disagreement between affidavits on when and how
often the plaintiff may have waived or preserved her privilege, and the
necessary factual issues involved in determining whether a waiver had
24
been made militated against a finding for summary judgment.
The partial dissension also argued against finding that constitutional issues prevented the court from interfering in the case. It noted
that New York courts had previously stepped into disputes involving
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Lightman, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 619.
Id.

22.

Id at 620-21.

23.
24.

Id.
Id. at 620-22.
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religious matters. 25 It also argued that the free exercise of religion is
made up of the freedom to believe and the freedom to act, and that
the freedom to act had previously been regulated permissibly by the
26

courts.

III.

DIscussIoN

The New York Court of Appeals first gave an explanation of the
origins and development of the law regarding confidential information and privilege against disclosure in court. The common law pro27
tects certain confidential information from disclosure during a trial.
Statutes delineate specific categories of confidential information that
are protected under the rules of evidence. 28 CPLR article 45 is a codification of the common law restricting the admissibility of information
gained in specific contexts, such as between attorney and client (CPLR
4503) or psychologist and patient (CPLR 4507).29 Quoting previous
case law, the court stated that the intent of these statutes is to protect
special relationships, which are created "in an atmosphere of transcen'30
dent trust and confidence.
The court noted that the clergy-penitent privilege was not available under common law and arose only with statutes. 31 Under the original legislation, the privilege applied when the rules of the specific
religion of the clergy member prohibited him or her from disclosing
the substance of confidential communications, but not when the religious law allowed clergy to divulge confidences. 3 2 This applied specifically in the case of Roman Catholic Penance, a ritual in which acts not
in accordance with the religion are confessed to a member of the
clergy who is bound by religious doctrine to refrain from divulging
33
these confidences.
25. See id. at 626 (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); First
Presbyt. Church v. United Presbyt. Church, 62 N.Y.2d 110 (1984), cert. denied).
26. See Lightman, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 626 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 303-04 (1940)).
27. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 78, at 323-24 (5th ed. 1999).
28. See e.g., N.Y. CODE PROF. RESP. DR 4-101(A), (B).
29. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503, § 4507 (Consol. 2001).
30. See Lightman, 97 N.Y.2d at 133 (citing Aufrichtig v Lowell, 85 N.Y.2d 540

(1988)).
31. See id.(citing Matter of Keenan v Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d 160, 166 (1979),
denied, 444 U.S. 887).
32. See Former CIVIL PRACFICE Acr § 351.
33. Lightman, 97 N.Y.2d at 133.

cert.
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The New York Legislature eventually enacted CPLR 4505, providing that unless "the person confessing or confiding waives the privilege, a clergyman, or other minister of any religion or duly accredited
Christian Science practitioner, shall not be allowed [to] disclose a confession or confidence made to him in his professional character as spiritual advisor."3 4 This expanded the understanding of the privilege
beyond Roman Catholicism to other religions. The court noted, however, that the statute's protection applies only to information given "in
confidence and for the purpose of obtaining spiritual guidance," and
8 5
not to all information given to a member of the clergy.
The court distinguished confidential information received under
the rules governing secular professionals from privileged information
under the CPLR. The narrowly drawn provisions under the CPLR, the
court stated, reflect that those rules are not the sources of fiduciary
duty but "merely reflections of the public policy of this State to proscribe the introduction into evidence of certain confidential information" in the absence of a waiver.3 6 The court pointed out that
professional responsibility codes frequently impose greater restrictions
on disclosure than statutes. The Code of Professional Responsibility,
for example, protects not only confidential communications covered
under the attorney-client privilege, but also secrets defined as "other
information gained in the professional relationship that the client has
requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embar37
rassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
The court also asserted that professionals and clergy specified in
CPLR article 45 are substantially different in terms of the extent of
state regulation of their practices. Specifically, professionals such as
physicians, psychologists, and social workers derive their authority to
practice from the state and are subject to educational and licensing
requirements, while clergy may engage in religious activities without
State permission and are not necessarily subject to educational requirements.3 8 This difference explains why, absent CPLR 4505, the plaintiff
has no independent statutory basis for stating a claim.
34. See N.Y. C.P.L.R § 4505 (Consol. 2001).
35. Lightman, 97 N.Y.2d at 134 (citing People v Carmona, 82 N.Y.2d 603, 609
(1993)).
36.
Id. at 135.
37. Cf. N.Y. C.P.L.P, § 4505 (Consol. 2001), CODE OF PROF. RESP. DR 4-

101 [A],[B].
38.

Id. at 136.
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The court heeded the contentions of the defendants and the
amici that the imposition of liability, regardless of religious principles
that motivate disclosure, would violate the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.3 9 The opinion stated the "prospect of conducting a trial to
determine whether a cleric's disclosure is in accord with religious tenets has troubling constitutional implications." 40 The court noted that
in different contexts, civil courts had previously been forbidden from
determining religious disputes because of the danger of violating the
First Amendment by establishing one religion as correct and interfering with the practice of other factions. 4 1 Placing the fact-finders in the
position to decide whether religious law has been violated or to allow
parties to introduce evidence or offer experts to dispute an interpretation or application of religious requirements would be
impermissible.

42

The court closed its opinion by reiterating that CPLR 4505 is intended by the legislature to be a rule of evidence, not a statute giving a
private right of action. 43 Thus, the court determined that resolving
the factual issues of the case was unnecessary since there was no basis
for a claim.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The New York Court of Appeals held that CPLR 4505, commonly
referred to as the "clergy-penitent privilege," does not give rise to a
private cause of action for breach of a fiduciary duty against clergy who
disclose confidences. The court found that the lack of a comprehensive statutory scheme indicated that the legislature intended CPLR
4505 only as a rule governing the admissibility of evidence, and that
constitutional concerns prevent it from legally requiring clergy to
maintain confidences.
Samuel C. Gardner

39. Id. at 136.
40. Id.
41. Lightman, 97 N.Y.2d at 137 (citing First Presbyt. Church of Schenectady v
United Presbyt. Church in the United States of Am., 62 N.Y.2d 110, 116 (1984)).
42. Lightman, 97 N.Y.2d at 133.
43. Id. at 137-38.

DELUCA V DELUCA'
(decided November 27, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the NewYork Court of Appeals held that
a non-pension supplemental benefit received by a New York City police
officer is "marital property" subject to equitable distribution in a divorce settlement, notwithstanding that the officer did not become eligible to receive the benefit until after the divorce action commenced
and the benefit did not accrue incrementally during the officer's years
2
of service and the marriage.
II.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff husband and defendant wife were married in 1966 and in
1967 plaintiffjoined the New York City Police Department(NYPD).3 In
1984 plaintiff was promoted to detective. 4 During the marriage the defendant was a housewife and cared for the two children born to her
and the plaintiff.5 In July 1996, the plaintiff commenced a divorce action and in February 1998 he retired from the NYPD. 6 Upon his retirement the plaintiff was entitled to three types of benefits: (1) a pension
from the New York City Police Officer's Pension Fund which had accrued during the plaintiffs nearly 30 years of service and amounted to
$46,737 per year; (2) an annuity fund which was maintained by the
Detective's Endowment Association and was valued at approximately
$33,000; and (3) a Police Superior Officer's Variable Supplement
Fund (PSVO) valued at approximately $110,000 and awarded to those
achieving the rank of detective at the time of retirement. 7
The PSVO was created by the New York State Legislature and consisted of monies paid from the contingent reserve fund of the NYPD
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
(2002)).

DeLuca v. DeLuca, 97 N.Y.2d 139 (2001).
See id. at 141.
DeLuca v. DeLuca, 718 N.Y.S. 2d 364, 365 (2d Dep't 2000).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. (citing N.Y. CoMP. CODES R- & REGs. tt. 13, § 232(a) (16), 278 (4)
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pension fund.8 The purpose of the PSVO was to be a supplement, for
those police officers who qualified, to the officers pension fund
benefits. 9
The Supreme Court of Queens County determined that all three
benefits were marital property and therefore the defendant was entifled to an equitable distribution of 50% of these benefits. 10 The plaintiff appealed the portion of the supreme court's decision regarding the
PSVO benefit."
The appellate division reversed the supreme court on the PSVO
benefit, holding that it was not marital property and thus not subject to
equitable distribution. 12 The appellate court based its decision on the
fact that the legislation that created the PSVO explicitly declared that
it "shall not be, and shall not be construed to constitute, a pension or
retirement system or fund," and therefore did not qualify as a marital
asset. 13 In support of this reasoning, the appellate division cited the
court of appeals in Matter ofMaye (Bluestein)14 where the court held that
firefighters' variable supplements funds may not be construed as a
15
pension.
Defendant wife appealed the judgment of the appellate division
regarding the PSVO benefit to the court of appeals. 16 The court of
appeals reversed stating that for purposes of marital actions, such as
divorce proceedings, where a determination must be made of what
constitutes marital assets, the Domestic Relations Law provisions, not
the Administrative Code, should apply, and under Domestic Relations
Law the PSVO qualified as a marital asset subject to equitable
17
distribution.

III.

DISCUSSION

In ruling that the PSVO was not a marital asset the appellate division looked at whether the benefits from the PSVO could be character8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See id. at 365 (citing N.Y. Comp. Coi)ES R. & REGS. tit. 13, §279 (2002)).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 367 (citing N.Y. COMP. COES R. & REDs. tit. 13, § 279 (2002).).
40 N.Y.2d 113, 115-116 (1976).
DeLuca, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
See DeLuca, 97 N.Y. 2d 139.
See id. at 143-44.
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ized as pension benefits. 18 This was an important question because, as
the appellate division stated, "in the context of marital property, pensions have been described as contract rights of value, received in lieu
of higher compensation which would otherwise have enhanced either
marital assets or the marital standard of living."1 9 The appellate division added that pension fund benefits have been ruled by the New
York Court of Appeals to be marital property because a pension fund is
a type of deferred compensation which, to the extent it accrues during
the marriage, is considered a marital asset and subject to equitable distribution. 20 The PSVO by contrast was not the type of benefit which
accrued over time or was received in lieu of higher compensation
which would have enhanced the marital assets or standard of living,
but was one which became available only upon the occurrence of certain conditions; that is, the officer must have been in service as a member of the pension fund and retire after 20 or more years of service. 2 1
If both conditions were not met, the officer would receive nothing,
regardless of the number of years of service the officer had accumulated. 22 The appellate division pointed to the explicit language of the
legislation which created the PSVO, which stated that it was not to be
considered another pension benefit, and thus not possess the accrual
characteristics of such.2 3 Instead it was to be a supplement to pension
benefits provided the officer met the stated conditions. 24 Since the
plaintiff here was not eligible to receive the benefit until after he retired, the benefit did not accrue during his years of service and marriage, and he did not retire until after commencement of the divorce
action, the appellate division reasoned, the benefit was not a marital
25
asset.
Central to the court of appeals reversal of the appellate division
was its decision that the Domestic Relations Law rather then the Administrative Code should be applied in determining whether the PSVO
was a marital asset. 26 According to the Domestic Relations Law of New
York, marital property is defined as "all property acquired by either or
18.

See DeLuca, 718 N.Y.S.2d at 366.

19.

See id.

20.

See id. (citing Olivio v. Olivio, 82 N.Y.2d 202, 207 (1993)).

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See id. at 366.
See id.
See id at 367.
See id.
See id.

26.

See DeLuca, 97 N.Y. 2d at 143.
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both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of the form in which title is held."27 The court of appeals had
earlier ruled that the wording "all property acquired during a marriage" as mentioned in the Domestic Relations Law showed the intent
of the law to provide each spouse with a fair share of that valuables that
28
each helped to create and expected to enjoy at a future date.
The problem that the court of appeals had to confront with the
PSVO benefit was that, unlike a pension, it does not accrue over time.
Thus, it would appear that the timing of the officer's retirement in
relation to the commencement of a divorce action would be the determinative factor in whether such benefit was a marital asset subject to
equitable distribution.
The court resolved this problem by stating that in light of the
broad interpretation given to marital property, concepts such as "vesting" and "maturity" are not determinative. 29 Further, the court had
earlier ruled that compensation received after dissolution of the mar30
riage for services rendered during the marriage is marital property.
But the court had also ruled that certain other types of compensation
that are not in the category of being deferred during the marriage and
paid after it was ended are not marital property.3 1 Compensation that
is defined as a type being created after a divorce rather than being
deferred during the marriage is not marital property and thus not sub32
ject to equitable distribution.
The court referred to its decision in Olivio v. Olivio where a Social
Security bridge payment, given to an employee as an early retirement
incentive and designed to provide support to the employee until he
33
reached the age of social security eligibility, was not a marital asset.
The court held this was the proper treatment of the benefit because
neither the employee nor his ex-wife had any right to the payment
during the time they were married as it was not based on past services
rendered by the husband. 34 Had the employee retired one day before
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See id. at 143-44 (citing N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236(B) (Consol. 2001)).
See id. (citing Dejesus v. DeJesus, 90 N.Y.2d 643 (1997)).
See id. at 144.
Olivio, 82 N.Y.2d at 208.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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the bridge payment benefit had become effective, the court added, he
would not have been entitled to that payment.3 5
Therefore, the question to be resolved by the court in DeLuca was
whether the PSVO benefit was one that was intended to be compensation for past services rendered during the marriage or was instead another form of compensation, such as an incentive to continue
36
employment, which is separate property post-divorce.
In holding that the PSVO benefit was for past services rendered
the court looked at the fact that to be eligible for the benefit an officer
had to have been a member of the pension system.3 7 Moreover, the
court stated, the money in the PSVO originated with the general pension fund and is subordinate to the pension fund in that it may not
impair the rights of any pension fund members.3 8 Therefore, the court
concluded, the purpose of the PSVO benefit was to provide a supplement to the benefits of certain long-term uniformed employees. 3 9 The
court pointed to its decision in Gagliardo v. Dinkins4° where it ruled
that variable supplements funds, such as the PSVO in DeLuca, are "additional future compensation for services actually rendered by police
officers". 4 1 The result of the court's holding was that the defendant
was entitled to an equitable portion of the PSVO benefit to the extent
42
of the plaintiff's past service that occurred during the marriage.
The court's decision here has established a clearer procedure for
determining whether benefits are marital assets or whether they are
separate property in the context of a divorce. Concepts such as "vesting" and "maturity" will no longer be considered obstacles to determining whether benefits similar to the PSVO benefit are marital
property.43 Instead the focus will be on whether the benefit can be said
to be for past services rendered, thus making it more likely that at least
a portion of such benefit will be considered marital property subject to
equitable distribution, regardless of the form the benefit may take and
the time it is received.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id.
See DeLuca, 97 N.Y. 2d at 145.
See id. (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 13, § 281[a] [2] (2002)).
See id. (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R.& RErs. tit. 13, § 232 (2002)).
See id at 146.
89 N.Y.2d 62 (1996).
See id. at 74.
See DeLuca, 97 N.Y.2d at 146.

43.

See id.
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CONCLUSION

In DeLuca, the New York Court of Appeals held that the PSVO
benefit was compensation for past services rendered, and to the extent
that such services were rendered during the marriage, the defendant
44
was entitled to an equitable share of the PSVO benefit.
Paul A. Kemnitzer

44.

See id.

BENJAMIN ALSTON ET. AL. V. STATE OF NEW YORK'
(decided December 13, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the NewYork Court of Appeals held that
the state preserved its sovereign immunity under the New York Court
of Claims Act § 8 for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938 ("FLSA").2 The court of appeals found that the claimants
failed to comply with the statute of limitations established by the New
York Court of Claims Act § 10(4), which allots a six month time frame
3
for claimants to file their claims against the State.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1991, the named claimant Benjamin Alston, a parole officer,
along with 102 similarly situated parole officers, filed an action against
the State in federal court for alleged violations of the FLSA.4 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of New York dismissed the claim in 1997 based upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.5 The Supreme Court, in Seminole,
held that Congress did not have the authority under Article I of the
U.S. Constitution to invalidate the State's Eleventh Amendment sover6
eign immunity from lawsuits brought or prosecuted in federal court.

After Alston's appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, both parties agreed to voluntarily dismiss the case after
the court of appeals ruled against the claimants in a similar case. 7 In
1998, claimants filed the same cause of action in the court of claims as
raised in federal court.8 In response, the State filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was
granted by the court of claims because the claimants failed to file
within the six month statute of limitations required by the Court of
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

97 N.Y.2d 159 (2001).
Id. at 162.
Id.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 161.
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996).
Alston, 97 N.Y.2d at 161.
Id.
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Claims Act § 10(4) and were not timely in seeking relief under Court
of Claims Act § 10(6). 9
Claimants appealed to the appellate division which then affirmed
the court of claims based on the Supreme Court's holding in Alden v.
Maine.10 In that case, the Supreme Court found that a state's sovereign immunity can not be overridden by Article I powers delegated to
the Congress by the United States Constitution.1 1 The appellate division decided that even though New York waived its sovereign immunity, subject to the six-month statute of limitations established by the
court of claims act, the limitation cannot be overridden by the two or
three year statute of limitation established for legislation enacted
under Article I powers.' 2 The court of appeals granted leave to appeal
and affirmed the decision by the appellate division on December 13,
2001.13

III.

DISCUSSION

The court of appeals began its analysis with a discussion of the
state's retention of sovereign immunity. 14 According to the Eleventh
Amendment, the states are immune from prosecution in their own
courts and can only be sued upon consent for liabilities that a state
chooses to assume. 15
In addressing the application of sovereign immunity, the court of
appeals relied heavily on its decision in Yonkers Constr. Co. v. Port Auth.
Trans-Hudson Corp.16 and the Supreme Court's decision in Alden v.
Maine.17 In Yonkers Constr. Co., the court of appeals "explicitly recognized that a waiver of sovereign immunity can be conditioned upon
compliance with a particular time requirement."1 8 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court in Alden stated, "[iun light of history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the Constitution, we hold that the States
retain immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Id.; Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730 (1999).
Alden, 527 U.S. at 730.
Alston, 97 N.Y.2d at 161.
Id.
Id at 162.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.

16.

93 N.Y.2d 375 (1999).

17.
18.

Alden, 527 U.S. at 706.
Yonkers Constr. Co., 93 N.Y.2d at 379.
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beyond the congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation." 19
In Alden, the Supreme Court dismissed plaintiffs state court FLSA action because Maine had not waived its sovereign immunity in regard to
20
ELSA actions.
The court of appeals continued its analysis by addressing claimant's alleged distinction of their case from Alden v. Maine. Claimants
argued that unlike Maine, New York waived its sovereign immunity to
include FLSA actions against the state.2 ' Claimants further asserted
that, because of the alleged distinction, their case should have been
governed by the Supreme Court decision Felder v. Case2 2 as applied by
23
the Third Department in Ahern v. State of New York.
In Felder, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin and held that the state's notice of claim statute was
not applicable to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
City of Milwaukee because:
In enacting § 1983, Congress entitled those deprived of
their civil rights to recover full compensation from the
governmental officials responsible for those deprivations.
A state law that conditions that right of recovery upon
compliance with a rule designed to minimize governmental liability, and that directs injured persons to seek redress in the first instance from the very targets of the
federal legislation, is inconsistent in both purpose and effect with the remedial objectives of the federal civil rights
law. Principles of federalism, as well as the Supremacy
Clause, dictate that such a state law must give way to vindication of the federal right when that right is asserted in
24
state court

The court of appeals disagreed with the claimant's reliance on Felder and Ahern and distinguished the claimant's case from Felder in two
respects. 25 First, the Supreme Court in Felder did not discuss the issue
of New York State's sovereign immunity; and second, that municipal
19.

Alden, 527 U.S. at 754.

20. Id.
21.

Alston, 97 N.Y.2d at 161.

22.
23.
24.
25.

487 U.S. 131 (1988).
Aiston, 97 N.Y.2d at 161-62.
Felder, 487 U.S. at 153.
Alston, 97 N.Y.2d at 162.
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corporations which included the city defendant, are not entitled to the
26
benefits of sovereign immunity.
The court of appeals also disagreed with claimant's reliance on
Ahern.2 7 Noting its decision in Alden v. Maine, the court of appeals
overruled the appellate division's interpretation of Felder in Ahern,
which indicated that FLSA claims brought against the state are governed by the Federal Statute of Limitations applicable to such claims
and that the State was not entitled to sovereign immunity based on the
claimant's failure to satisfy the six-month limitations period specified
in the Court of Claims Act § 10(4).28
The court of appeals continued its analysis with a discussion of
another more substantial distinction between the claimant's case and
Felder.29 The claims in Felder were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which was enacted under § 5 of the 1 4 " Amendment.3 0 The claimant's
case in Alston was brought under the FLSA, which was enacted under
Congress' Article I authority. 31 The Supreme Court in Alden v. Maine
stated that even when the Congress has complete lawmaking authority
over a particular area, like legislation enacted under the authority of
Article I of the United States Constitution, the Eleventh Amendment
prevents the authorization of suits by private parties against non-consenting states. 32 In contrast, the Supreme Court also held in Alden v.
Maine "that in adopting the Fourteenth Amendment, the people required the states to surrender a portion of the sovereignty that had
been preserved to them by the Constitution, so that Congress may authorize private suits against non-consenting states pursuant to its § 5
' 33
enforcement power.
The court of appeal's analysis indicates that legislation enacted
with respect to Article 5 of the 1 4 h Amendment, like 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
is not abrogated by the state's sovereign immunity if Congress has authorized private suits against the state under that statute. 34 Whereas
with regard to the FLSA, state employees cannot sue a state employer
for unpaid overtime, since Congress did not have power to abrogate
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted legislation
under the Interstate Commerce Clause, and FLSA's overtime provisions cannot be regarded as serving the Fourteenth Amendment pur26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.; Ahern v. State of New York, 676 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1998).
Alston, 97 N.Y.2d at 162.
Id.
Felder, 487 U.S. at 138.
Alston, 97 N.Y.2d at 162.
See Alston, 97 N.Y.2d at 162 (citing Alden, 527 U.S. at 756).
See id. (citing Alden, 527 U.S. at 756).
See id. (citing Alden, 527 U.S. at 756).
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pose.3 5 In light of its analysis, the court of appeals concluded that
because the ELSA was enacted under
Article I the state's sovereign im36
munity can not be invalidated.
The court of appeals continued its analysis of the state's waiver of
its sovereign immunity according to New York Court of Claims Act
§ 8.37 The Court of Claims Act states:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the
same determined in accordance with the same rules of
law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations, provided the claimant complies
with the limitations of this article.3 8
The court of appeals then explained that the Court of Claims Act
clearly establishes that the state's waiver of its sovereign immunity was
not absolute. 39 It also discussed that the waiver was conditional on
compliance with the applicable statute of limitations explicitly set forth
in Court of Claims Act § 10(4)4, which stated "[a] claim for breach of
contract, express or implied, and any other claim not otherwise provided for by this section, over which jurisdiction has been conferred
upon the court of claims, shall be filed and served upon the attorney
general within six months after the accrual of such claim ....
" 40 The
Court of Appeals reasoned that a conditional waiver of sovereign immunity is consistent with the legislative history.4 1 It also concluded
that even though New York has a conditional waiver of sovereign immunity, it is not enough to distinguish itself from Alden v. Maine as
nothing in that case indicated that a waiver of sovereign immunity
must be "absolute, unconditional and applicable in all situations." 42
Therefore, due to the fact that claimants failed to file their claim
within the six month statute of limitations established by the Court of
Claims Act, the state was entitled to have the claim dismissed based on
its sovereign immunity.43
35.
36.

Moad v. Arkansas State Police, 111 F.3d 585, 587 (1997).
Alston, 97 N.Y.2d at 162.

37.

Id.

38.

N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 8.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Alston, 97 N.Y.2d at 163.
N.Y. CT. CL. Acr §1014].
See N.Y. CT. CL.Acr, Statement in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1939, ch 860, at 27.
Alston, 97 N.Y.2d at 164.
Id.
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CONCLUSION

The New York Court of Appeals decided unanimously to uphold
the appellate division's decision in Alston v. State.44 The court of appeals decided that when the State of New York waives its sovereign immunity subject to the statute of limitations set forth by the New York
Court of Claims Act § 10(4), it cannot be nullified by Congress' Article
I powers. 4 5 Furthermore, the court of appeal's decision in Alston overruled its decision in Ahern v. State of New York in light of the Supreme
46
Court's more recent decision in Alden v. Maine.
AndreaJ. Sessa

44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 162.
Id.

PEOPLE V. ROBINSON71
(decided December 18, 2001)
I.

SYNOPSIS

In a unanimous decision, the NewYork Court of Appeals held that
a police officer, who has probable cause to believe a driver has committed a traffic violation, does not violate Article I, § 12 of the New York
State Constitution by stopping the vehicle, even though the officer's
primary motivation was to conduct another investigation. 2 The court
of appeals adopted the rule of law announced by the United States
Supreme Court in Whren v. United States.3
II. BACKGROUND
Three cases based on Article I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution were merged by the court of appeals for this decision. In each
of the three cases a police officer observed the defendant engaging in
suspicious conduct in the automobile, but stopped the car only after a
traffic violation was committed. The officers then arrested the defendants for the more serious offense, which was unrelated to the traffic
violation.
In the first case, People v. Robinson, two police officers were on
night patrol in the Bronx.4 Their main assignment was to ensure that
no robberies of taxicabs occurred that night.5 They observed a taxicab
run through a red light and pulled it over. 6 When they approached
the car they saw the defendant in the backseat wearing a bulletproof
vest. 7 They ordered the defendant out of the taxicab, and noticed a
gun on the floor of the car where the defendant had been sitting.8
They arrested the defendant and charged him with criminal possession
of a weapon and unlawfully wearing a bulletproof vest.9 The
1. 2001 N.Y. LEXIS 3790 (N.Y. Ct. of App. Dec. 18, 2001)
2. Id. at *2.
3.

517 U.S. 806 (1996).

4. Id. at *2.
5.

Robinson, 2001 N.Y. LEXIS 3790, at *2.

6.
7.
8.
9.

Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
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"[d] efendant moved to suppress the vest and the gun, arguing that the
officers used the traffic infraction as a pretext to search the occupant
of the taxicab."'10 The court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence and he was convicted of both charges.1 1 He was
sentenced to 8 years to life on the weapons charge and 1 1/2 to 3 years
12
for unlawfully wearing a bulletproof vest.
The appellate division affirmed the district court decision and applied the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Whren. 13
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the appellate division.
In the second case, People v. Reynolds, a police officer observed a
male prostitute get into the defendant's truck. 14 The officer ran a
check on the license plate and learned that the registration had been
expired for two months.' 5 He then stopped the vehicle, but did not
charge either occupant with prostitution. 16 However, he noticed that
the "driver's eyes were bloodshot, his speech was slurred and there was
a strong odor of alcohol in the car."' 7 He arrested the defendant for
driving while intoxicated. "At the police station, tests indicated that
the defendant's blood alcohol level was .20 percent, double the legal
limit of .10 percent (see, Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1192-(2))." 18 The
defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated and operating an
unregistered vehicle.19 However, the Rochester City Court granted the
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence and dismissed all of the
charges. The county court affirmed, "holding that the traffic violation
was merely a pretext and the officer's primary motivation was to investigate prostitution. ' 20 The court of appeals reversed this decision.
In the third case, People v. Glenn, two plainclothes police officers
observed a taxicab make a right turn without signaling. 2 1 One officer
also noticed a passenger in the backseat lean forward. The officers
pulled the car over in order to determine if the taxicab driver was be10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4-5.
Id. at *5.
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ing robbed.2 2 An officer found cocaine on the backseat and additional
drugs on the defendant. The "[d]efendant was charged with criminal
possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and criminally
using drug paraphernalia in the second degree. '23 The defendant
made a motion to suppress the evidence. The motion was denied and
he was convicted and sentenced to 4 1/2 to 9 years in prison.2 4 The
appellate division relied on the reasoning in Whren and unanimously
affirmed his conviction, and the court of appeals affirmed the appel25
late division's decision.
III.

DISCUSSION

As mentioned above, the New York Court of Appeals adopted the
rule of law announced in Whren by the United States Supreme Court.
In Wren, the Supreme Court held that "where a police office has probable cause to detain a person temporarily for a traffic violation, that
seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, even though the underlying reason for the stop might
26
have been to investigate some other matter."
The court began its discussion by comparing the language of the
Fourth Amendment with the language in Article I, § 12 of the New
York State Constitution. Noting that the language of the two provisions is identical, the court determined that they "generally confer similar rights," 27 however, the court has never "hesitated to expand the
rights of the New York citizens beyond those required by the Federal
28
Constitution where a longstanding New York interest was involved."
In determining whether there was a longstanding New York interest involved, so as to expand the rights of the defendants, the court
looked to previous decisions. The court concluded that the defendants' rights should not be expanded and dismissed the dissent's suggestion that the primary motivation test should be applied. 2 9 The
primary motivation test focuses on the officer's subjective intent.3 0
However, the majority states that the court has always upheld police
22.
23.

Id.
Id

24.

Id.

25.

Id. at *5-6.

26.
27.

Id. at *6.
Id. at *9.

28. Id. at *10.
29. Id. at *9.
30. Id. at *11.
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conduct where the reason for the traffic stop is valid, without considering the officers' subjective intent. Thus, the court concludes that the
"primary motivation test is not, and should not be, part of [the New
York] State constitutional jurisprudence. '31 The validity of the traffic
stop will be upheld, as long as it is based on an objective standard. The
32
objective standard present in this case is the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
The court explained that in previous decisions, the defendant's
rights have not been extended beyond the Federal Constitution in any
cases where a police officer had "probable cause to conclude that a law
or regulation [had] been violated." 33 If the court were to regulate the
ability of a police officer to stop a vehicle when he or she has probable
34
cause, the regulation "may lead to the harm of innocent citizens."
They cite People v. Reynolds as an example, where by stopping the vehicle, the officers arrested someone who was driving under the influence
of alcohol.
In response to the argument that the "officers will use their authority to stop persons on a selective and arbitrary basis," 35 the court
refers to the Whren decision. In the Whren case, the Supreme Court
noted that the answer to this type of claim or action falls within the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 3 6 The court also cites to
the Brown v. State of New York3 7 case where "this court recognized that
in New York State, a plaintiff has a cause of action for a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause and the Search and Seizure Clause of the
State Constitution."3 8 Thus, the citizens rights are protected because
the court's decision addresses the initial police action; "[t]he scope,
duration and intensity of the seizure, as well as any search made by the
police subsequent to that stop, remain subject to the strictures of Arti'3 9
cle I, § 12 and judicial review."
Next, the court responds to several of the arguments made by the
dissenters. First, they acknowledge that the dissenters correctly maintain that the exercise of police power under both the Fourth Amendment and the New York State Constitution must be reasonable, and
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at *13.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *14.
Id.
89 N.Y.2d 172 (1996).
See Robinson, 2001 N.Y. LEXIS 3790, at *15.
Id. at *16-17.
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not arbitrary. 40 However, the majority determines that the dissenters

incorrectly bifurcate the concepts of arbitrariness and probable cause.
Citing Florida v. Wells41 as an example, the majority states that "[o]nly
in the absence of established probable cause has the United States Supreme Court and this Court examined the arbitrariness of police conduct so as to require that police activities be governed by objective
standards that restrict officers in looking for incriminating evidence." 42
Therefore, if an officer has probable cause, the issue of whether or not
the stop was arbitrary is not relevant.
The court contrasts this type of search with an inventory search,
"where arbitrariness is necessarily part of the reasonableness equation."43 In these cases, even though "the seizure of the vehicle is justi-

fied, the subsequent inventory search, lacking probable cause, cannot
be arbitrary and must be performed according to uniform procedures."44 Therefore, in inventory search cases, the courts will analyze
probable cause and arbitrariness separately. 45
46
To support this proposition, the court cites Delaware v. Prouse.
In this case, the United States Supreme Court "invalidated random police stops conducted for vehicle license and registration checks because there was no probable cause justification."4 7 However, the
"Prouse Court expressly distinguished a random stop from one based
on circumstances where, as here, probable cause exists 'to believe that
a driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and
equipment regulations. "' 48
The dissent believes, that "in the context of traffic code violations
...

the existence of probable cause that the infraction was committed

is manifestly insufficient to control arbitrary police conduct . .. because motor vehicle travel is so much a part of our lives and minutely
regulated, total compliance with the law is impossible." 49 However, the
majority rejects this assertion, stating that just because many New
Yorkers disobey the Vehicle and Traffic Law, does not mean that the
40.

Id. at *17-18.

41.

495 U.S. 1 (1990).

42.
43.

See Robinson, 2001 N.Y. LEXIS 3790, at *18.
Id at *19.

44.
45.

Id.
Id.

46.
47.

440 U.S. 649 (1979).
See Robinson, 2001 N.Y. LEXIS 3790, at *20.

48.
49.

Id. at *20-21.
Id. at *22.
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officers should not be allowed to enforce it. The Vehicle and Traffic
Law provides an objective basis for the stop, therefore, making it impossible that the stop could be considered arbitrary. According to the
majority, if a citizen breaks any one of the many Vehicle and Traffic
laws or regulations, the violation is enough of an objective reason for
the officer to stop the automobile.
Next, the dissenters argue that many officers use racial profiling as
a means of determining which vehicles to stop and search. Therefore,
they suggest that search and seizure cases should be based on a "reasonable police officer" standard. 50 The "reasonable police officer"
standard asks "would a reasonable police officer with traffic responsibilities [make] the stop? '5 1 However, the majority of the court concludes that it is impossible to separate the reason for the stop from the
legality of the stop itself.5 2 They conclude that if the dissents test is
imposed, "[a] police officer could arbitrarily stop someone for speeding and the stop would be valid, but a gun seen in plain view in the car
55
during the stop would be suppressed and unlawfully seized."
Additionally, the court points out that not one State has adopted
the "reasonable police officer test."5 4 In fact, they cite to two cases that
expressly rejected the test. The first is, United States v. Sccpo,55 where
the Second Circuit held that "the fact that an officer may be engaged
in an arrest which would not usually be effected in the course of the
56
officer's normal duties does not negate the validity of the arrest."
The second case is, United States v. Botero-Ospina,5 7 where the Tenth
Circuit, which had been applying the "reasonable police officer" standard, reversed itself and adopted the same rule of law announced in
Whren, before Whren was decided. The Tenth Circuit found the "reasonable police officer" standard unworkable stating that it created "in58
consistent and sporadic" results.
The court concludes the opinion by stating that it will not invoke a
test (the "reasonable police officer" standard) that will allow selective
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at *24.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *25.
Id.

55.
56.
57.
58.

19 F.3d 777, 782 (1994).
See Robinson, 2001 N.Y. LEXIS 3790, at *26.
71 F.3d 783, 786-87 (1995).
See Robinson, 2001 N.Y. LEXIS 3790, at *26.
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enforcement of traffic laws. 59 Several factors lead the court to this conclusion. First, a unanimous majority of the United States Supreme
Court rejected this test in Whren.60 Second, the court agrees that there
is truth in the dissenters argument that police officers use their discredon daily and that New York citizens violate the Vehicle and Traffic
Law often. However, these two factors together do not make the traffic
stops arbitrary in nature. 6' Therefore, by adopting the rule of law in
Whren, the court "confirm[s] a standard that constrains police conduct
probable cause under the Vehicle and Traffic Law and its related
62
regulations that govern the safe use of our highways."
IV.

CONCLUSION

In People v. Robinson, the New York Court of Appeals held that the
reasoning in Whren adopted by the United States Supreme Court,
should be adopted as a matter of New York State Law as well. The
rationale behind the holding in Whren is that "when a police officer
has probable cause to detain a person temporarily for a traffic violation, that seizure does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution even though the underlying reason for the
stop might have been to investigate some other matter."63 The New
York Court of Appeals extended this reasoning to hold that "where a
police officer has probable cause to believe that the driver of an automobile has committed a traffic violation, a stop does not violate Article
I, § 12 of the New York State Constitution." 64 Additionally, "[i] n making that determination of probable cause, neither the primary motivation of the officer nor a determination of what a reasonable traffic
65
officer would have done under the circumstances is relevant."
Therefore, it affirmed the decisions in People v. Robinson and People v.
Glenn and, it reversed the decision in People v. Reynolds.
Cynthia Mitchell

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at *27.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *28.

63.

Id. at *6.

64.
65.

Id. at *9.
Id.

